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AWAKE! U.S.A. 
WILLIAM FREEMAN 



AWAKE! U.S.A. 

ARE WE IN DANGER? 
ARE WE PREPARED? 



By 

WILLIAM FREEMAN 



AUTHOR OF 
"are we prepared ? " ETC., ETC. 




NEW YORK 
GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY 






COPYRIGHT, I916, 
BY GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY 



FKQtTEO m TS£ XnUXm STATES 01 AKSUCA 
y 



f 



m -6 1916 

0)Cl,A433274 



DEDICATION 

Dedicated to every man and woman who is up- 
lifted and inspired — not by the example of Peter 
who, as the cock crew, bought 'peace at the price of 
denying his Master' — but by the spirit and sacrifice 
of Saint Peter suffering martyrdom under Nero at 
Rome. 



CONTENTS 
Part One: Are We in Danger? 

CHAPTER PAGE 

I. Starving Nations . . . . .11 

11. Why Germany May Fight Us . . .40 

III. Why Japan May Fight Us . . .62 

IV. Why England and the United States May 

Be Led into War . . . . . ']'j 

V. The Good Faith of Nations ... 91 

VL Their Attitude Toward Us ... 97 

VII. Do They Intend to Attack Us? . . 105 

VIII. The Nearness of the Enemies . . . 106 



Part Two: Are We Prepared? 

I. The Guards Without .... 127 

II. The Guards at the Door .... 152 

III. The Guards Within .... 165 



Part Three: What Are Our Chances? 

I. When the Spiked Helmet Comes . . 209 

II. When the Brown Man Comes . . . 218 

III. If the Lion Comes ..... 238 

IV. Military Camps or Cemeteries . . . 246 



viii CONTENTS 



Part Four: Why We Are Not Prepared 

CHAPTER PAGE 

I. Pacific Militarism for Politics . .251 
II. Inefficiency, Negligence and Suppression 

of Facts ...... 260 

III. Wasting Billions 275 



Part Five: How Political Militarism Fails 

I. The Minute Men ..... 291 

II. The Price We Have Paid .... 316 

III. Tragic Comedy . . . . . 350 



Part Six: Will the Proposed Plans Protect? 

I. Dealing in Futures — Daniels. . . 367 

II, The Wilson-Garrison Bryanized Army 

Plan 385 

III. Belgium and Belgium .... 400 



Part Seven : What Each Citizen Can Do 



I. As to Experts 

II. As TO Appropriations 

III. As to Citizenship Obligations 

IV. As TO National Fitness . 

V. As TO the Ideal of the Christ 



427 
434 
438 
443 
451 



PART ONE; ARE WE IN DANGER? 



The appreciation and thanks of the author are due 
to the ranking officers in the United States Army and 
the ranking officers in the United States Navy who 
have kindly and carefully verified these statements 
regarding our impreparedness. 



PART ONE: ARE WE IN DANGER? 

CHAPTER I 

STARVING NATIONS 

DOES not the home and family exist for the 
purpose of protecting and providing for the 
children? 

And does not the nation and government exist 
for the protection and welfare of its citizens? 

Just as a father will steal — even kill — to secure 
food for his starving children, so a nation will levy- 
indemnities — even make war — to keep its people 
from industrial starvation. 

There are three hungry nations in the world — 
and only three. 

The three hungry nations are : Germany, Japan 
and Great Britain, They are significantly and re- 
markably alike in the density of their population, 
their lack of areal resources, and their needs of in- 
ternational revenue. Each is, from a commercial 
standpoint, an isolated empire. Great Britain and 
Japan are isolated by water, while Austria-Ger- 
many is completely surrounded by industrial ene- 
mies. 

11 



12 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

The people of Great Britain as well as the people 
of Germany and Japan are industrially hungry 
because they have not sufficient materials at home. 
For centuries their farmers have tilled the meagre 
soil and eaten the heart out of their lands; their 
miners have drilled into the earth and have taken 
away its treasures, the axes of their woodmen have 
sounded over the land and the virgin forests have 
vanished. 

Their people are hungry for food ; their factories 
are hungry for the raw products of the soil and the 
minerals of the earth; their ships are hungry for 
the trade of other nations ; their banks are hungry 
for over-sea tolls. They must have nutriment for 
their people, materials for their factories, products 
to fill the holds of their merchant marines and inter- 
national tolls to fill the cofifers of their banks. 

Great Britain is hungry, but Germany and Japan 
are starving — it is necessary to arrest this process 
of starvation or die. 

They are hungry and starving not only for new 
areal resources, but they are hungry even for lands 
upon which their people may live. In Germany and 
Japan the average number of people living on each 
square mile is ten times the number in the United 
States and forty times the average in South Amer- 
ica. Of the world powers, Germany, Japan and 
Great Britain are the three most densely populated 
countries. 



STARVING NATIONS 13 

OaislfyofPopulalion 
NumDer of People toBidii SquaieMfle 

BoUvfO f 
Bpcnil f 

Oifle |i 

Russia m . 

U.SA. turn 

(hfna 

Qennany 

Japan 



When we think of a densely populated country our minds turn 
to China, yet the average number of people to each square mile in 
Germany is 250 per cent, more than the average number of people 
to each square mile in China ; in Japan 230 per cent, more ; in Great 
Britain 370 per cent, more ; and in England alone 620 per cent. more. 
Area data are taken from the "Century Atlas," 1914 edition, with 
exception of the data for Bulgaria and Servia, whose areas are 
given as they existed at the close of the Second Balkan War. Pop- 
ulation data are taken from the "Century Atlas" (1914), from the 
"World Almanac" (1916), from "Statesman's Year Book" (1915), 
from "Government Reports of U. S. A.," from "Official Reports of 
European Governments," and from "Revue Statistique de I'Empire 
du Japon" (1915)- 



(1) Population and area of Continental U. S, 

(2) Including Manchuria, Mongolia. 

(3) Not including Korea, Formosa. 



TA AWAKE! U. S. A. 

When we think of a densely populated country, 
we think of China! Yet the number of people per 
square mile in Japan is 230% greater than in 
China; the number of people per square mile in 
Germany is 250% greater ; in Great Britain, 370% 
greater, and in England alone, 620% greater. 

Germany and Japan are the only densely popu- 
lated countries in the world having no considerable 
colonial territory to which their citizens can mi- 
grate. Russia has immense territories to the East ; 
she is not even as densely populated as the United 
States. All northern Africa — Tripoli, Algiers, 
Morocco — are open to the people of Italy, France 
and Spain. Norway and Sweden are not densely 
populated. 

The German nationalities have lived upon their 
lands for more than ten centuries; the English 
have depleted English soil for a thousand years; 
the Japanese have been exhausting their lands for 
six thousand years. 

In one respect Great Britain is essentially differ- 
ent from Germany and Japan. Great Britain has 
millions of square miles of colonial territory and 
for that reason has outside resources to draw from 
and outlying territories to which her people may 
migrate. Great Britain has millions of square miles 
of colonial territory and three hundred million co- 
lonial population. Great Britain has abundant 
areal resources in her colonial possessions. Great 



STARVING NATIONS 



15 



U.JA I" 



HomeAFcal 
Resources 



n 

C/i/Je 



Bpoz/J f2) 



Ar^enf/ne 

Bolivjo 



Germany 
Japan 



GrBrita/n 



i 



1. Areal resources of Continental United States only. 

2. Reduced 27 per cent, to make allowance for lands uninhabitable 
and at present of little commercial value. 



16 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

Britain has abundant trade with the people of her 
own colonies. There is little danger, therefore, 
that Great Britain would ever make war upon us 
for the purpose of acquiring our territory or se- 
curing our trade unless we seriously interfered 
with her trade with her own colonies. 

There arc two great storehouses of wealth — 
North and South America — eleven million square 
miles of land — ^grazing meadows, cereal lands, vir- 
gin forests, mineral riches — to supply the needs of 
this century. 

These storehouses are filled with everything the 
starving nations need. The per capita areal re- 
sources of the United States alone are eleven times 
the per capita areal resources of Germany, Japan 
or Great Britain. Moreover, the areal resources 
of the three hungry nations have been worked over, 
dug out, depleted and exhausted for a thousand 
years. 

And if the Americas refuse to allow themselves 
to be politely robbed by commercial dictation — 
then the starving nations will fight. They will at- 
tempt to compel the Americas by force of arms, if 
necessary, to give up the wealth of their storehouses 
— they will attempt by war to force the Americas 
to pay commercial tribute for generations to come. 

They will do so because areal resources are es- 
sentially important as the basis of wealth. Bank- 
ing wealth depends upon commerce; commerce 



STARVING NATIONS 17 

upon manufacturing; manufacturing upon the ma- 
terials obtained from animals living upon the prod- 
ucts of the land, from vegetation grown upon it, 
or from chemicals and minerals taken from it. 

Individually labour is an equally important basis 
of wealth, but differences in the riches of differ- 
ent nations depend upon differences in the area! re- 
sources. The quality of labour does not vary 
greatly enough to vitally change national values. 
The German, the Englishman, the American, the 
Japanese labourer are each efficient — each has 
proved it by centuries of existence. 

Are there storehouses other than the Americas? 

Other lands may have been the storehouses of 
wealth in other centuries and still other lands may 
be the storehouses of wealth in centuries to come; 
but for the twentieth century. North and South 
America are and will be the areal resources of 
wealth of the world. 

The comparison of the great areal resources of 
the Americas to those of Great Britain, Germany 
and Japan, as indicated by the chart — "Areal Re- 
sources at Home" — tells respectively but half the 
story of the differences in value. 

Considering the density of population, the real 
value of areal resources to the hungry nations can 
be truly judged only by a comparison of their home 
areal resources per person with the "Home Areal 
Resources of Bach Inhabitant" in the Americas. 



18 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

HOME AREAL RESOURCES OF EACH INHABITANT 

The true value of the areal wealth of a nation depends upon two 
factors; first, on whether or not it is largely virgin territory, 
unexhausted by having supported millions of people for hundreds 
of thousands of years; and, second, upon the number of people 
living upon the lands. The home areal resource of each inhabitant 
of Germany, Japan and Great Britain is infinitely small; first, be- 
cause there are many millions of people living upon tiny bits of 
land; and, second, because the land in each case has been exhausted 
— its minerals mined, its forests cut, its soil depleted by a thousand 
years of occupancy. 

On the other hand, we have just begun to open up the vast areal 
wealth of the United States; while that of Chile, Argentina, Brazil 
and Bolivia is much of it as yet untouched. 



STARVING NATIONS 



19 



Home Areal Resources 
to Eacti Inhabitant 



Bolivjo 





Brazil 



GerwojiY' Japan -G/'Bp/foJn 



20 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

THE GIGANTIC DEBT 

April First, 1916 

These figures of the debts of the nations at war indicate only the 
loans, war credits and treasury bills ; they do not indicate the enor- 
mous loss of property, the gigantic financial loss due to interference 
with industries. 

On the other hand, the national debts of the American nations in- 
dicate a proportionally greater burden than they should. They do 
not indicate the increasing prosperity, the increase in gold, the 
increasing international commerce, the increase of new industries, 
and the increase in ability to meet obligations. 
It is seen that the combined debt of the nations at war is nearly 
927 per cent, greater than the combined debt of all the American 
nations and nearly 1661 per cent, greater than the combined debt of 
all the neutral European nations. 



STARVING NATIONS 



21 



Who Will Pay Ihe 
Di^anlicDebt 



$ 60'5'35000,000'DGbfofAlINarions 
a/ War 
{wilhout fn/epe^/) 



■$2U,/5(OOQ00O'DeJDf of Germany. 
Japan anoi Gr Britain 



$ Qm.OOQOOO- DeN of Ail 
Neutrai Nations ofitie Wbricf 





A B 



A. $3,225,000,000 debts of U. S. 

B. $2,648,000,000, debt of all nations of Central and South America. 



22 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

They have used up their natural wealth, yet they 
are hungry — they are starving! They must have 
food. 

They must induce other nations to pay commer- 
cial tolls or failing in this, they must take com- 
merce and resources by force of arms. Germany, 
Japan and Great Britain cannot pay out of their 
own wealth. Not only have they small natural 
resources but they are to-day burdened with debts 
out of all proportion to their national wealth. 

Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, Japan and 
their allies were on April ist, 1916, already bur- 
dened with war loans, war credits, etc., to the 
amount of $21,435,470,000. The zvar loans and 
war debts of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Tur- 
key at that date were $13,992,556,000. The war 
debts total $35,428,026,000. This gigantic sum is 
the amount of the war loans, war credits and im- 
perial treasury bills issued to carry on the war. 

Moreover, the countries at war were heavily bur- 
dened with national debts before the war began. 
The combined pre-war debts of the nations en- 
gaged in the present conflict were, in 19 13, $24,- 
903,817,000. 

These combined with the present war debt 
make a grand total — an unimaginable sum — of 
$60,335,843,000. This represents the debt of the 
nations at war at the present time; and the war 
is not yet finished. 



STARVING NATIONS 23 

And this present war debt of the nations at war 
is not only equal to the combined national debt of 
the United States, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Bo- 
livia, Chile and all the other independent nations 
of North, Central and South America, but it is 
actually, at the present moment, 927% greater. 

This combined debt of the nations at war is not 
only equal to all the debts of all neutral Euro- 
pean nations but 1661% greater than all their na- 
tional debts put together. 

This gigantic combined debt, however, does not 
represent the industrial losses of the war nor repre- 
sent the decrease in revenue that will be felt for 
many years after the war is closed. 

Besides the enormous debt, Germany and Aus- 
tria, if defeated, will find themselves cut off from 
billions of dollars of foreign trade; and England, 
if defeated, will be placed in a like position. 

This war debt is so great that one can conceive 
of it only in comparison with other great sums. 

We gasp at the past expenditures of our govern- 
ment; yet the sum total of every dollar spent by 
our government during the last 127 years for all 
its eleven wars; of all the moneys spent by our gov- 
ernment for all the pensions that have ever been 
paid for all the wars from the War of the Revolu- 
tion to the Philippine War; of all the money paid 
as interest on the national debt from the founding 
of the government to the present moment; of the 



24 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

NATIONAL BURDEN OF DEBT TO WEALTH 

A comparison of amounts of the debts of two nations is mani- 
festly of little value. 

The seriousness of the burden of each nation's debt depends, first, 
upon the relation of its debt to its wealth ; second, upon the number 
of people laboring to pay off that debt. 
This chart represents the national burden of debt to wealth. 
Japan's national debt is $1,260,000,000. The national debt of the 
United States is $3,225,000,000. Japan's national wealth, however, 
is less than ten times its national debt. The wealth of the United 
States is fifty-five times its national debt. 

The national debts of Great Britain and Germany include the pre- 
war debts and war debts up to April ist, 1916. 



PER CAPITA BURDEN OF NATIONAL DEBT 
TO NATIONAL WEALTH 

The seriousness of the burden of each nation's debt depends, first, 
upon the relation of its debt to its wealth; second, upon the num- 
ber of people laboring to pay off that debt. 

This chart represents the burden of national debt that must be 
borne respectively by each person of the United States, Germany, 
Great Britain and Japan. 

The national debts of Germany and Great Britain include the pre- 
war debts and the war debts up to April ist, 1916. 



STARVING NATIONS 25 

Ncilional Burden 
of 
DebtloWeolIti 



Qepmany 
QFJBn'tafin 
Japan 



vep Capito Burden 

01 

Naffonal DeDt to Nalfonal weaim 

U.S.A. ■ 

Qermony 

Japan 

OKBritain 




26 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

money paid for the purchase of Louisiana, for the 
Gadsden purchase, for Alaska, for Florida, and for 
Texas; in the assumption of the public debt of 
Hawaii; for the purchase of perpetual right 
to the Panama Canal and even the building of the 
Panama Canal — in fact every dollar ever spent by 
our government from the time of its foundation to 
the present day for extraordinary purposes — has 
been but $14,999,490,000. The present debt of the 
nations at war — and more than half of it has been 
added during the last twenty-one months — is not 
only equal to these enormous expenditures of ours, 
but 302% greater. 

In this comparison we have included all the in- 
terest on the public debt of the United States for 
127 years, while the figure representing the debt of 
the nations at war represents only the principal ex- 
isting at the present time. The great portion of 
these war loans have been made at 4/4%, 5% and 
6%. Only one of them was at less than 4%. If, 
then, the nations at war should pay off this debt in 
20 years — a feat absolutely impossible — the interest 
at 4%, added to the principal, would make a total 
of $108,603,000,000. 

Inasmuch as the pre-war debts of the nations at 
war were increasing even in prosperous peace times 
by leaps and bounds — with the exception of Great 
Britain — it is recognised that after this war it will 
be impossible for the nations to pay this debt even 



STARVING NATIONS 27 

in two generations. And by that time, even though 
the present bonds should be exchanged for others at 
lower rates of interest and all the other expenses 
of the government should be met year by year, the 
cost of the debt in two generations would rise to the 
enormous sum of $156,871,000,000. 

This is an overwhelming burden for Europe — a 
debt it can never pay out of its own wealth! 

And the hungry nations! The debt of the three 
hungry nations — Germany, Japan and Great Brit- 
ain — is to-day not only equal to the debt of all 
the American nations, but 311% greater; it is 
60/% greater than all the debts of all neutral 
Europe! 

Moreover, the wealth areas of the three hungry 
nations is less than one-half of one million square 
miles, while the wealth areas of the American na- 
tions is more than eleven million square miles. 

The combined population of Germany, Japan 
and Great Britain and Ireland is almost equal 
to that of all South America, of Central America 
and of the United States. But every hundred peo- 
ple of the three hungry nations are burdened on an 
average with a national debt mortgage of $14,816, 
while every hundred people of the American na- 
tions are burdened on an average with but $3,300. 
Moreover, the national debt mortgage of the three 
hungry nations on each square mile of their lands is 
$50,314, while the average national debt mortgage 



28 



AWAKE! U. S. A. 



The Overwtielmf n|| Burden 

InteresJ: MuJiAkoBGPard 



1 

^60,35^000,000 

DeblJ of I 
NatloriiS at Wap(^> 
April /, 1916 



$ f 08,603,000,000 
DebJ-s 
with In teres/ 
UVo'20yearj(^ 



1. Pre-war debts, war debts, loans and treasury bills issued to 
carry on the war. 

2. The debt of the nations at war, with interest at 4 per cent. 
Interest at 4 per cent, is a low estimate. All loans have been made 
at 4, 5 and 6 per cent., with the exception of one loan — Great 
Britain's first one. 



STARVING NATIONS 



29 



The OverwhelminiJ BuFden 

Interest tlusi Also Be Paid 



^ mSJiOOQOOO 

Debt 

w/W In feres/ 



I 

$ QS,265.00QOOO (n 

Inleres/ alone 
each 20 years 
at ^ % 



^ 3,600^000,000 
Great Britain's Debt 
before ttie War- (^> 



1. The interest per generation is 835 per cent, greater than the 
entire combined debts of Germany, Japan and Great Britain before 
the war. 

2. This was considered so large before the war that statesmen 
never expected Great Britain to pay the principal in full. 



30 



AWAKE! U. S. A. 



Naiional Debf Norf^a^e 
on Eacli 100 People 



$iQ.8f6' Germany. Japan oncf QrBr//a/n 




^:5,^l6'AmmcQn Natfons 



The governments of Germany, Japan and Great Britain have placed 
an average mortgage of $148 on each individual — every man, woman 
or child; while each man, woman or child of the American nations 
is burdened with an average governmental debt of but %2,2,. 
The average national debt mortgage of Germany, Japan and Great 
Britain to each man, woman or child is 348 per cent, greater than 
that of the American nations. 



STARVING NATIONS 



31' 



National Debt Mort^a^e 
on Each Square Mile 



: 50.dm -Germany, Japan 
and Gr BrJ/aln 



^525 -American Nations 



The governments of Germany, Japan and Great Britain have bur- 
dened every acre of their home lands with an average debt mort- 
gage of 78 dollars. 

Each acre of the lands of the American nations is burdened with 
a national debt mortgage of but 82 cents. 

The average national debt mortgage of Germany, Japan and Great 
Britain on every square mile of their home lands is 9,485 per cent. 
greater than that of the American nations. 



32 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

of the American nations on each square mile of 
their lands is but $525. 

Germany may have some portions of central and 
southern Africa and Japan will have China from 
which to draw revenue after the war. These coun- 
tries ofifer wonderful possibilities for the century 
to come. They would offer great possibilities for 
the present, if Germany and Japan should have 
billions of dollars of cash at the close of the war 
to develop them, build railways, colonise and wait 
two or three generations for the profits from such 
enterprises. 

But burdened by a debt 607% greater than all the 
combined debts of all neutral Europe, can they wait 
a generation for the results? 

Can Germany and Japan, especially, turn for 
ready cash at the close of the present struggle to 
the other nations at war? Austria in proportion 
to her wealth will be more heavily burdened than 
Germany. France even before the war had the 
largest national debt in the world. It will take a 
generation for Russia to readjust her finances. In 
fact, the combined debt of the nations at war, ex- 
cepting Germany, Japan and Great Britain, is al- 
ready 149% of the combined debt of Germany, 
Japan and Great Britain. The three hungry na- 
tions cannot turn to other nations now at war for 
the payment of immediate indemnities. 

And evidently no group of the warring European 



STARVING NATIONS 33 

WHO WILL HAVE THE WEALTH TO PAY THE DEBT? 

We gasp at the burden the nations at war have piled up for them- 
selves — billions and billions of dollars of debt. We know they 
cannot pay it out of their own areal resources. We realize that 
the wealth free from debt of all neutral European nations is less 
per million people than that of the nations at war, burdened as 
they are with great debts. 

Before the war England, Germany and Japan might have turned 
to Africa and China, even though billions of free wealth are re- 
quired to develop those countries. After the war, however, they 
will not have the billions of wealth free for investment. 
The American nations are the only ones that have developed wealth 
immediately available. Their per capita wealth free from national 
debt is 304 per cent, of the free per capita wealth of the nations 
at war, 323 per cent, of the free per capital wealth of the European 
nations, 2866 per cent, of the free per capita wealth of China. 



34 



AWAKE! U. S. A. 



Who wm Have The WeaUh 
Necessary To Pay 



IheDeM 

Nati'onol Wealfh free 






from 






Noli on a/ Debl 






April i J9J6 






per iOOQOOO people. 




All 




AmepJcan 




Nol/ons 






^fi 


?3^00Q0O0 


All 








All 




Nations 




Meuiral 




a/ War 




Eopopean 




$537,000,000 


Na//onj 






China ^505,000,000\ 






$57000000 








1 



STARVING NATIONS 



35 



Who Win Have Land 
To Yield The Wealtti 

National Area/ Resources 
per (000.000 people 



I All 

American 
Nations 



All All Neutral 

Nalions European 

at War Germany china H^H^^^ 
Japan 
Gr Britain 

2.900 





6W00 

tSg.mil 



36 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

nations, even though emerging from the present 
war successfully, can secure indemnities or find 
sufficient wealth in neutral European nations to 
save themselves. 

But the treasure nations of the world — ^having 
areal riches of 23 units compared to the i unit of 
the hungry nations — are burdened with a debt only 
24% of that of the three hungry nations. 

Our North and South American home areal re- 
sources are 2,200% greater than the home areal 
resources of the three hungry nations and our 
North and South American debts are but one-fourth 
Toi their debts. And North and South America are 
the only portions of all the lightly burdened treasure 
lands that are sufficiently developed to be able to 
furnish international revenue to the hungry nations 
without the expenditure of billions of dollars. 

Can any sane man doubt that the hungry na- 
tions — burdened with this debt, living on depleted 
lands exhausted of their natural resources, sup- 
porting the densest populations in the world — will 
not come to the Americas, the unprotected store- 
houses of wealth of the Twentieth Century? 

Germany, Japan or Great Britain will not — either 
separate or combined — make an attack upon us be- 
cause of mere desire to make war. Each German, 
Japanese or English family is just as adverse to 
losing its sons and father on the battlefield as is 
the American family. The governments of Ger- 



STARVING NATIONS 37 

many and Japan will not attack us because of hatred 
or because of viciousness but because of absolute 
necessity. If they come they will come because 
economic conditions force them to take our treas- 
ures in order to keep their people from industrial 
starvation. 

We should not blame them! 

We, under similar conditions, would probably go 
to other nations just as Germany and Japan must 
come to us. 

Because of the commerce of the Americans who 
had settled in Texas previous to 1846, we sup- 
ported their declaration of independence and took 
Texas from Mexico; because of the commercial 
interests of the American sugar planters who had 
established themselves in Hawaii we supported their 
revolution, dethroned the native queen, and an- 
nexed the Hawaiian Islands. 

It is useless to villify the intentions of Germany 
and Japan; it will be useless to villify Great Brit- 
ain if she should later deem it necessary to take 
means to extend her commerce; but it is wise to 
prepare for attack if we desire to maintain our 
commercial independence, especially as the com- 
bined debt of these three hungry nations is ^43% 
of the combined debts of all the neutral nations of 
the world. 



AWAKE! U. S. A. 



Who Will Be Able To Pay 




Nations al War^ 




^DebtsAprlim \ 
withou! Inleresf 

^Land WealtJi- 
AreaJ Resources 



$5^ 
Germany 

Japan 

GrBrJ/ain 

$2Qf5l026000 



7SO0000 jqm'/GJ 




iJSQOOOsq.miiGS 



STARVING NATIONS 



39 



TheAnswcF 

Debts. April i 1916 



\^ Land WeaJ/h 
ArcQl Resources 



A/I Neutral Nations of/Jie IVorld 
£xceptin0 IJDer/a.Pers/a andiSiam 



Alt 

Neutral 
European 
Nations 



$:)Q 15000 000 



Cliina 



^7777^ 

$.5tlOJi6,000 



650.000 sq.mjl 



All 
American 
Nations 



$5,875,300,000 



itJOCOOOsgrntl 




CHAPTER II 
WHY ge:rmany may i^ight us 

SUPERFICIAL students of economics talk and 
write of the great prosperity in Germany. It 
is true that Germany has no idle class, that practi- 
cally every man is busy, that every factory is hum- 
ming, that every railway is burdened with prod- 
ucts being shipped from the factories to the sea- 
ports, and that every port is a bee-hive where the 
loading and shipping of the "made in Germany" 
products go on night and day. 

"But it is a false prosperity, based upon a forced 
system of taxation and an increasing national debt, 
growing by gigantic additions year by year even 
during peace times. These conditions cannot con- 
tinue many months longer. No other nation in Eu- 
rope is so near bankruptcy. Every known method 
of taxation has been tried by Germany with the 
single exception of the capital tax, and the Im- 
perial Government must soon impose that also ; and 
after that, — the deluge for Europe! 

"I warn you, to-night, that Germany cannot con- 
tinue two years longer without an industrial re- 
action. To save herself from such a reaction she 

40 



WHY GERMANY MAY FIGHT US 41 

will seek war with some neighbouring power, hoping 
thereby to gain a big indemnity sufficient to tide 
her over the industrial crisis which she is now fac- 
ing." ' 

Germany was on the point of bankruptcy pre- 
vious to the war. From 1880 to 19 10, the per cent, 
of increase in the cost of living and in expenditures 
for the army and for the navy was so much greater 
than the per cent, of increase in wages that Ger- 
many could not have continued another five years 
without an industrial revolution. 

During the thirty years indicated, the increase in 
the imperial debt was 1,223% 5 i" naval expenditures 
was 1,054%, the increase in army expenditures, 
127%; the increase in the cost of living 109%, 
greater than that of any other European nation, 
excepting Austria-Hungary. But wages in Ger- 
many during this thirty years had increased only 

31%. 

Germany, then, previous to the outbreak of the 

European war, was financially in a worse condition 
than even England. The average increase for the 
four great expenditures for the thirty years was 
628%. The increase of wages, out of which this 
was ultimately to be paid, was but 31%. 

Not only was Germany on the point of indus- 
trial bankruptcy before the war; but, even with all 
the heavy taxation year after year, Germany was 
approaching financial ruin. 



42 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

INCREASING INDUSTRIAL BANKRUPTCY OF GERMANY 

FOR THIRTY YEARS BEFORE THE WAR, 

1880—1910 

The industrial prosperity of Germany during the last forty years 
has been a paper prosperity. 

The increase from 1880 to 1910 of the imperial debt was 1223 per 
cent., the increase in the expense of the navy was 1054 per cent., of 
the army, 127 per cent., of the cost of living, 109 per cent. ; while 
the increase in wages was but 31 per cent. 

Year by year the three great governmental expenses and the one 
great individual expense — cost of living — increased out of all pro- 
portion to the increase in earning income. 

Increases in public expenditures can only be met by increased loans 
which must some day be paid, increased taxation, or by indemnities 
levied upon foreign nations by means of conquest. 
The prospect was industrial bankruptcy. 

The data of the increases in the expenses of the navy and of 
the army are taken from official reports of the German Imperial 
Government and from the "Statesman's Year Books" of 1880 and 
1910. 

The data on the increase in the cost of living and the increase 
of wages are taken from various German writers on political econ- 
omy and sociology, from "Bliss' Encylopsedia of Social Reform" 
and from information obtained from the British Museum, the Brit- 
ish Institute of Social Science and the Musee Social de France. 
Increase in the cost of living is not based, as so many writers on 
economics wrongly base it, upon a few actual necessities of life 
but upon the average amount of money the masses spent for their 
living. 

The increase in wages is based neither upon the increase nor de- 
crease of the wages of a few skilled labourers nor upon the very 
small increase of the wages of unskilled workers, but upon the 
average increase of all types of labour. 



WHY GERMANY MAY FIGHT US 43 

Increasfn^ 

Industrial BanKruptcy of Qermany 

FoFThiFty Years Berore the War 

1880-1910 



/223 % /ncreasG 
ImperJal Debt 



WSP % IncpeaJG 
'Naval £xpGn<y6 



/f 7 % fncreajG 
Army£xpGnJG 



/OSf % IncPGasG 
Co J J- of Uv/n^ 

0/ % ino'GasG 
ofWa^GS 

u 



44 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

Germany had been at peace for forty years. In 
peace times nations attempt to reduce the national 
debts that have accumulated in times of stress and 
war. Not so with Germany. Her seeming indus- 
trial and financial progress was so false that, not- 
withstanding the colossal taxes she imposed upon 
her people, Germany's national debt increased year 
by year by gigantic sums. The average increase in 
national debt each year from 1875 to 1880 was 
$17,010,000; the increase each year from 1880 to 
1890 was $30,861,000; each year from 1900 to 
1908 was $69,741,000; and the increase including 
— as stated in the Reichstag by the Imperial Treas- 
urer — the deficits to be covered by additional loans 
was $148,0/4,480 each year from 1908 to 1913. 

The debt of the German Empire previous to the 
beginning of the war was given as a little more than 
one billion dollars. The o/^e-billion-dollar debt, 
however, was the indebtedness of the Imperial 
Government alone. It was kept separate from and 
did not include the debt of Bavaria. The Bavarian 
debt was listed separately because of her separate 
army. But as her army is an integral part of the 
German Imperial armies, a portion of her debt 
should be included in the actual debt of the Empire. 
However, in all statements and comparisons given 
in the work, only the amount of the Imperial debt 
is employed, unless otherwise stated. 

The emptiness of Germany's prosperity during 



WHY GERMANY MAY FIGHT US 



45 



YeoFiy Increasing increases 
of 
DeDi 0/ QeFmony i 



^m.ooQooo 

Adcfecf 

Each Year 2 



S 69.000,000 

Addecf 
Each Year 



^/j.ooo.ooo 

Addecf 
Each Year 



f 30,000.000 

Added 
Eac/i Year 



ISSO-/^90 



/S7S-/SS0 



W00-J90S 



/gOS'i9J3 



Not only has the debt of Germany increased every year of each 
period as shown, but there has been a great increase of the increase, 
(i) The data for the years from 1875 to 1908 are taken from the 
official reports of the German Empire and from the Annual Regis- 
ters for the years from 1875 to igo8. 

(2) Including the loans necessary to cover the increasing deficits, — 
as reported on the floor of the Reichstag by the Imperial Treasurer. 



46 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

INCREASE OF NATIONAL DEBT 
GERMANY AND U. S. 1880 — 1914 

The two nations of the world that were renowned for remarkable 
commercial and industrial prosperity from i88o to 1910 are Ger- 
many and the United States. 

Germany was at peace during all those thirty-four years and a real 
prosperity should have shown on the national balance sheets. 
The United States during that period was engaged in two wars — 
the Spanish-American War and the Philippine War, costing the 
United States more than 538 millions of dollars. Yet the increase 
in our national debt during those 34 years was but 37 per cent., 
while that of Germany was 1408 per cent 



WHY GERMANY MAY FIGHT US 47 

Increase of National Debi 

Qermany and U.S.A. 

1880' 19m 



Germany / 




37% 



48 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

the 33 years of peace, 1880 to 1913, is best indi- 
cated by the fact that, notwithstanding her heavy 
taxation, the imperial debt alone in 19 13 was 
1,408% greater than it was in 1880. The signifi- 
cance of this is overwhelming, when one compares 
it with the increase of the national debt of the 
United States, the other great nation of the world 
that has been commercially prosperous during this 
same period of thirty-three years — 1880 to 1913. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the United States 
carried on a most expensive though short war with 
Spain, built the Panama Canal at a cost of hun- 
dreds of millions, and pacified and redeemed Cuba, 
Porto Rico and the Philippines at a great addi- 
tional expense, our national debt increased but J/% 
for the same period during which Germany's in- 
creased 1,408%. 

But even this comparison does not tell the entire 
truth, because a nation's ability to pay its debts 
depends upon the areal resources, its wealth and 
the number of people working to pay off that debt. 
Germany's areal resources were but one-fifteenth 
our areal resources, Germany's wealth but one-half 
our wealth. Consequently Germany had during 
those thirty years infinitely smaller resources to 
pay her debt. 

The more just comparison is obtained by com- 
paring the increases of the per capita national debt 
of Germany with the changes in the per capita na- 



WHY GERMANY MAY FIGHT US 49 

tional debt of the United States. From 1880 to 
1910 the per capita national debt of Germany in- 
creased 4,400%, our per capita national debt de- 
creased /3%. 

And now there is the addition of the war debt. 
Germany's war debt for the first twenty-one months 
of the war is $9,817,560,000. She now has a debt 
— pre-war and war — of $11,011,560,000. 

Germany has lived on her foreign commerce and 
must have immediate money at the close of the war, 
whether she emerges from it successful or unsuc- 
cessful. 

Even if successful, Germany cannot immediately 
collect billions of cash indemnity for her imme- 
diate needs, either from England, or France, or 
Russia, because — they will not have it, 

Germany has lost and will not be able to regain 
for some years the greater portion of her trade 
with Russia, with England and with the British 
colonies even if she emerges successful from the 
war. She has also lost a considerable portion of 
her trade with the United States and will not be 
able to regain all of it. Factories have already been 
established here, and many of the products pre- 
viously imported from Germany will in the future 
be made within our own country. 

Even if she is victorious she cannot regain all of 
her foreign trade within three years. Her own 
international merchants have judged that it will 



60 



AWAKE! U. S. A. 



Increase of Qermany'sDebi 
per capita 
1877-1915 



During jame period 
U.J. per capita DebJ- 
Dec/>Ga^dd 73 % 



f877 



/8S/ 



me 



m 



im 



1901 



{906 



m 



/m 



WHY GERMANY MAY FIGHT US 51 

Nafjonol Debts Per Capita 
l$80'19iO 



Increase per cap/la 
Germany ^,Q00 7o 



Japan 2Z7 % 



DecreOiSe pep cap/Id 
GpBrllain- i/O % 



52 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

take three years to regain even seventy per cent, of 
it. 

As her foreign markets will not be immediately 
re-established at the close of the war, Germany, 
even if successful, will have six million men out 
of work, with nothing to do. Before the war these 
were employed in factories making goods for for- 
eign trade. 

Four million men are now in the army ; two mil- 
lion additional men are in training camps and two 
million more are employed in the factories manu- 
facturing war material. 

Women, as before, are in the fields and have 
proved themselves capable of conducting the agri- 
cultural life of Germany without the aid of the 
eight million men now in the army, in the training 
camps and in the war factories. 

With war over, at least three million of the four 
million under arms will be discharged. 

With war over, there will be no further need of 
manufacturing products of war and two million 
men in war factories will be out of employment. 

With her foreign trade cut off and at least 
seventy per cent, of her foreign buyers, not only 
unwilling but unable to purchase from her, the fac- 
tories will be unable to reopen for months, except 
under governmental management. 

This governmental supervision of factories in 
Germany would require enormous capital. They 



WHY GERMANY MAY FIGHT US 53 

would have to be kept running at least one or two 
years before Germany's foreign trade, according 
to her own commercial experts, could be re-estab- 
lished on the old basis. Even to accomplish this, 
Germany would have to flood foreign markets with 
quantities of goods at cheap prices. 

This would be more expensive to the German 
Government than war. At present Germany is 
manufacturing and consuming her own war ma- 
terials; consequently the government is paying the 
government for the products produced. Moreover, 
the men now employed in battle line — over four 
million of them — consuming the war products of 
the factories — are costing Germany not more than 
$.25 to $.50 a day, but in peace times the govern- 
ment would have to pay these men working in fac- 
tories from $1.50 to $2.00 a day. The difference 
for four millions of men is enormous. Such indus- 
trial governmental operation after the war, during 
the first year at least, would require infinitely more 
money than a year of war itself. 

This governmental nationalisation of factories 
might be attempted if Germany should have at the 
close of the war a billion or more in clear cash. 
But impoverished by the war — without the billion 
in cash, with at least six million out of work — what 
would happen in Germany? 

Nothing could prevent an industrial revolution 
except another war with the certainty of a big in- 



64, AWAKE! U. S. A. 

demnity; and the Imperial German Government 
would prefer another war rather than run the risk 
of revolution — no matter against whom it might be 
necessary to wage war. 

It is well known among diplomats that Germany 
has in her secret archives of the Wilhelmstrasse 
exact charts showing that one-third of our national 
wealth is located within one hundred miles of the 
Atlantic seaboard; and Germany has long been 
envious of American wealth and American com- 
merce. 

Prince Radziwill, a former German Ambassador 
at Paris, said on February 26, 1899: ''There is 
another country against which the continental pow- 
ers should indeed come to an understanding for 
the organization of their economic defence. There 
is the United States, whose pretensions and riches 
are becoming a danger to us all." 

Germany already believes that if we had not sup- 
plied the Allies, and England in particular, with 
enormous quantities of artillery and ammunition, 
the war would now be over and she would now be 
victorious. 

Germany and Austria both consider that the 
United States is virtually fighting against them by 
furnishing money and supplies to the Allies. High 
officials in Germany have publicly stated that any 
neutral country which turns itself into an arsenal 
to supply guns, military stores, or food even, to 



WHY GERMANY MAY FIGHT US 55 

the enemies of Germany is in "active participation" 
against her. 

Germany believes that such successes as the Al- 
lies have had is due, and that whatever successes 
they may have in the future will be due, to the 
credit and the ammunitions we have supplied them. 
The Crown Prince has publicly stated that America 
is ''already the enemy of Germany" for having al- 
lied herself with the enemies of Germany by pro- 
viding them with the necessities of war. 

But still more, the Imperial Government at Berlin 
by an official statement of its General Staff notified 
the world, October 4, 191 5, that it considered the 
United States as its enemy — the ally of Great Brit- 
ain and France. The statement refers to the suc- 
cesses of the Allies on the western front "due" to 
the help of the munition factories of the whole 
world, ''including the United States" This notifi- 
cation to the world by a statement of the General 
Stafif that the successes of Germany's enemies are 
due to the help furnished by the United States is 
especially significant, being issued, as it was, only 
twenty-four hours before Count von Bernsdorf 
made his personal disavowal of the Arabic sinking. 

If Germany is defeated, it will be most easy for 
the German mind to conceive that the defeat was 
due to the ammunition and money which we sup- 
plied to Great Britain and France. And what; 
would be more natural than that she should con- 



56 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

ceive the idea that we, who helped to defeat her, 
should be also compelled to help put her on her feet 
again ? 

But Germany has another excuse for seeking a 
decisive conflict with the United States. That is 
the Monroe Doctrine. Germany is fighting at pres- 
ent to establish a so-called freedom of the seas. 
And for what purpose ? So that Germany may ex- 
tend her colonisation and her trade wherever she 
wishes without interference from the navies of 
other powers. No other nation in Europe is in 
such need of expansion. The English do not breed 
rapidly ; neither do the French. The Russians have 
immense areas which can yet be utilized, extending 
from the Baltic to the Pacific and from the Arctic 
to the Black Sea. But Germany has no room; she 
has but two hundred thousand square miles for 
nearly seventy millions of people. While South 
America has three thousand four hundred per cent, 
more land and not half as many people. 

^'But what we do want and will have is the Ar- 
gentine. Had you (the English) not given your 
moral support to the Monroe Doctrine and stood 
between us and our goal in South America, we 
'should only have required half our fleet to have 
laughed at the American nation and their dog-in- 
the-manger policy." ^ 

Germany has determined that she must have 
South America for her rapidly breeding people. 



WHY GERMANY MAY FIGHT US 57 

Her population has increased almost beyond belief. 
In 1870, Germany had a population of but 41,000,- 
000; in 1910, only forty years later, it was 65,000,- 
000, in spite of the fact that hundreds of thousands 
had gone to the United States, to Canada, to South 
America, to Africa, to Australia, to Russia and to 
France. 

But the English navy and the Monroe Doctrine 
have stood in Germany's path to South America. 

''England once out of the way, South America 
will be ours, to be colonised by our flesh and blood, 
who now have to go under other flags." ^ 

First to get England out of the way, then to over- 
throw the Monroe Doctrine! Hence the present 
war is an "advance step" just as Von Bulow de- 
clared it would he, in bringing about ''new political 
formations," especially on the "American side of 
the water." 

The Imperial Chancellor stated in the Reichstag, 
when speaking of unrest in Germany and the desire 
for "oversea activity," on November 10, 1912: "At 
the root of this feeling is the determination of Ger- 
many to make its strength and capability prevail in 
the world." 

Germany has never admitted the right of the 
American nation to promulgate or uphold the Mon- 
roe Doctrine. She has taken every occasion to vio- 
late it. At Manila she tried to force her battle- 
ships into the bay in order that she, as well as the 



68 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

WHAT GERMANY WOULD GAIN IN AREAL RESOURCES 
FOR COMMERCE 

This depends upon the condition that Germany is victorious in the 
present war; or that Germany shall make terms of peace with 
Great Britain such that Germany shall be free to pursue such a 
policy without interference — a not improbable result in case of 
deadlock in the great European struggle. 

If Germany should for commercial and naval reasons bring about 
a war with the United States and defeat us in that war, the main- 
tenance of the Monroe Doctrine would have to be abandoned 
by us. 

In consequence Germany's millions of people would be free to col- 
onise and cement their control over Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Venezuela, eastern Colombia, eastern Mexico, eastern Central Amer- 
ica and to obtain restrictive commercial control of the international 
commerce of the United States. 

Moreover, Germany would gain in conjunction with Japan actual 
control of the Panama Canal. 

This would give Germany not only the coveted naval bases in the 
western hemisphere, but the commercial control of the untold 
wealth of 9,975,000 square miles of virgin and undepleted territory. 
This is 4480 per cent, greater than that which Germany has at 
present — a prospective gain worth fighting for. 



WHY GERMANY MAY FIGHT US 59 

What Qennany Would Qafn 

in 
Areal Besources for Commerce 



60 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

United States, might have a claim upon the terri- 
tory of the Philippines. 

Germany hoisted her flag over the custom houses 
in Venezuela after she had promised not to do so. 
President Roosevelt mobilized our fleet, England 
and Italy acquiesced in our demand and the German 
flag came down. 

Even as late as 19 12, Germany attempted to se- 
cure a naval station on the coast of Colombia at 
the very door of the Panama Canal. 

We may be sure, then, that if Germany comes out 
of this war victorious, she will not be as considerate 
of our Monroe Doctrine as she has been in the 
past. 

Germany will be burdened by an enormous debt. 
She will have need of immediate resources ; she will 
not be able to regain her foreign trade quickly even 
if successful in this war; her factories will be idle; 
she will face an industrial revolution, and another 
foreign war against the nation that aided her 
enemies will divert the populace and promise a great 
indemnity of twenty billions of dollars, opening the 
pathway at the same time to Venezuela, Brazil, 
Argentina, and Bolivia, the combined areal re- 
sources of which are more than three thousand per 
cent, greater than Germany has at present. 

And what would Germany gain by a successful 
attack upon us? First: areal resources in Central 
America and Colombia, fifty per cent, greater than 



WHY GERMANY MAY FIGHT US 61 

all her home areal resources; areal resources in 
Mexico two hundred per cent, greater ; in Venezu- 
ela, two hundred per cent.; in Bolivia, three hun- 
dred per cent. ; in Argentina, six hundred per cent. ; 
in Brazil, 1,500 per cent ! Second : the control of the 
Panama Canal. Third: the Mexican oil fields. 

Something worth fighting for! 

"We must at all costs hope for the formation in 
southern Brazil, of a state with twenty or thirty 
million Germans." * 

"How unreasonable it is to expect that the com- 
bined nations of Europe, with all their military 
strength, shall remain restricted to one-twelfth of 
this world's land, burrowed into and hewn over for 
the last thousand years, while this Republic, with- 
out armies, shall maintain dominion over one-half 
of the unexploited lands of the world l'^ 



QUOTATION REFERENCES 

* Page 41. From address of M. Brown-Landone, given 
at Sorbonne, Paris, December 18, 191 3. 

2 Page 56, Hildegard von Hilton, from letter to the Eng- 
lish from the Palais Augustenberg, June, 1912. 

^ Page 57. From an official report of a German Consul 
in Brazil. 

* Page 61. Schmoller, prominent German political writer. 
^ Page 61. General Homer Lee, in "The Valor of Igno- 
rance." 



CHAPTER HI 

WHY JAPAN MAY FIGHT US 

AND Japan! 
Putting aside the "agitation of jingoes," is 
there any real cause for serious concern as to prob- 
able trouble with the rising power in the Far East ? 

There are but three over-populated isolated na- 
tions in the world, each of which must control world 
commerce on its portion of the globe or go down in 
bankruptcy. Japan is one of them. 

The conditions which exist, and which have ex- 
isted in Japan during the last thirty years, are now 
culminating financially and industrially. 

Japan finds herself commercially and financially 
in exactly the same condition as Germany. During 
the thirty years from 1880 to 19 10, Japan's naval 
expenditure in 1910 was 2,292 per cent, greater 
than it was in 1880; her increase in army expendi- 
tures, 933 per cent.; her increase in the Imperial 
debt, 519 per cent.; and the increase in the cost of 
living, 87 per cent. 

The average increase of the four great expendi- 
tures during the thirty years was 957 per cent; 
while the increaae in wages was but 28 per cent. 

62 



WHY JAPAN MAY FIGHT US 63 

While income and business taxes are very much 
higher in Japan than in any other country, the en- 
tire revenue yielded from both income and busi- 
ness taxation is but one-tenth of the national rev- 
enue of Japan. Therefore the people out of their 
wages have paid, or ultimately must pay — either by 
direct taxation, by higher cost of living, or by less- 
ened wages due to business taxation — 90 per cent, 
of the enormous sums that have been spent on the 
army and the navy during the last 35 years. 

This drain upon the Japanese people cannot go on 
forever. 

Moreover, Japan was burdened before the war 
by a debt which in proportion to her national wealth 
was greater than that of any other world-power in 
Europe, Asia or America. A nation's debt can be 
paid by the combined use of her wealth and the 
labour of her citizens, by the opening up of unde- 
veloped resources, by the acquisition of interna- 
tional trade; by the levying of indemnities upon 
other nations. 

In proportion to her area and her wealth, Japan 
has an enormous population. The labour wealth 
of her people is of phenomenal value; but labour 
must have capital and resources to produce the sur- 
plus wealth with which to pay a nation's debt. 

Japan's national debt in proportion to her popu- 
lation is small. From the labour standpoint, Ja- 
pan's burden of national debt is much less than 



64 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

INCREASING INDUSTRIAL BANKRUPTCY OF JAPAN 

FOR THIRTY YEARS BEFORE THE WAR 

1880—1910 

The increase in the expense of the navy was 2292 per cent, and 
of the army 993 per cent.; the increase of the Imperial debt was 
519 per cent, and of the cost of living, 87 per cent.; while the 
increase in wages was but 28 per cent. 

Year by year the three great governmental expenses and the one 
great individual expense, the cost of living, had increased out of 
all proportion to the increase in earned income. 

Increases in public expenditures can only be met by increased loans 
which must some day be paid, increased taxation, or by indemnities 
levied upon foreign nations by means of conquest. 
The prospect was industrial bankruptcy. 

The data of the increases in the expenses of the navy and of the 
army are taken from the "Revue Statistique de I'Empire du Japon" 
and from the "Statesman's Year Books" of 1880 and 1910. 
The data of the increase in the cost of living and the increase 
of wages are taken from "Bliss' Encyclopaedia of Social Reform" 
and from information obtained from the British Museum, the Brit- 
ish Institute of Social Science, and the Musee Social de France. 
Increase in the cost of living is not based, as so many writers on 
economics wrongly base it, upon a few actual necessities of life, 
but upon the average amount of money the masses spent for their 
living. 

The increase in wages is based neither upon the increase nor de- 
crease of the wages of a few skilled labourers nor upon the very 
small increase of the wages of unskilled workers, but upon the 
average increase of all types of labour. 



WHY JAPAN MAY FIGHT US 65 

Incpeasing 
Industrial Banki^uptcy of Jopan 
FoF ThiFty YeaPS^Before flieWoF 

1880-1910 



S292 % Increase 
Naval Expenje 



P93 % Incpeose 
Army Expense 



3/9 %/ncreasG 
Imperial Del)/- 



W%CoJlofLiv/n^\ 
^S 7o Increase of Wages 



m AWAKE! U. S. A. 

ours. Our per capita national debt is $32, while 
that of Japan is $23. 

There has been much discussion lately and much 
difference of opinion as to the solvency of Japan. 
But in all the newspaper and magazine discussion 
there has been no comprehensive summing up of 
all the factors that make for national wealth, that 
make for solvency. Comparing the wealth of the 
two countries in billions of dollars leads to wrong 
conceptions. A comparison of the per capita bur- 
den of wealth also leads to wrong conceptions. 
To arrive at any just comparison of the condition 
of Japan with that of any other country, all the ele- 
ments of labour, national wealth, national debt, 
population and resources from which to draw 
wealth must be considered. Labour is useless with- 
out capital, capital and labour are useless without 
materials to work with ; capital and labour and ma- 
terials are of little commercial value with no mar^ 
kets for the products. 

If we consider both our population and our wealth 
in relation to our national debt and compare the 
result to the population and wealth of Japan in re- 
lation to her national debt, we find that Japan has 
a burden 800 per cent, greater than the one we 
bear. 

The labour of Japan's fifty-five million people 
could easily solve Japan's financial problem if they 
had a sufficient surplus of natural resources and 



WHY JAPAN MAY FIGHT US 



67 



Japan ond Four Slates of U.S.A. 
Weal/h fop ul at/ on 



u stales I 
t30-3mons 




J a /I an 
J^J.0-Bjllfon6 





Japan 
55J^jW'on<S' 




^<S/OtGS / 

23N////on<S' 





The four states chosen are New York, a wealthy and populous 
state ; Pennsylvania, a manufacturing and mining state of com- 
paratively extensive area; Ohio, a manufacturing and farming 
state not densely populated ; and West Virginia, a state noted 
neither for its dense population nor for its wealth. 
A comparison is here made between these four states and Japan. 
The area of the four states is equal to that of Japan. 
These four states have thirty billions of wealth with which to pay 
their labourers and to invest in their industries ; Japan has but ten. 
These four states have but twenty-three millions of people that 
must be fed, clothed and housed, with wealth of thirty billions. 
Japan has, on the same area, fifty-five million people, whose food, 
clothing and shelter must come out of the profits of ten billions of 
wealth. 



68 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

sufficient wealth. While Japan lacks these, the 
United States as well as other countries of North 
and South America have limitless undeveloped 
areal wealth. 

The mortgage burden of the national debt of 
Japan averages $8,780 for every square mile of ter- 
ritory, while our national debt burdens each square 
mile with a mortgage averaging but $1,065. 

Not only is Japan's burden of national debt per 
square mile of territory very much greater than 
ours, but her national debt to each million of rev- 
enue is greater. Each million of our revenue must 
pay the interest and a portion of the principal of 
$3,086,000; each million of Japanese revenue must 
pay the interest and a portion of the principal of 
$4,zH3,ooo. 

Every billion of the wealth of the United States 
is mortgaged by but ^//, 172,000; every billion of 
Japan's wealth is mortgaged by a debt of 
$i26,yoo,ooo. 

Our free national wealth gives us ^d/0,000,000 
for the development and cultivation of every ten 
thousand square miles; the national wealth of Ja- 
pan free from debt gives her people but ^5^1,000,- 
000 per ten thousand square miles. 

Each million Japanese people have but $1^8,000,- 
000 capital freed of all national debt; each million 
Americans have $1,840^000,000 freed of all na- 
tional debt. 



WHY JAPAN MAY FIGHT US 69 

Every half million of our people have almost a 
million dollars' worth of capital with which they 
can work to produce other wealth. Every half mil- 
lion Japanese have but one-twelfth that amount. 

Instead of 527,000 people to every billion of 
wealth, Japan has 6,395,000 people. 

Moreover, each million of our people have an 
average of 320,000 square miles from which to 
draw their riches, while each million of the Jap- 
anese have but 290 square miles. 

From all this, it is evident Japan lacks every- 
thing except labour. And her labour is useless un- 
less she has more capital, more lands, more unde- 
veloped resources. Not only is labour useless with- 
out wealth and resources but millions of people 
without sufficient natural resources, without suffi- 
cient capital, with increasing debt, increasing taxes, 
increasing cost of living are a source of serious 
danger. 

Japan — with her fifty-five millions of people, 
crowded upon islands not twice the size of Oregon, 
possessing wealth of but ten billion dollars, with 
a debt of $1,267,000,000 — must, to avoid national 
bankruptcy, draw her revenue from foreign com- 
merce or save herself by levying indemnities on 
other nations. 

Japan must have new lands, undeveloped re- 
sources and international commerce. 

But new lands and natural resources alone are 



70 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

not sufficient for Japan. They would be for a na- 
tion with an enormous amount of capital to invest. 
Japan has only surplus labour. Consequently 
China, which may become a great source of wealth 
to Japan in another hundred years, is not now able 
to furnish Japan the revenue she needs at present. 
Japan must have international commerce. But even 
ships are not enough for international commerce. 
There must be in the foreign countries well organ- 
ised systems of transportation to handle the prod- 
ucts Japan exports to them, and thousands of miles 
of railroad to bring the products of the foreign 
lands to the ports at which Japanese ships call. 

China to each million people has but Jj miles 
of railway, the United States to each million of its 
population has 2,460 miles. 

China has but i,2po miles of railways to trans- 
port the products of each million square miles of 
area. The United States has, for the transporta- 
tion of the products of each million square miles 
of area, 80,400 miles of railways. 

The Japanese would be quite satisfied with China, 
if China had wealth, developed industry and trans- 
portation systems comparable with the wealth, in- 
dustry and railroad systems of the United States. 
Japan is looking to China for the future — but for 
the more distant future. For the present and im- 
mediate future she must look to the United States. 



WHY JAPAN MAY FIGHT US 71 

We alone can meet the present needs — wealth, land 
and commercial revenue. 

To acquire, maintain and increase a nation's com- 
merce, and to prevent other nations from destroy- 
ing that commerce, a nation must have control of 
the seas its merchantmen traverse. For these rea- 
sons Japan has definitely planned to make herself 
the England of the Pacific. She has definitely 
planned to commercially control, and if need be po- 
litically control, the lands capable of yielding her 
the greatest income. 

Japan has already established herself in Korea 
and has assumed control of eastern Manchuria. As 
she extends her influence over China, she will, lit- 
tle by little, close the ports of China to our trade. 
This will not be done by open declaration but by 
practical direction and the operation of her navy 
until the trade of the four hundred million people 
passes through her hands. When Manchuria 
passed under the influence of Japan the ''open door" 
was banged shut and locked and our twenty-mil- 
lion-dollar cotton trade with that province was at 
once cut ofif. If we expect to maintain an open door 
in China we will have to fight for it. 

To protect her commercial control of the Pacific 
she has developed in twenty years a navy second 
only to the navies of Great Britain, Germany and 
France. She needs coaling stations for her ships. 
She has already secured concessions on the west 



72 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

coast of Mexico within easy distance of the Panama 
Canal; she is now rapidly fortifying the Marshall 
Islands, two thousand miles nearer our shores than 
the Philippines. 

She has initiated a Monroe Doctrine for Asia 
and for the Pacific. 

An important Japanese diplomat said a few years 
ago to one of our patriotic American Lord Roberts 
— Hudson Maxim — "Mr. Maxim, you have a Mon- 
roe Doctrine, America for the Americans; we also 
have a similar doctrine, Asia for the Asiatics, but 
we are not ready to enforce ours yet; and you are 
not ready and are not likely to be ready to enforce 
yours. A little later, we shall inquire by what logic 
you can proclaim America for the Americans, and 
disclaim our right equally to proclaim Asia for the 
Asiatics." 
/ Prominent Japanese, men in power, have defi- 
/ nitely indicated that they intend to seize Alaska, 
as well as Hawaii and the Philippines, for Japan 
needs lands as well as commerce and naval bases. 
Japan has a population equal to one-half of our 
population. They are crowded on islands which, 
all together, are not twice the size of Oregon alone. 
At present each Japanese citizen has an areal re- 
source but one-third of one per cent, of a square 
mile and this land has been depleted and exhausted 
by eight thousand years of use. Alaska is about 
three times as large as Japan. After fifty years of 



WHY JAPAN MAY FIGHT US 73 

ownership, we have a population there of but 65,- 
cxx); yet in ten years, Japan has sent 100,000 Jap- 
anese to our coast states, a quarter million to Mex- 
ico and thousands to the Philippines and the Ha- 
waiian Islands. 

"The earth of California is so rich that we, in 
our thrifty way, can make immense money there. 
The air is salubrious, and the cost of living so small 
that we can in twenty-five years defy the rest of 
the United States." ^ 

The war for the trade of Asia, western Mexico 
and western South America and the war for the 
control of the Panama and the Pacific must be 
fought; China in 1895, Russia in 1905, America 
in 191 5 was the plan outlined by the late emperor. 
The war must be fought ! The financial and com- 
mercial need is too great, the certainty of success 
too sure and the prize to be obtained too rich to 
waver or change. 

Japan now commercially controls less than one- 
third of a million square miles of area resources; 
if successful in a war with the United States, she 
would be able to draw commercial revenue from 
three million six hundred thousand square miles. 

If Japan wins, she will in conjunction with Eng- 
land or Germany not only control the Panama Ca- 
nal, but she will have command of areal resources 
of Alaska, of all the Pacific Coast, of western Mex- 
ico, of Peru, of Equador and of Chile, as well as 



74- AWAKE! U. S. A. 

possession of the Philippines, Guam and the Ha- 
waiian Islands. 

If Japan succeeds in making herself master of 
the Pacific as England has made herself master of 
the Atlantic, Japan will commercially control areal 
resources i,8oo per cent, larger than her present 
home resources. 

Japan is a powerful nation with a navy more 
modern than ours and an army fifty times as great 
as the army of the United States with additional 
millions of other trained men in reserve. 

*'No prouder nation exists on the face of the 
earth, no nation which has more venerable tradi- 
tions of which it justly has the right to be proud. 
Their courtesy and tact in dealing with foreign 
nations lose nothing by comparison with France." ^ 

We have signed and ratified an international 
treaty with Japan, guaranteeing her citizens certain 
rights in the United States. In accordance with 
the expressed statement of our United States Con- 
stitution, and second only to it, our ratified treaties 
are the supreme laws of the nation and the United 
States. We have broken our treaties, insulted Ja- 
pan by doing so ; and we offer no apology. 

Not only have we broken faith with Japan as a 
nation, but we insult her citizens individually. We 
have treated them and continue to treat them worse 
than we treat Koreans, Mexicans, Chinamen and 
negroes. An American Y. M. C. A. (a brother- 



WHY JAPAN MAY FIGHT US 



75 



What Japan Would Gain 
in 
Areal Resources fop Commepce 



A 
B 



If Japan should for commercial reasons bring about a war with 
the United States and defeat us in that war, the maintenance of 
the Monroe Doctrine would have to be abandoned by us. 
In consequence, Japan's millions of people would be free to colonise 
and cement their control over Alaska, California, Oregon, Wash- 
ington, western Colombia, western Central America, western Mex- 
ico, Philippines, Chile, Ecuador and Peru, and to retain restrictive 
control of the international commerce of the United States. 
Moreover, Japan would gain, in conjunction with England, actual 
control of the Panama Canal. 

This would give Japan not only the coveted naval bases near the 
Panama Canal, but commercial control of the untold wealth of 
2,895,000 square miles of virgin and undepleted territory. This 
territory is 1700 per cent, greater than that which Japan has at 
present — a prospective gain worth fighting for. 



76 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

hood without restriction as to creed or race) admits 
Koreans and Chinamen but refuses membership to 
Japanese. When their navy visited our shores, they 
invited our naval officers to a ball and showed them 
every courtesy; our citizens in return invited their 
officers to a function in their honour but our women 
refused to dance with the admirals and aristocrats 
of the oldest and most dignified race in the world. 

Japan is an old nation, a proud nation, with an 
unbroken imperial family six thousand years old; 
it is an oriental nation that smiles but never for- 
gets nor forgives. 

How foolish to imagine — 

"... that Japan, possessed of two-thirds the 
population of this nation and a military organisa- 
tion fifty fold greater, shall continue to exist on her 
rocky isles that are, inclusive of Korea, but one- 
two-hundred-and-fiftieth of the earth's lands, while 
an undefended one-half lies under the guns of her 
battleships?"^ 

QUOTATION REFERENCES 

* Page 73. From a book circulated by the National De- 
fense Association of Japan, the present officers of which 
are reported to be : Count Okuma, premier of Japan, presi- 
dent; Baron Kato, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 
Vice-President. 

^ Page 74. General Francis V. Greene, U. S. V., in the 
"Present Military Situation in the United States," 

* Page '^6. General Homer Lee, in "The Valor of Igno- 
rance." 



CHAPTER IV 

WHY ^NGI^AND AND THE UNITEID STATES MAY BE 
LED INTO WAR 

ENGLAND and the United States have been at 
peace for a hundred years. The peoples of the 
two countries speak the same language and the 
blood tie between the two countries is very strong. 
But neither blood ties nor similarity of language 
prevent war when commercial interests are at stake. 

In 1763, the English colonists of Massachusetts 
willingly levied«a tax upon themselves of two-thirds 
their entire yearly income to fight with the British 
against the French forces in Canada. They thus 
contributed to the English war chest $70,000 in 
twenty months — an enormous sum for those days. 
They also raised an army of 30,000 men, to fight 
with their English brothers against the French in 
Canada. 

Yet only twelve years afterwards these same 
English colonists in Massachusetts turned and 
fought to the bitter end their English brothers of 
the same blood because the English brothers at- 
tempted to restrict the commerce of the English 
colonists and to tctx them without their consent, 

77 



78 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

If the United States and England ever engage 
in war it will come about because of conflict in world 
trade. England's life is her commerce. When the 
Englishman lights for the commerce of Britain, he 
fights for the nation's life. 

Twice in 140 years England and the United 
States have been at war over commercial matters. 

The War of the Revolution was begun because 
England refused to allow us to freely trade with 
other nations and taxed us for her own profit even 
in our trade with her. 

We call our War of the Revolution our war for 
political independence and our War of 1812 our 
war for commercial independence; but to England 
both wars were commercial wars. 

A little over a hundred years ago England was 
engaged in a life-and-death struggle with France, 
whose military head, Napoleon, planned to invade 
England and destroy forever England's control of 
the seas. At present England is engaged in a life- 
and-death struggle with Germany, whose military 
head, the Kaiser, has planned to invade England 
and whose avowed purpose is to destroy for all time 
English commercial control of the seas. 

After this war England, successful or unsuccess- 
ful, will be burdened with billions of debt. We are 
becoming to a certain extent the creditor nation of 
the world and are taking over at a considerable rate 
a larger portion of the world's commerce than we 



ENGLAND AND THE U. S. A. 79 

have ever before handled. As England views it, 
we are beginning to tap her veins; and we are be- 
ginning, in a small way, to drain the life blood from 
her body. 

England's habitual attitude is well known. For 
centuries she has waged wars for imperial aggran- 
disement, for world trade, for British supremacy; 
but England has never zvaged zvars for indemni- 
ties! Moreover, the results of her imperial con- 
quests have been so beneficent that her colonists, 
even though differing in blood and nature from her 
own sons, have soon become as loyal to the Empire 
as Englishmen themselves. Witness the large per- 
centage of German-Australians who volunteered 
and fought for England in South Africa; witness 
the South Africans of to-day loyal and faithful to 
the England they fought but a generation ago. 

Has England absolute need of retaining her com- 
merce? 

In England during the last thirty years, 1880- 
1910, the increase in naval expenditures was 245 
per cent. ; the increase of army expenditures was 
65 per cent. ; and the increase in the cost of living 
71 per cent. 

The citizens of a nation must pay, by direct or in- 
direct taxes, the nation's army bill and the navy 
expenditures; and they must pay directly for the 
things — food, clothing, shelter — with which to sup- 
port themselves. Whatever a nation pays in the in- 



80 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

INCREASING INDUSTRIAL BANKRUPTCY OF GREAT 
BRITAIN FOR THIRTY YEARS BEFORE THE WAR 

1880—1910 

The increase in the expenses of the navy was 245 per cent, of 
the army 65 per cent., of the cost of living 71 per cent., while the 
increase in wages was but 27 per cent. 

Year by year the two great governmental expenses and the one 
great individual expense — cost of living — had increased out of all 
proportion to the increase in earning income. 
Increase in public expenditures can only be met by increased 
loans which must some day be paid, by increased taxation or by 
indemnities levied upon foreign nations by means of conquest. 
The prospect was industrial bankruptcy. 

The data of the increases of the navy and of the army are taken 
from official reports of the British Government and from the 
"Statesman's Year Books" of 1880 and 1910. 

The data of the increase in the cost of living and the increase 
of wages are taken from various British writers on political econ- 
omy and sociology, from "Bliss' Encyclopaedia of Social Reform," 
and from information obtained from the British Museum, the 
British Institute of Social Science and the Musee Social de France. 
Increase in the cost of living is not based, as so many writers on 
economics wrongly base it, upon a few actual necessities of life, 
but upon the average amount of money the masses spent for their 
living. 

The increase in wages is based neither upon the increase nor de- 
crease of the wages of a few skilled labourers nor upon the very 
small increase of the wages of unskilled workers, but upon the 
average increase of all types of labour. 

The estimates of wage increase in Great Britain, according to 
the work of the Royal Statistical Society and the report of the 
English Board of Trade Blue Books, do not give a correct estimate 
of the increase of income of the masses, because of the fact that 
wage rates are made per day and per week, while for thirty years 
before the war through middle and northern England men and 
women were often out of work three days out of six. Conse- 
quently the actual income earned was but one-half of the wage 
scale cited upon which statistical reports are made. 



ENGLAND AND THE U. S. A. 81 

Incpeasing 

IndusfPiol BankFupicy of Great Briid&i 

FoF TJiiFly Yeaps Before Ihe Wop 

1880^1910 



B^5 % IncrGQiSG Na\/al Expefi'Se 
7r/oIncpGasG CosIofUv/n^ 



6S % IncpeQiSG Apwy Expense 

' I I ' 
t7 % Increase of Wa^cs 



National Debt 
Decpeased $121000.000 
from mo to 1910 
olthou^h Great Britain 
carriGd on me Boer War 

during tfiij Period 
at a Coj/of-$(ttt/,OOQOOO 



82 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

creased cost of living, army expenditures, and naval 
expenditures, must come out of what they earn, — 
unless the nation levies tribute on the commerce of 
other nations or exacts indemnities froml'them. The 
cost of living must be paid out of the wages earned. 
The army and navy expenditures must be paid by 
taxes, and 95% of the taxes during the thirty years 
previous to the war have been paid out of the 
wages earned. 

If the increase in wages over an extended period 
does not keep pace with the increase in army and 
naval expenditures and with the increase in the 
cost of living, the national debt grows and grows 
and a day of reckoning comes sooner or later. The 
increase in wages, in England during the thirty 
years period, from 1880 to 1910 was only 27%, 
while the average per cent, of increase of the three 
great expense items was 127%. 

Moreover, the people of Great Britain were 
burdened before the war by a debt of $3,600,000,- 
000. The present war debt up to April i, 1916, is 
$9,222,470,000, making a total debt at present of 
$12,822,470,000. The per capita debt of Great 
Britain is $312, while our per capita debt is $32. 
Great Britain's debt is at the present time 15% of 
her entire national wealth. 

Without natural resources. Great Britain's na- 
tional debt, in proportion to her wealth and in pro- 
portion to her population is greater than that of 



ENGLAND AND THE U. S. A. 83 

any other country in the world today. Bankruptcy 
can be avoided only by tribute on international com- 
merce or by indemnities by conquest. 

England is a hungry nation, but she is not a starv- 
ing nation. Her density of population is greater 
than that of any other great world power. The 
density of population in Great Britain, including 
Scotland and Wales, is 370% greater than that of 
China; and that of England alone is 620% greater 
than that of China. England's few thousand miles 
of territory have been dug out, depleted, worked 
over for a thousand years. The food which she 
raises on her lands each year is not sufficient to feed 
her population for six weeks. Therefore for the 
other forty-six weeks of the year she must obtain 
food from other nations for forty-three millions of 
people. England does not produce enough material 
for clothes on her own land to clothe one hundred 
out of every hundred thousand of her people. 
Therefore for each 99,000 out of each hundred 
thousand she must secure clothing materials from 
other lands. 

England each year must in some way get hold 
of enough money to pay other nations for the food 
of forty-three million people for forty-six weeks a 
year and England must in some way acquire enough 
money each year to pay for the cloth-material for 
forty-two million people a year. 

But, how can she get this money? She cannot 



84? AWAKE! U. S. A. 

dig it out of her soil; she cannot secure it from 
crops raised on her lands. There are but two ways 
— commercial tribute or indemnities by conquest. 

By possessing a gigantic navy and thus being 
able to control the seas and protect her merchant- 
men, she can monopolize over sea commerce. Be- 
cause of this monopoly, England makes the Aus- 
tralians pay for shipping their wool to England in 
her vessels, makes them pay for its manufacture 
into cloth in England and makes them pay a third 
time for the privilege of having it carried back to 
Australia as cloth. In the same way, by her control 
of the seas, she has for more than seventy years 
induced us to pay her to carry our cotton to Eng- 
land in her ships, to pay her for manufacturing it 
there, and to pay her again for bringing it back 
to us as cotton cloth. And we have acquiesced in 
spite of the fact that in many of the southern states 
as well as the Middle Atlantic States, there is coal 
and iron and labour, all the essentials for manu- 
facturing cotton cloth. 

England's very existence — the very life of her 
people — depends upon the triple profit which she 
thus compels other nations to pay her because of 
her control of the sea. It is not only the profit of 
the manufacturing, it is the profit of transporting 
— the revenue of international commerce that is 
England's life. Every great English manufacturer 
would become bankrupt in one month if his work 



ENGLAND AND THE U. S. A. 85 

were limited to the use of materials produced on 
the soil of England. 

England, burdened by her great war debt, can 
save herself from financial bankruptcy only by 
the levying of great indemnities or by rapidly and 
enormously increasing her international trade. It 
is not England's policy to wage zi'ars for indenmi- 
ties. There will be but one avenue left to her — that 
of increased commerce with her colonies and with 
North and South America. In energetically push- 
ing her trade with the United States and with the 
countries of South and Central America and with 
Mexico, England's interests may come in conflict 
with those of the United States. 

England and America will never be drawn into 
war because of a desire on the part of England to 
obtain territory. 

In this respect England's need is vastly different 
from that of either Germany or Japan, even assum- 
ing that all the colonial territory taken from Ger- 
many during the present war should be restored to 
her. In fact, Great Britain has a surplus instead 
of a need. Great Britain, with but 88,000 square 
miles of territory, has colonies, dependencies and 
dominions of 12,600,000 square miles. Germany 
with 200,000 square miles had colonies and depend- 
encies before the war of but 1,000,000 square miles. 
Japan with an area of about 150,000 square miles 



S6 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

has colonial and dependent territory of but 110,000 
square miles. 

At the present time each million of Great Brit- 
ain's population have an average colonial territory 
from vv^hich resources can be drawn of 280,000 
square miles. If all German territorial possessions 
should be returned at the close of the war, each mil- 
lion German population would have but 18,000 
squares miles of colonial territory from which to 
draw trade and revenue; while each million of Ja- 
pan's population has but 2,000 square miles of co- 
lonial and dependent territory from which to draw 
trade. 

To her hundred per cent, of home territory, Ja- 
pan has but 73 per cent, colonial and dependent ter- 
ritory ; to her hundred per cent, of home territory, 
Germany had less than 500 per cent, colonial and 
dependent territory; to her hundred per cent, of 
home territory, Great Britain has more than 14,000 
per cent, colonial and dependent territory. 

It is possible but not probable that England and 
the United States will ever again be drawn into 
war because of international trade conflicts. 

Japan and Germany have not large enough colo- 
nial populations from which to draw trade and 
revenue sufficient in amount to support the home 
governments and keep the home empires from 
industrial starvation. With England conditions 
are entirely different. Japan's colonial and de- 



ENGLAND AND THE U. S. A. 87 

pendent population is about 16,000,000 — about 35 
per cent, of her home population. Germany's co- 
lonial and dependent population is about 14,000,000 
— less than 20 per cent, of her home population. 
Great Britain's colonial and dependent population 
is over 440,000,000 — over 1,100 per cent, of her 
home population. 

Every million of Germany's population can trade 
with and draw revenue from but 200,000 colonial 
and dependent peoples. Each million Japanese can 
trade with and draw revenue from but 300,000 
colonial and dependent peoples, but every million of 
Great Britain's population can trade with and draw 
revenue from 8,700,000 colonial and dependent peo- 
ples. 

Great Britain has the opportunity of sufficient 
trade with her own people to save her from bank- 
ruptcy and to feed and clothe her home population. 

This is evidenced by the fact that Great Britain 
is the only great world power that reduced its debt 
during the thirty-five years before the war. 

This war has freed us of one great illusion. Un- 
til there is universal disarmament, no nation can 
continue to carry on an increasing commerce with' 
the colonies of another nation or with its own col- 
onies even in times of peace without armed protec- 
tion for that commerce. Germany is waging war 
to-day because she discovered that she could not 
gain and hold international trade in British and 



88 AWAKE! U. S. A 

French colonies without political control of those 
territories and naval control of the seas. England 
is fighting because she realised that unless she con- 
tinued her naval control of the seas and her po- 
litical control of her own colonies, she could not 
prevent the commercial encroachments of Germany. 
The nation wishing to control in the world of com- 
merce must also control from a naval, military and 
political standpoint. 

England, successful or unsuccessful in this war, 
knows that she must prepare for the future. Her 
navy must be larger than ever before. Just as com- 
merce in the Nineteenth Century centred in the 
northern hemisphere, so in the Twentieth Century 
it will centre in the southern hemisphere with its 
millions of square miles of undeveloped resources. 

To protect her trade in the southern hemisphere, 
England must have ready fuel for her ships and 
consequently naval stations near the base of opera- 
tions. Oil will be the fuel of battleships in the fu- 
ture. Mexico will be the source of oil for naval 
operations near North and South America. In 
Mexico the struggle for the control of oil lands has 
been going on for a generation and has lately re- 
sulted in years of anarchy. English, German, Jap- 
anese and American interests are fighting for su- 
premacy. 

It is most improbable that England would ever 
wage war upon the United States for the purpose 



ENGLAND AND THE U. S. A. 89 

of levying an indemnity. It is possible but not prob- 
able that England and the United States would 
ever be again led into war because of conflicting 
interests in world trade. 

But it is very probable that England and the 
United States may be led into war if we continue 
to assert that England has no right to protect her 
citizens on North and South American continents 
and at the same time refuse to take the necessary 
means — means which we now claim as our absolute 
rights — to insure the safety of her interests and 
the protection of her citizens. 

England is justly world-famed for the protection 
she gives her citizens, no matter where they may 
be, no matter how small the injury, no matter how 
slight the insult offered. Even before the present 
war, her patience was sorely tried regarding Mex- 
ico. If the American oil interests place a man of 
their choice at the head of the Mexican Govern- 
ment, other rebels will again be supplied with money 
and arms, just as English and German interests 
have done in the past; and there will again be 
trouble. 

If England's citizens are killed, it will then be 
necessary for us to back down regarding the Mon- 
roe Doctrine or fight. 

May there not be possibility of trouble in the fu- 
ture if we do not recognise our duty in Mexico and 



90 AWAKE! U. S. A. 



do not live up to our highest conceptions of that 
duty? 

We have practically guaranteed all the Americas 
from intervention, but if, in pushing her trade, in 
Mexico for instance, her interests and her citizens 
should suffer from anarchy and if we should con- 
tinue to refuse to assume the responsibilities of our 
Monroe Doctrine, England will intervene, protect- 
ing her interests and her citizens — Monroe Doc- 
trine or no Monroe Doctrine. 



CHAPTER V 

TH^ GOOD FAITH OP NATIONS 

THE prophets plead with us to trust to the 
''good faith of nations" and to ''make uni- 
versal arbitration treaties." 

It is good to "have faith," but it is not wise to 
have too much faith in "gold bricks !" 

We are asked to trust to the good promises of 
nations that have not kept and are not now keeping 
their agreements. 

France, England, Prussia, Austria and Russia, 
have each at many times both ignored the treaties 
they have signed and violated the arbitration agree- 
ments to which they were parties. 

And what of ourselves? Are we willing — have 
we been willing in the past — to abide by arbitra- 
tion? 

Would ive have agreed to the decision of an in- 
ternational tribunal regarding any of our five great 
crises: the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, 
the War with Mexico, the Civil War, the War with 
Spain? } 

In 1775 we were colonies of Great Britain, inter- 

91 



92 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

nationally recognised as such, under the govern- 
ment of the King of England, who decided to direct 
our commerce and to tax us as British subjects. 
If, at that time, there had been an international tri- 
bunal and if we had carried our case to that tri- 
bunal, would Russia, Prussia, Austria, Spain and 
royal France, all absolute monarchies and leading 
nations of the world, have decided in our favour ; or 
would they have held that the English Government 
had a right to direct the commerce of one of its 
colonies and to fix import duties? 

Certainly in 1848, if we had submitted to an in- 
ternational tribunal, our legally unjustified and un- 
reasonable occupation and seizure of Texas, a por- 
tion of another nation — the international court 
could have arrived at but one decision : *'The United 
States has no international right to steal Texas." 
Yet if we had not seized it, it would to-day be in 
the same condition of anarchy as that in which 
Mexico finds itself. 

In 1 86 1 we went to war to compel some of our 
federated states to remain in the Union. If we 
had submitted this case to an international tribunal, 
South Carolina would have admitted that she had 
agreed to federate; but she would have asserted 
that she had never agreed to remain in the Union 
forever, unless she wished to do so. She would 
have pointed out that both Presidents Jefterson and 
Madison, the two men who created the Constitu- 



THE GOOD FAITH OF NATIONS 93 

tion, were themselves of the belief that the Union 
could not force any state to remain a member of it ; 
she would have pointed out that the supreme law 
of the United States is the Constitution of the 
United States which gives the Federal Government 
power to regulate affairs not allotted to the sov- 
ereign states, but that there is not a single phrase 
in the Constitution that gives the Federal Govern- 
ment any right to force a state to remain in the 
Union if she does not wish to do so. It being a 
point of law, we would have lost our case. 

Before our Spanish-American trouble, we re- 
quested Spain, by a concurrent resolution of the 
House and the Senate, to recognise the independ- 
ence of Cuba two years before the explosion of the 
Maine. What would be our attitude to-day if Ger- 
many should send us a "request" to recognise Wis- 
consin's independence as a separate little Germanic 
nation? Before our declaration of war the united 
powers of Europe urged President McKinley to 
maintain peace. 

Does any one dream that a concert of European 
nations would have decided, if the question had been 
submitted to a Hague Tribunal, that we had a right 
to demand of a foreign nation that she withdraw 
all her naval and military forces from a portion of 
her own territory ? 

Will we be more likely in the future to submit 
great questions to the decision of other nations than 



94 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

we have in the past? Is the American citizen, if 
attacked and robbed, willing to go to court to sub- 
mit to arbitration the question of whether a robber 
has a right to rob or not ? 

If the great powers of the world, with whom we 
may soon have trouble, have shown for centuries 
that they do not keep agreements, even when signed 
and formally honoured, what cause have we to be- 
lieve that they will do so in the future, especially 
when high officials, — men in power in the nation, 
speaking of arbitration and the inefficiency of di- 
plomacy publically state that : 

"No true statesman will ever seriously count on 
such a possibility (effectiveness of arbitration) ; he 
will only make the outward and temporary main- 
tenance of existing conditions a duty when he wishes 
to gain time and deceive an opponent, or when he 
cannot see what is the trend of events." ^ 

"No nation should hold to a paper agreement 
when it is to its interest to take what it wants and 
has at the same time the power to do so." ^ 

If Great Britain should buy the Galapagos Islands 
of Ecuador, fortify them and thus create a naval 
colony at the western door of the Panama Canal, 
would we submit to arbitration? 

If we presented our case to the International 
Hague Tribunal, the first question asked would be : 
*'Has the United States any right to prevent Great 



THE GOOD FAITH OF NATIONS 95 

Britain's purchase of islands that do not belong to 
the United States?" 

We would answer : "Our Monroe Doctrine pro-* 
hibits the purchase." 

Then the Hague Tribunal (rendering its decision 
in accordance with international law) would ask 
us: 

"What standing has the Monroe Doctrine as in- 
ternational law?'' 

We would be compelled to answer: "No nation 
has ratified it; and all nations, except ourselves, re- 
fuse to recognise it." 

As a matter of courtesy, the Hague Tribunal 
might continue the inquiry; and the next question 
would be hypothetical : 

"Assuming that European nations may be 
brought to recognise the Monroe Doctrine, is it 
not a matter of fact that the Monroe Doctrine is 
an indirect reply to the proclamation of the Holy 
Alliance; that it definitely states that it applies to 
governments "distinctly different" from that of the 
United States — that is, to those nations governed 
by a king or emperor who believes in his divine 
right to rule? That being the case, how can the 
United States hold that the Monroe Doctrine ap- 
plies to the purchase by Great Britain of the Gala- 
pagos Islands ; inasmuch as neither the English peo- 
ple nor even the King of England himself believes 



96 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

that the ruler of the British Empire is divinely ap- 
pointed ? 

We would lose our case before any international 
tribunal. 

If Japan should occupy the Philippines, Hawaii, 
Lower California, and the Panama Canal Zone, 
would we arbitrate the question as to whether she 
has a right to rob us, or whether she has a right to 
hold us up for blackmail before vacating any one or 
all of the territories occupied? 

Would we arbitrate or would we fight ? 

Why pretend that we want universal arbitration 
when we have not arbitrated and will not arbitrate 
vital international questions ? 

Why place our faith in unsupported arbitration 
— a form of settlement often broken by the nations 
threatening us and a method of settlement which 
we would refuse to accept as a means of solving 
any of our own vital problems ? 

QUOTATION REFERENCES 

^Page 94. Prince von Bulow. 

^ Page 94. Personal statement of prominent German 
official to the author. 



CHAPTER VI 

TH^IR ATTITUDE TOWARD US 

THE diplomats and the government of Great 
Britain are most polite, doing everything to 
appeal to us ; yet the most common phrases in Eng- 
land to-day are: 

''The Americans boasf of their love of liberty; 
Englishmen fight and die for it." 

"They (the Americans) v^ish English gold too 
much to enter the European conflict for liberty." 

"We pity you, living in a land which places the 
dollar before all else. Here, we fight for honour 
and the sanctity of neutral nations, when it would 
have paid us well to keep out of it." 

"Belgium has been violated and France raped of 
its richest provinces, yet you, sister republic of 
France at whose birth Lafayette presided, send no 
word of protest. Has the Statue of Liberty top- 
pled into the sea? Has the land of the free no 
thought for the brave?" 

They think of us principally as : 

"Money-chasers, dollar hustlers, intent only on 

97 



98 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

supplying weapons of death to whosoever will buy, 
anxious only to haggle over traffic and to protest 
loudly at dislocation of trade." 

England condemns us. 

Because: Our government did not protest 
against the violation of Belgium's neutrality; 

Because: Our government did not protest 
against the laying of floating mines on the high 
seas; 

Because: Our government did not speak out 
against the devastation of Belgium ; 

Because : Our government did not raise its voice 
against the atrocities of Aerschot and Tongres; 

Because: Our government made no objection 
to the bombardment of undefended towns and the 
killing of peaceful citizens; 

Because: Our government has known of the 
massacres of five hundred thousand Armenians and 
has made no official protest ; 

Because: Our government refused to sanction 
a loan to France at the beginning of the war on the 
plea that our gold reserve was low; yet attempted 
at the same time to pass a ship-purchase bill which 
would have placed millions of credit to Germany's 
account ; 

Because : Our government later, when it meant 
increased trade for us, sanctioned a loan to the 
Allies ; 

Because: We made our first protest not in the 



THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARD US 99 

interest of humanity, but for the benefit of our own 
trade. 

General Wolseley, brother of the late Field Mar- 
shal Sir Garnet, writes: 

*'The question is not now whether America should 
or should not help the Allies; it is now that the 
western continent of the world should prove that 
she is a truly great nation." 

Sir E. Ray Lankaster, a noted biologist and 
world- famed British scientist, says: 

"In my judgment, the American abstention from 
war with Germany is owing to a mistaken though 
patriotic desire on the part of many leading Ameri- 
cans to safeguard and increase the material pros- 
perity of their country. . . . 

". . . Material interests can never be perma- 
nently and greatly advanced by shutting our eyes to 
the call of honour and humanity and allowing our 
devotion to freedom and justice dwindle." 

"... I do not hesitate to say that America, hav- 
ing tolerated, submitted to, and sought profit 
through triumph of German iniquity, would lose 
her self-respect and her power to oppose and de- 
stroy what is vile and injurious." 

And even England's greatest socialist, the lover 
of men of all nations, the believer in universal broth- 
erhood, H. G. Wells, writes : 

*'At the outset we believed that the United States 



100 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

would stand with us in the defence of civilisation 
and if need be act with us. Nobody now expects 
the United States to act, whatever outrages may 
occur. Nobody believes now that President Wil- 
son's last message was a Virtual ultimatum.' The 
letters and messages that come to Europe from 
America attract less and less attention. Britain 
had expected from the United States the neutral- 
ity of the just balance; she gets the neutrality of 
deliberate ineffectiveness. 

". . . We fight not merely for our threatened 
selves; we fight for the liberty and peace of the 
whole world. We fight, and you Americans know 
we fight, for you. 

"War is a tragic and terrible business, and those 
who will not face the blood and dust of it must be 
content to play only the most secondary of parts in 
the day of reckoning. 

"That is, with the utmost frankness, what I am 
thinking, and what a very large number of other 
Englishmen are now thinking, about the United 
States." 

Germans believe that we are wealthy only; that 
we are unpatriotic; that we are unwilling to pro- 
vide protection or to fight for our country — and this 
to them means cowardice! 

In Munich, July, 1913, I listened to the address 
of a prominent German politician. He proclaimed 



THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARD US 101 

that there were only Germans, Austrians, Russians, 
Jews, Italians, Scandinavians, etc., living in 
America, but no Americans; that our country had 
been developed and our wealth created by the Ger- 
man people in America; that our enormous wealth 
was due to German efficiency; that the wealth of 
America was in reality the wealth of the German 
people here. Munsterburg in a late article has also 
suggested that that which is good and great in our 
development is the result of the industry and ideal- 
ism of the German-Americans. 

Von Billow emphasised this also in 1906 and 
hinted that he could control our politics by the bal- 
ance of power then wielded by the voters of the 
seven and a half million German descendants in 
the United States. 

Speaking of the American peace movement and 
our efforts to establish international arbitration, 
Prince von Bulow writes : 

**With a child-like self -consciousness, they (the 
Americans) appear to believe that public opinion 
must represent the view which American pluto- 
crats think most profitable to themselves. They 
have no notion that the widening development of 
mankind has quite other concerns than material 
prosperity, commerce and money-making." ^ 

"They (the Americans) have a dog-in-the-man- 
ger policy. They are only rich but on the whole 



102 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

not patriotic enough to be able to defend them- 
selves." ^ 

The German military caste, which is the German 
Government, has always despised us; now they 
hate us. 

Because: We have not succeeded in inducing 
Great Britain to abandon her blockade of German 
ports ; 

Because: We have pushed our cases (so Ger- 
many believes) against her with much more vigour 
than we have pressed those against her enemies ; 

Because: We have defeated her efforts to pre- 
vent the manufacture of ammunition in this coun- 
try; 

Because: We have refused to prevent the sale 
of ammunitions to her enemies; 

Because: We have loaned half a billion dollars 
to the Allies; 

Because: We have attempted to interfere with 
her submarine warfare — her only efficient weapon 
against the British navy; 

Because: We have (as Germany believes) al- 
lied ourselves with her enemies by allowing our mu- 
nition factories to be placed under restrictive con- 
tracts of the British Government. 

Professor Hans Delbriick, former director of 
Kaiser Wilhelm's education and training; and pres- 
ent Secretary of the Home Office and Representa- 
tive of the Chancellor of Germany, writes: 



THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARD US 103 

"Their momentary proud position need deceive 
no one. The Americans have not yet stood any 
really severe test." 

And across the Pacific there is another nation 
that has "ideas" regarding us! 

The following quotations are from a booklet of 
the National Defence Association of Japan, of 
which the present officers are reported to be : Count 
Okuma, Premier of Japan, president ; Baron Kato, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, vice-president: 

"The Americans are a race of what-nots; crimes 
among them run rife to a steadily growing greater 
degree every year; and we Japanese are needed to 
teach them honour, morals and cleanliness." 

"It must be remembered that the Americans are 
a crude race that consists of every kind of riff- 
raff blood — including the negro-white mixture — of 
foreign nations. We in Japan have a glorious his- 
tory that antedates by thousands of years even 
the knowledge that the wild and Indian-infested 
America ever existed." 

"The United States seems to us like a huge soup 
pot, into which every kind of thing has been put 
in the hope of obtaining a savoury mess. The 
'mess' is there, we grant; but as to its taste, we 
know that it is bad, and that its smell is worse!" 

"And still the Americans say that their 'Eagle 
screams with pride.' Rather, we should say, it had 



104 AWAKE! U. S. !A. 

better squawk with shame — or that the United 
States should adopt some carrion bird of filthy 
habits that fills its beak with the flesh of human 
bodies from which life had — fortunately for them 
— departed. This sort of a bird would be a better 
emblem for the United States." ^ 

This is not jingoism. In no case have I quoted 
the extremists. The preceding quotations are from 
men and works of prominence. The wise men in 
our own country are beginning to realise the dis- 
favour with which we are looked upon by the rest 
of the world. 

Even so conservative a man as Joseph H. Choate, 
former Ambassador of the United States to Great 
Britain, has lately stated that "the United States 
is the most prosperous and hated nation of the 
world; that two of the warring nations of Europe 
dislike us more than they do the men they are fight- 
ing in the trenches; that even in British dominions 
beyond the seas the Americans are the most hated 
people on earth." 

QUOTATION REFEREWCES 

^ Page loi. Prince von Bulow. 

2 Page 102. Hildegard von Hilton. 

^ Page 104. From a book circulated by the National 
Defense Association of Japan, the present officers of which 
are reported to be : Count Okuma, premier of Japan, presi- 
dent; Baron Kato, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 
Vice-President. 



CHAPTER VII 
DO the:y intend to attack us? 

GERMANY and Japan openly state their in- 
tentions and publicly inform their people of 
just how the United States is to be conquered. 

In discussing the causes for attacking the United 
States and Germany's intention of doing so, Frei- 
herr von Edelsheim, in an official work widely cir- 
culated in Germany with the approval of the Em- 
peror and the General Staff at Berlin, writes as 
follows : 

''With that country (the United States) political 
friction, manifest in commercial aims, has not been 
lacking in recent years and has, until now, been 
removed chiefly through acquiescence on our part. 
However, as this submission has its limit, the ques- 
tion arises as to what means we can develop to 
carry out our purpose zuith force, in order to com- 
bat the encroachment of the United States upon our 
interests." 

It is feasible for us to build strong military forces 
to secure by fighting a feared and esteemed position 
in the world such as we have attained in Europe. 

105 



106 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

"This shows the advisability of impressing dis- 
tant countries that believe themselves inaccessible 
to direct attack, with the size and strength of our 
army." 

"As a matter of fact, Germany is the only great 
power which is in a position to CONQUER the 
United States." 

"It is certain that after the defeat of the United 
States fleet, the great extension of unprotected 
coast line and resources of that country would com- 
pel them to make peace." * 

(The italics and capitals are the author's.) 

It would be wise for us to note that the next to 
the last paragraph of the second Ancona note, sent 
to our government by Austria, contains this para- 
graph: 

"While the imperial and royal government may 
probably consider the affair of the Ancona as set- 
tled with the foregoing statements, it reserves to 
itself at this time the right to bring up for discus- 
sion at a later period the difficult questions of inter- 
national law connected with submarine warfare." 

Also it is well for us to note that the Frankfurter 
Zeitung, a conservative, semi-official, German paper 
in the Rhine provinces, stated on November 24th, 

"Few events of the war have caused such wide- 
spread or deep bitterness in Germany as the atti- 
tude of the United States after war was declared." 



DO THEY INTEND TO ATTACK US? 107 

". . . When Germany has recovered from the 
war, she will undertake a widespread, well-engi- 
neered work of education in America as to the rela- 
tive merits of Germans and Britons. // necessary 
the mailed fist mill also be applied to American 
aberrations. 

"Meanwhile Germany will show patience and con- 
sideration for certain weak sides of the American 
national character." 

And what are the intentions of Japan? 

It has been previously shown that the lands and 
areal resources of China will be of great value to 
Japan in another seventy-five or a hundred years. 
It has also been shown that lack of capital needed 
to develop industry and to build the thousands of 
miles of railway necessary in China, cannot be im- 
mediately supplied by Japan. It is therefore evi- 
dent that Japan cannot at present reap sufficient 
wealth from China to save her industrially. 

That the Japanese statesmen recognise this is in- 
dicated by the expenditures for their navy. 

During the year 1904-1905, the total appropria- 
tions of Japan, both for the ordinary and extra- 
ordinary expenses of the Japanese navy, was but 
20,614,000 yen. This was the year of the Russo- 
Japanese War. Previous to this, however, when 
she was preparing for her attack upon Russia — at 
the very time European and American statesmen 



108 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

asserted Japan had no intention of attacking Rus- 
sia — Japan was spending on her navy sums much 
greater than this. For eight years previous to the 
Russo-Japanese War, the expenditures for the navy 
averaged yearly 228 per cent, of v^hat they were for 
the fiscal year ending 1905. But immediately after 
Japan had accomplished the defeat of the Russian 
squadron in the East, the average yearly expenses, 
ordinary and extraordinary combined, for the years 
ending in 1905 and 1906, were only 48 per cent, of 
what they had been during the years of prepara- 
tion. 

Again, in 1907, the Japanese statesmen began to 
prepare their navy for another conflict. In 1908, 
in a time of peace in the Pacific, the ordinary and 
extraordinary appropriations for the navy were not 
only equal to the entire appropriations both ordi- 
nary and extraordinary of the year of war with 
Russia, but were actually 293 per cent, greater. 
Why should the expenses of the Japanese after 
three years be 393 per cent, of what they were dur- 
ing the year of their naval war with Russia? The 
only explanation possible is that the Japanese states- 
men then began to plan to prepare their navy for 
some extraordinary conflict in the future. 

And these expenses have continued. In 1912, for 
instance, the ordinary, the extraordinary and trans- 
ferred funds for the upkeep and building of the 
Japanese navy were 545 per cent, of what they were 



DO THEY INTEND TO ATTACK US? 109 



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In 1895 and 1896 little money was spent by Japan on her navy be- 
cause there was no special need for it. The Japanese War with 
China proved that Japan had no need of a navy so far as China 
was concerned. 

But there was need to prepare for the war with Russia. 
Consequently during the eight years from 1897 to 1904 the average 
expenditure per year on the navy was 425 per cent, of the average 
yearly expenditure during the Japanese War with China. That 
this money was for a purpose is proven by Japan's victory over 
Russia. 

That conquest having been effected, there was no need at that time 
for great constructive work on the navy. Consequently during 
1905 and 1906 the average expense per year on the navy was hut 
48 per cent, of what it had averaged each year during the time 
Japan was preparing for the conflict with Russia. 
In 1907 Japan began to prepare for another great conflict. 
Since that time Japan's naval expenditures on naval preparation 
have averaged each year, from igoj to 1914 inclusive, 392 per cent. 
of all her naval expenses during the year of the Russo-Japanese War. 
Is it to defeat the Chinese Navy? 

The Chinese Navy consists of four tiny ships, all more than nine- 
teen years old. The largest is of four thousand tons displacement. 
What navy is Japan expecting to combat? 



110 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

during the year of the Russo-Japanese War. This 
data is taken from the Resume Statistique de V Em- 
pire du Japon. 

In studying the finance report of the Empire of 
Japan, one needs be careful, however, to search out 
all the appropriations. The ordinary appropriation 
is in one place; for 1912, it was 40,208,000 yen. In 
another place one finds the extraordinary appro- 
priation, which is often not only equal to the ordi- 
nary, but 50 per cent, more; in 1912, it was 60,225,- 
000 yen. Then also, in very small print under the 
heading of finance, one finds a transfer of funds 
for submarines and warships totalling, in 191 1, 10,- 
689,586 yen, and estimated at 12,000,000 yen for 
1912. 

A true view of the enormous upbuilding of the 
Japanese navy can best be understood by compar- 
ing this tiny *'tucked-away" expense item — the 
amount transferred — to the entire appropriations 
of the Japanese navy, ordinary and extraordinary, 
during the year of war with Russia. This little 
"transferred" item for submarines and special craft 
was, in 191 1, 51.8 per cent, of the entire ordinary 
and extraordina/ry appropriations of the navy of 
Japan for the year of the Russo-Japanese War. 
Moreover, a late official of the Japanese Govern- 
ment, in speaking to the Diet, urging larger and 
larger appropriations for navy, said in substance: 



DO THEY INTEND TO ATTACK US? Ill 

"We must work night and clay for the upbuilding 
of our navy. Not one hour must be lost." 

Are Japanese statesmen mere children ? Are they 
expending on their navy these enormous sums in 
proportion to their wealth, merely for the folly of 
spending? If not, what other navy do they expect 
to combat in the near future? Japan has an of- 
fensive and defensive treaty with Great Britain. 
Japan has, practically, an offensive and defensive 
treaty with Russia. Japan's ofifensive and defen- 
sive treaty with Great Britain makes it necessary 
for Great Britain to use her navy against Germany 
if trouble should arise between Japan and Germany. 

But there is China! I have before me the letter 
of a venerable American who calmly and sincerely 
believes that Japan holds only the most altruistic 
intentions towards America and who also believes 
that Japan's entire preparation is for the conquest 
of China. But China has no navy. The Chinese 
navy consists of four tiny ships. The largest — the 
Hai Chi, is of but 4,300 tons displacement. It has 
a battery of two eight-inch guns. The other three 
ships are cruisers 25 per cent, smaller. The main 
armament of each of these cruisers consists of three 
six-inch guns. All of these ships are more than 19 
years old. 

If Japan's military and naval appropriations were 
intended for the conquest of China there would be 
an upbuilding and equipping of the army. Japan 



112 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

need not build up the transport system of her navy 
if her intentions are directed against China, for 
Japan already has a transport system, independent 
of her passenger ships, capable of carrying 199,000 
men. In a few weeks, these, plying back and forth 
between Japan and China, could carry to China a 
million men. One warship would protect them in 
their trips from the Japanese coast to the Chinese 
coast, and if China were the immediate goal, Japan 
would need greater extraordinary appropriations 
for their army — not for their navy. 

If Japan by these most extraordinary measures 
is not preparing her navy to combat the navy of 
the United States, for what purpose is she making 
such gigantic efforts? Why this great upbuilding 
of the navy from 1908 to the present time, corre- 
sponding with the same tremendous upbuilding of 
the navy during the years before the Russo-Jap- 
anese war? Can any one doubt that this money is 
being spent for a definite purpose? And since Ja- 
pan needs wealth as much as she needs land and 
areal resources and since China cannot furnish the 
wealth, since the immediate occupation of China 
would demand billions of Japanese capital, who can 
doubt that Japan is preparing her navy to combat 
the United States rather than China? 

Moreover, we have her own testimony in regard 
to this matter. 

A booklet by a member of a Japanese National 



DO THEY INTEND TO ATTACK US? 119 

Defence Society, circulated with its approval, de- 
scribes in detail how our Pacific Islands and our 
Western Coast States are to be taken. 

**Our war with the United States will be one 
whose intention is for the general betterment and 
benefit of the world." 

"If Washington is not strong enough to enforce 
its orders on the Pacific Coast, we are! In short, 
the United States Government is but a foolish child- 
hood game, such as checkers or jack straws." 

"We must seize our standards, unfurl them to the 
winds and advance without the least fear, as 
America has no army, and, with the Panama Canal 
destroyed, its few battleships will be of no use until 
too late." 

"The Tokyo arsenal is working night and day in 
making ammunition of all kinds. The Japanese 
Naval Minister is now occupied in the great work 
of hastening the building of first-class battleships, 
transports and submarines. Our army and navy 
commissariat departments at Futagwa are now 
working night and day in order that adequate sup- 
plies of our own compressed foods may be ready." 

"Sixty million Japanese are eager to begin a war 
against the United States that shall prove to the 
boasting Americans that the Japanese people do not 
know defeat and that their soldiers are invincible." 

"We will conquer them! How can we fail?" 

"We ask no clearer vision of them — except that 



114* AWAKE! U. S. A. 

which we will have over the sights of our rifles and 
the guns of our battleships." 

"We will of course have only trained men (sol- 
diers) go out, disguised as workmen and even rich 
merchants. These will slowly be reinforced, with 
the object always in mind of capturing the Philip- 
pines and Honolulu." 

"Capture these islands we must, in order to 
place our hands firmly and once for all on the Pa- 
cific Ocean." 

"Manila being ours, we will divide our navy and 
army forces. One part will go to take Honolulu 
and all the Hawaiian Islands; the other, and far 
greater part, will proceed to the Golden Gate of 
San Francisco!" 

"Then will our able workmen, agriculturists and 
artisans of all kinds go to their new country! And 
go with the most glad hearts." 

"The National Manifestation against America 
that took place last year in Hibiya Park, in our im- 
perial capital, attended by 100,000 people of all 
ranks, shows how glad we will be when the first 
shot is fired! 

"The Text of the resolution that was then passed 
is as follows : 

"We herewith formally request our government 
to declare war against the United States without 
an instant's delay 1 

"Let America beware! For our cry On to 



DO THEY INTEND TO ATTACK US? 115 

Hawaii! On to California! is becoming secondary 
in our country to our imperial anthem." ^ 

QUOTATION REFERENCES 

^ Page 1 06. From a book outlining Germany's means 
and method of attacking England and the United States; 
prepared by Freiherr von Edelsheim, when member of the 
General Staff at Berlin; book approved by the Kaiser and 
widely circulated. 

2 Page 115. From a book circulated by the National 
Defense Association of Japan, the present officers of which 
are reported to be : Count Okuma, Premier of Japan, presi- 
dent; Baron Kato, Minister of Foreign Affairs, vice-presi- 
dent. 



CHAPTER VIII 

AFTER this war is over Japan and all the 
nations of Europe will be too exhausted to 
start any war against us; and, even if they wished, 
we are so isolated on the east and on the west by 
expanses of water from three to five thousand miles 
wide, that no army could successfully cross to our 
shores." ^ 

Exactly the same idea was expressed by Ran- 
dolph in 1810 referring to Great Britain and war- 
ring Europe. 

A citizen who goes from the inactivity of his of- 
fice into the wilderness to hunt is not so able to bear 
hardships and endure fatigue the first ten days as 
he is afterwards. He may be fagged out day after 
day, he may be scratched and bruised, he may lose 
thirty or more pounds of fat, but after a few weeks 
of such life he is more fit, more able to endure, more 
skilled in using his gun than when he came fresh 
from the office. 

"All history teaches us that a natixjn never 

116 



THE NEARNESS OF THE ENEMIES 117 

fights more readily and more valiantly than im- 
mediately after the close of a war in which it was 
involved." ^ 

We ourselves after a long four-year struggle 
were well equipped and ready to go immediately 
into Mexico — compelling France to withdraw the 
Emperor she had installed in that country. Japan 
was not exhausted by the war with China, nor by 
the war with Russia. 

''Even the little kingdom of Servia fought first 
Turkey, then Bulgaria and finally, with scarcely a 
spell of rest, she waged the most remarkable cam- 
paign of her history against a first-class European 
power." ^ 

Some years ago, in Paris, a French diplomat said 
to me: "We in Europe have learned to put our 
treasures in bank vaults and to employ guards to 
watch them. But you, Americans, are a strange 
people. You have made of your America a great 
glass house and you have stored within it the great- 
est treasures of the world. I should think, my dear 
sir, that your people would understand that there 
are envious nations on our side of the water, who 
will some time want your treasure." 

That is what a world known diplomat thought; 
this is what some of our own people think: 

"Only the ridiculous fear of a crying child left 
alone in the dark can account for the wild stories 
being spread about of how a foreign nation can sue- 



118 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

cessfully send an invading army to our shores. 
Such a thing is impossible." ^ 

But what do miHtary experts think? General 
Crozier, Chief of Ordnance of the United States 
Army ; Francis V. Greene, Major-General U. S. V. ; 
General Leonard Wood, Commander of the Depart- 
ment of the East; Captain Bristol, Director of 
Naval Aeronautics; Captain A. W. Grant, Chief of 
the Submarine Service! 

General William Crozier, before the Congres- 
sional Committee in 19 12, stated: 

"So far as transporting troops is concerned, the 
sea as a highway is not an obstacle but a facility." 

''It is very much easier to get any number of 
troops across the Atlantic Ocean than it would be 
to get the same number over anything like the same 
distance on land. Marine transportation is the very 
best kind you can have; the easiest, the least ex- 
pensive, and the most expeditious, if you are con- 
sidering large bodies of troops and large amounts 
of material." 

*'In smooth water and fine weather, they (the 
enemy) could land almost any place." ^ 

''The guns in these defences (coast forts) would 
be no more powerless to oppose a landing beyond 
their range if they were located on the most remote 
island of Alaska." ^ 

"Germany by using only 50 per cent, of her mer- 
cantile marine, only including vessels of more than 



THE NEARNESS OP THE ENEMIES 119 




TFansporf Facilities for Annies 

Qr.BFftain 
Qermony 
Japan 
U.S.A. I 

Great Britain's ability to transport large armies has been demon- 
strated for two hundred years. The transportation of troops in 
the Boer War was the marvel of military experts. 
In the transportation of troops distance is not the important factor. 
The size of the ships and the number of ships that can be used are 
essentially important. Great Britain's transportation tonnage is 
greater than that of any other country in the world. 
Germany's transportation and passenger tonnage is next to that 
of Great Britain. Even in 1901 Freiherr von Edelsheim, then a 
member of the General Staff at Berlin, worked out a definite plan 
for the invasion of the United States and demonstrated that Ger- 
many could embark 240,000 men for this attack upon the United 
States in two and a half days. During the fifteen years that have 
elapsed since 1901 Germany's transportation facilities have greatly 
increased. 

Japan's major and minor transportation fleets can now accommo- 
date 199,000 men. This does not include the use of the enormous 
passenger ships now under her control. 

As to the United States : We have now the problem of protecting 
lands, interests and wealth beyond the border of the United States. 
Porto Rico, Panama, the Philippines and the marvellously wealthy 
though little considered Alaska. 

In our Spanish-American War, after ninety days' preparation, we 
could not obtain transports enough to move more than 17,000 troops 
from Florida to Cuba, and it took our transports 17 days to do 
this. Men were left behind because there were no transportation 
facilities. 

In April, 1914, when, after more than two years of trouble with 
Mexico, President Wilson ordered General Funston to sail from 
Galveston to Vera Cruz, the transport fleet was able to take less 
than 4,200 men. A large portion of Guneral Funston's original 
command, as well as the artillery and cavalry, was left behind 
at Galveston because there were not sufficient transports. 



120 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

2,000 tons' registery, could land 450,000 men in 
this country in from sixteen to seventeen days after 
domination of the sea had been obtained." ^ 

''Since steamers have supplanted sailing ships 
for commercial intercourse, it is possible to trans- 
port our large troop forces in them." ^ 

What are the experiences of history? 

''The war between Japan and China, between 
America and Spain, between England and the 
Transvaal, and finally the Chinese Expeditions, 
have largely demonstrated the methods of trans- 
porting troops over the sea." ^ 

"Lord Cochran landed 18,000 men on the open 
coast of America in five hours ; in the Crimean War 
the English accomplished the disembarking of 45,- 
000 men, 83 guns and about 100 horses in less than 
eleven hours." ^^ 

"In an operation by the Russians, 8,000 men, in- 
cluding infantry and cavalry, were embarked in 
eight hours." " 

Our own experience in transporting troops to 
the Philippines is sufficient. 

"We had four transports — improvised from 
mail steamers, plying on the Pacific — the largest 
of which had a gross tonnage of 5,000 and the 
smallest 1,500. The total tonnage was about 
12,500." ^^ 

Our slowest ship had a speed of but nine knots 
and of course the transports had to keep together so 



THE NEARNESS OF THE ENEMIES 121 

that the average speed was not greater than that 
of the slowest ship. Yet in thirty-two days we cov- 
ered seven thousand miles from San Francisco to 
Manila and landed our forces ; although, when war 
began, we were unprepared to conduct a campaign 
across the Pacific. 

When this war is finished, England, whether suc- 
cessful or unsuccessful, will have at least one mil- 
lion men in training camps or in the field ready for 
service. The carrying capacity of her railways is 
such that these cannot be dismissed at a moment's 
notice. For months, perhaps for a year, there will 
be a standing army of at least five hundred thou- 
sand men. England has the greatest transport sys- 
tem in the world and her mariners have been 
trained for centuries in handling traffic and troops. 

"In England, the steamers for transporting 
troops to Cape Town, which is a long trip, were 
prepared in four days for the infantry; and seven 
days for the cavalry and artillery." ^^ 

The combined tonnage of the British India, 
White Star, Peninsular and Oriental lines is nearly 
two million tons. England could transport to the 
United States, without even interfering with her 
other shipping trade, from two hundred and fifty 
thousand to five hundred thousand men, in two 
weeks' time. 



122 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

And Germany ! 

"When the war is over, Germany will still be the 
second naval power in the world, stronger than our- 
selves in battleships, and possessed of an ocean-go- 
ing commerce with a tonnage nearly five times as 
great as our own." ^* 

"There would be no lack of ships. The fleet of 
the Hamburg line alone measures 1,168,000 tons, 
and of the North German Lloyd, 795,000 tons." ^^ 

Even all the details have been worked out by Ger- 
many — by Freiherr von Edelsheim when a member 
of the German General Staff. 

"The expedition corps would require eighteen 
ships; material and supplies would take five. The 
greater part of this number would be amply sup- 
plied by our two large steamship companies, the 
North German Lloyd and the Hamburg-American 
Line. The charter of these steamship companies 
provides for their use as transports if needed for 
expeditions of this sort." 

"The greater part of the supplies can be brought 
by tugs from Bremen to Bremerhaven. The troops 
can consequently embark at Quai in about four 
hours." '' 

"Ninety-six thousand men can be embarked in 
one day, or two hundred and forty thousand men in 
two and a half days." ^'^ 

"If we, almost ludicrously unready for war in 
1898, could do this (take our troops to the Philip- 



THE NEARNESS OF THE ENEMIES 123 

pines) is it to be supposed that Germany, with her 
plans studied out long in advance, with her enor- 
mous tonnage of fast ships, her troops in instant 
readiness, with no continent to cross and an ocean 
of barely 3,000 miles instead of 7,000 separating 
her from her opponent — is it to be supposed, I say, 
that Germany could not bring 240,000 infantry 
with the corresponding numbers of artillery and 
cavalry to our shores in from twelve to fifteen 
days ? No soldier who has studied the question will 
deny that Germany can do this." ^* 

Japan has a merchant marine whose tonnage 
almost equals that of the White Star, Cunard, 
British India, and Peninsular and Oriental lines 
combined. It is sufficient to handle under great 
emergency one-half million men. She has practi- 
cally absolute control of trans-Pacific trade, except- 
ing for the few English ships. England is pledged 
to Japan as an offensive and defensive ally. It is 
quite possible that Japan could land within four 
weeks after she determines to do so, and probably 
before a declaration of war, from two hundred 
thousand to three hundred thousand men on our 
western coast. 

QUOTATION REFERENCES 

^ Page 116. American newspaper editorial. 
^ Pag-e 117. General Francis V. Greene, U. S. V., in 
"The Present Military Situation in the United States." 



124 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

' Page 117. (See note 2,) 

* Page 118. American newspaper editorial. 

^ Page 118, Rear- Admiral Frank F. Fletcher. 

"Page 118. Report of the Army Committee of the 
National Security League, including : Hon. Henry L. Stim- 
son, ex-Secretary of War; Colonel William C. Church, 
editor Army and Navy Journal; Captain Matthew Hannah ; 
General Francis V. Greene; Major George Haven Put- 
nam; Colonel S. Creighton Webb, and others. 

■^ Page 120. Press report of interview with American 
Army Officer. 

^ Page 120. From a book outlining Germany's means 
and method of attacking England and the United States; 
prepared by Freiherr von Edelsheim, as member of the Gen- 
eral Stafif at Berlin; approved by Kaiser, and widely circu- 
lated. 

9 10 n Page 120. (See note 8.) 

^^ Page 120. (See note 2.) 

" Page 121. (See note 8.) 

14 15 Page 122. (See note 2.) 

" Page 122. (See note 8.) 

17 18 Pages 122-123. (See note 2.)] 



PART TWO: ARE WE PREPARED? 



PART TWO: ARE WE PREPARED? 

CHAPTER I 

THE GUARDS WITHOUT 

IN case of war, all our navy need do is to find 
the enemy's fleet and sink it." ^ 

Easy and simple ! Just about as simple as asking 
a man with arms cut off at the elbows to enter the 
ring" to thrash Willard or Carpentier ! 

Admiral Fiske gave official testimony that it 
would take five years to put our navy in shape to 
meet an efficient enemy. Admiral Knight, presi- 
dent of the naval war college, when urging that we 
make our navy efficient, stated that everybody who 
knows anything about the navy knows that it is 
not now in an efficient condition. 

Great speed and guns capable of high elevation 
are the most important features of the modern 
dreadnought. Over-thick armour is not of special 
value to-day. 

The most powerful battleships possess very large 
guns capable of being elevated thirty degrees, have 
armour plate of but medium thickness, and are able 
to make from twenty-five to twenty-eight knots per 

127 



128 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

hour. We have not one battleship combining these 
qualities. 

The battle in the North Sea demonstrated how 
important speed is to a big battleship. A fast ship 
can move in and out and around its enemy, keeping 
out of range when it desires to do so, and coming in 
again unexpectedly. A dreadnought with an ad- 
vantage of even one knot in speed is fifty per cent, 
more efficient than a ship of equal size and with like 
guns, one knot slower. The powerful Bluecher was 
destroyed not because of lack of armour, or lack of 
big guns, but because she was too slow to get away. 
Yet the Bluecher was able to make three knots more 
per hour than the fastest, most powerful, best- 
equipped armoured ship we have in our navy. 

-'They have no conception of the fact that a ship 
one-half knot faster, with guns of one-half mile 
greater range, with practically all other conditions 
equal, would have at its mercy any ship having 
lesser speed and guns with the shorter range." ^ 

England has twenty battleships capable of main- 
taining from 23 to 29 miles an hour, Germany has 
fourteen, Japan has four. We have none! 

Although guns on ships of foreign navies can be 
elevated twenty, twenty-eight and thirty degrees, 
we have had none that can be elevated more than 
fifteen degrees and most of them can be elevated 
only ten degrees. 

Even the two ships just about to go in service — 



THE GUARDS WITHOUT 129 



Modem Dreadnoujjlite i 




Japan has finished four modern dreadnoughts in the last two 

years, three of which have a displacement of 27,500 tons and the 

other a displacement of 30,600 tons. 

The first three have a speed of 27 knots and the fourth a speed 

of 22 knots. 

Two more ships of this last type are practically ready for service 

and will probably be in service by the time this paragraph is read. 

We have no ships of this type whatever. 

Our two best ships — the Nevada and the Oklahoma — have a maxi- 
mum speed of 22 knots. 

The engine efficiency of our best dreadnoughts is 26,000 and 25,000 
horsepower respectively. Japan's dreadnoughts have an engine effi- 
ciency of 60,000 horsepower. 

During the past eighteen months German naval construction has 
been pushed at an enormous rate. 

Our own Secretary of the Navy has just admitted that Great 
Britain has probably added to her navy sixteen great fighting ships 
since the present war began. 



130 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

the Oklahoma and the Nevada — are, in comparison 
with foreign ships, plodders. The Oklahoma and 
the Nevada in their speed tests some months ago 
were able to make an extreme record of about 21 
knots per hour. These are our best ships, but they 
are not yet in service. 

Japan has three new ships of 68,000 horse-power 
that have a speed of 27 knots, one great super- 
dreadnought of 40,000 horse-power that has a 
speed of 23 knots. These ships are already finished 
and in service. Two more ships of the super- 
dreadnought type of the same speed are to be fin- 
ished this year. 

Ships like the Minnesota, Connecticut, Vermont 
and New Hampshire cannot maintain a speed of 
even 12 or 15 knots. 

Moreover, the guns on many of our ships have 
shorter range than the guns of the ships of foreign 
navies. All the ships of the Alabama class have 
an extreme range of only 7^4 miles. The two 
great battles of the present war have been fought at 
a distance greater than 10 miles. 

After witnessing a review of ten of our best bat- 
tleships a short time ago, John Hays Hammond, 
Jr., remarked, "As we watched these massive struc- 
tures pass, some of us wondered how long they 
could contest with the superior range gun-power 
and speed of the modern battle cruisers of other 
nations. To those interested in naval development, 



THE GUARDS WITHOUT 1311 

it was obvious that only four out of the ten would 
make a real showing under modern battle condi- 
tions." ^ 

All of our battleships are supposed to be equipped 
with useable torpedo tubes, yet Rear-Admiral 
Strauss, Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, United 
States Navy, admitted in testifying that all ships of 
our navy, previous to the Nevada and the Okla- 
homa, have torpedo tubes, which are useless for 
modern torpedoes. As the Nevada and Oklahoma 
are not yet in commission, his admission means that 
we have now not one single torpedo tube in any bat- 
tleship afloat that is of any value. Even when the 
Nevada and Oklahoma are commissioned, there will 
be but eight torpedo tubes adapted to the use of 
modern torpedoes in our entire navy, while every 
single modern German battleship has six tubes each. 

Our torpedo boats are out of date and are ineffi- 
cient. All of them are more than fifteen years old 
and about as useful as an automobile of an 1899 
model. 

Fast light cruisers are most important, not only 
in protecting other ships of the fleet, hut above all, 
in protecting coast lines. Yet we have but three 
up-to-date ones to aid us in protecting thousands of 
miles of the Atlantic Coast, thousands of miles of 
the Pacific Coast and both entrances of the Panama 
Canal. 

"This leaves our fleet peculiarly lacking in this 



132 AWAKE! U. S. A. 



Bi0 QunsonShfps^ 



US- 
Japan 
Qepmany 
OKfiFitoin 




(i) Keels laid since 1905. 

The guns, larger than lo-inch, on ships the keels of which have been 
laid since 1905 are as follows : 

United States 172 

Japan 186 

Germany 232 

Great Britain 330 

United States ships of this class have no 13-inch gun and almost 
one-half of all the guns are 12-inch. 

Germany has twenty-four 15-inch guns, and Great Britain eighty 
IS-5 guns cm ships of this class. 



THE GUARDS WITHOUT VSS 



AvcFO^e nojpse Power per Ship * 



U.S. 
Oepmanyi 
Japan 
QRBFftafn 



(i) Keels laid since 1905. 

This represents the average horsepower of each ship of the first 
line ships. 

Japan has three ships finished of 68,000 horsepower each, one fin- 
ished of 40,000 horsepower, two more almost ready for service of 
40,000 horsepower. 

In our entire navy we have but four ships the engines of which 
have more than 30,000 horsepower each, and the engines of three 
of these are just over the 30,000 horsepower mark. 



134 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

element so necessary for information in a naval 
campaign, and of such great value in opening and 
protecting routes of trade for our own commerce, 
and prohibiting such routes to the commerce of the 
enemy." * 

"Leading the torpedo flotilla came the Birming- 
ham, a sad reminder that we have only three light 
cruisers of considerable speed, and these vessels, 
compared to the numerous craft of this type in the 
British and German navies, would present a sorry 
contrast in their relatively low speed and weak 
armament." ^ 

We have not a single fast scout boat built or even 
authorised since 1904. The three we have are not 
armed adequately and are too slow for use. None 
of them has ever made more than twenty-six 
knots. Up to the present time, we have not been 
able to secure firemen able to live before their fur- 
naces, for whenever there is a little wind they draw 
into the faces of the firemen, instead of upward 
into the stacks. 

England and Germany have been adding scout 
cruisers at the rate of from three to eight each 
year. Each is able to make thirty knots or more an 
hour. Before the war Germany had fourteen and 
Great Britain thirty-one. 

We have less than seventy destroyers. We 
should have at least three hundred. 

The less said about our submarines, the better. 



THE GUARDS WITHOUT 136 

Nearly a year ago Commander Sterling testified 
that one out of the twelve on the Atlantic Coast 
could efficiently take part in the manoeuvres at sea. 

In the spring manoeuvres this year, all of our 
good submarines, excepting one, were again unable 
to continue their operation because of some acci- 
dent or other. In the October manoeuvres, all, ex- 
cept one, were again conveyed to the navy yards, 
because "something" happened to their engines or 
other machinery. 

But a new submarine has just been launched! 
Assuming that this one zvill work, we have evi- 
dently but two submarines, on the Atlantic coast 
north of Panama, able to manoeuvre for a few days 
at least — without having to be convoyed to port. 

Even those of the L type, which in the past we 
have considered about as perfect as any of our 
submarines, are now found to be defective. 

We have two mine layers, one to cover the thou- 
sands of miles of the Atlantic Coast-line and one 
for the thousands of miles of the Pacific. Each 
mine-layer has but a few hundred mines. Germany 
had about 19,500 mines when the war began, and 
evidently laid about 14,000 or more in the North 
Sea for the purpose of destroying British commerce. 

The American nation wishes no navy for the 
purpose of waging a war of aggression against any 
nation. We wish a navy for the purpose of sup- 
porting our policy and defending ourselves. SucH 



136 AWAKE! U. S. A. 



Average Speed olStifps * 



U.S. 

Qermany 

QcBrftain 

Japan 




I. Speed of ships whose keels have been laid in the last six years, 
showing the increasing tendency for great speed in the construc- 
tion of battleships of Germany, Great Britain and Japan. 



THE GUARDS WITHOUT 



137 



AverageTonnage Displacement perOun 



Japan 

Germany 

QF.BFftain 

US. 




Not only are our ships slower than the ships of Japan, Germany 
and Great Britain, not only is the average horsepower of each of 
our first line ships less — in most cases less than half that of the 
ships of Japan — but the average tonnage displacement Per gun of 
our ships is greater. 

Our weaker engines propelling ships at less speed must carry 
around greater weight per gun than the stronger engines of the 
ships of Japan, Germany, and Great Britain. To carry each gun 
on the first line ships, our engines must pull a bulk i6 per cent, 
heavier than that which the higher-powered engines of Japan's first 
line ships have to propel. 



138 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

defence must prevent other nations from bombard- 
ing our cities or landing troops on our coasts. As 
the nature of our shores permits landing of troops 
practically anywhere along our coast-line, the 
primal purpose of our navy is to defend our coast. 
"We have 21,000 miles of coast-line and a rapidly 
increasing commerce to defend." ® 

Our coast-line now includes that of Alaska, 
Hawaii, the Philippines and Porto Rico, as well as 
that of the continental United States. 

German submarines are certainly as efficient as 
ours. With one-half of their submarine fleet and 
fourteen thousand mines, they attempted to block- 
ade 2,600 miles of the coast-line of Great Britain. 
Yet with all these means, they were able to stop or 
destroy only two per cent, of the ships entering 
British ports. 

We have an idea that our present fleet of sub- 
marines and our present supply of mines will be of 
great value in defending our coasts against an in- 
vading fleet. At least, we have hoped that the 
number of mines we have, strewn along our coast, 
and the activity of our submarines might be able to 
prevent a considerable portion of an attacking fleet 
from landing men on our shore. 

We will assume that our submarines are just as 
powerful, just as fleet, just as perfect in construc- 
tion, just as well manned as the German submarines 
which operated against the English coast for eight- 



THE GUARDS WITHOUT 139 

een months — and the German submarines are the 
marvels of the world. 

We will assume that the mines we have can be 
laid just as efficiently and that they are just as pow- 
erful as the mines Germany planted on the seas in 
her attempt to prevent ships entering British ports. 

Germany's effort in preventing ships entering 
English ports was confined to a coast-line one-tenth 
as extensive as the coast-line we would have to 
guard. Her chances, compared to what ours would 
be, were consequently ten to one. The number of 
German submarines, compared to those we have, 
indicates that Germany's chances, compared to what 
ours would be, were five to one. The number of 
mines the Germans used compares to all the mines 
we have as twenty-five to one. Taking all these 
factors into consideration, the chances Germany 
had of preventing ships entering British harbours 
compares to the chance we would have of prevent- 
ing foreign vessels entering our harbours as 1250 
to I. 

Our present Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Daniels, 
takes great pride in comparing our navy to other 
navies of the world by showing its relative tonnage. 
In tonnage the navy of Great Britain is 183 per cent, 
greater than ours, while Germany's, according to 
the Navy Year Book of 1914, was 24 per cent, 
greater than ours. By this same method our navy 



140 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

is ranked greater than the navy of France and 
greater than that of Japan. 

No method of judging the fighting quaUties of a 
navy can be more misleading and ridiculous than to 
determine those qualities by the tonnage of the 
navy. One might as well judge the fighting quali- 
ties of a man by his bulk. On the tonnage basis 
the greatest pugilist in the world would be the fat- 
test man. If a man has a gouty foot and a wrenched 
back, if his wrists are swollen with rheumatism; 
and his shoulders suffering from neuritis, he isn't 
of much value in the fighting ring, even though he 
may weigh 470 pounds. 

All naval authorities of Europe consider a battle- 
ship as a fighting instrument, not a boat. As a 
fighting instrument, either for offensive or defen- 
sive purposes, a battleship loses much of its value 
in twelve years, and is completely superannuated in 
twenty years. For this reason, a navy rapidly de- 
teriorates in value if new ships are not constantly 
added. Consequently the plans of construction for 
the European navies are based upon retiring ships 
as soon as they reach a certain age, replacing them' 
with modern up-to-date ships. A merchant vessel 
is an efficient carrier of commerce when it is twenty 
or even thirty years old, but a carrier of commerce 
is not a fighting instrument. 

Our navy department, however, counts as fight- 
ing instruments anything and everything that floats 



THE GUARDS WITHOUT 



141 



Battleships and Bottle Cruisers > 



Qr.BFitafn 
Qerman 
Japan 
U.S.A. 




I. This represents the number of battleships and battle cruisers 
authorized and laid down from December 31st, 1904, to January ist, 
1 914. 

And since January ist, 1914, Germany, Japan and Great Britain 
have been rushing construction of ships of this type at a tremen- 
dous rate. 

It is admitted even by Secretary Daniels that Great Britain has 

probably completed sixteen large ships since this date. It is known 

that Germany and Japan have been rushing construction of new 

ships night and day. 

A member of the Japanese Cabinet, in presenting the new budget, 

urged that "not a single hour should be lost in Japanese Naval 

construction." 

The United States has lagged woefully behind; at this writing, 
April 1st, 1916, the Oklahoma and Nevada are not yet in service, 
although they were authorized more than five years ago. 



142 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

in a seaworthy condition. No other method of 
making the apparent strength of our navy more 
misleading could possibly be evolved. 

Our navy has greatly decreased in value rela- 
tively to other great navies during the last six years 
because new fighting instruments have not been 
built to take the place of those that have lost the 
value they once had. Because the American people 
fail to recognise the difference between the fighting 
value of a ship and its seaworthiness, they are still 
under the impression that they now have as strong 
a navy compared to the navies of other nations as 
they had under President Roosevelt. A battleship 
fifteen years old may be a very efficient and sea- 
worthy craft, but almost useless as a fighting fac- 
tor. Our Navy Department not only lists ships 
fifteen years old, but those twenty years old, thirty 
years old, and even forty years old. 

Only four months ago the government at last as- 
signed to the junk-man a warship built just seventy- 
three years ago. This ship was used in the war 
with Mexico in 1846 and went to Japan with Perry 
in 1853. 

By listing anything and everything and ignoring 
our shortage in enlisted men and reserves, we have 
greatly over-rated our naval efficiency. If we in- 
clude personnel and count only ships less than 
twenty years old, we fall to fourth place, finding 
France's navy better than ours. 



THE GUARDS WITHOUT 143 

Other nations of the world do not list their ships 
in this way. Japan, for instance, discarded most of 
her torpedo boats more than seven or eight years 
old. In 1904 the navy list of the official report of 
the Empire of Japan showed 85 torpedo boats; in 
1913 she lists but S3- Her old torpedo boats have 
become useless as fighting factors and Japan does 
not try to deceive herself by counting her useless 
units. Also note that the official report of the Em- 
pire of Japan shows that she has added 47 new war 
vessels to her navy, exclusive of her torpedo boats 
and submarines in the last twelve years. 

According to our naval lists, we have, of all types 
of fighting ships — battleships, armoured cruisers, 
first, second and third class cruisers — only 27 ships 
whose keels have been laid in the last twelve years, 
even counting ships almost completed, but not yet 
in commission. 

Other navies of the world do not count their ships 
until they are finished. We count them as units 
of our navy as soon as they are voted and the Navy 
Department counts them the moment the keels are 
laid. But oftentimes two years elapse between the 
voting and the laying of the keel. And three years 
more elapse between the laying of the keel and the 
commissioning of the ship. The Nevada and the 
Oklahoma at the present moment, April i, 1916, 
are not yet in service, although they were voted 
early in ipii, five years ago. 



U4. 



AWAKE! U. S. A. 



Bottle Crutseps > 



Qr.BFitaJ 
Qerman 
Japan 

U.S.A. O 




I. This represents the number of battleships and battle cruisers 
authorised and laid down from December 31, 1904, to January i, 
1914. 

During this period Great Britain authorized and laid down 10, Ger- 
many 7, Japan 6, U. S. A. none. 

And since January i, 1914. Great Britain, Germany and Japan 
have rushed construction of battle cruisers at an enormous rate. 
We have no battle cruisers in our navy, and none is authorised. 



THE GUARDS WITHOUT 145 



Seoul Cruisers < 



Qr.Brii(ifn 
Qermany 
Japon p 

U.S.A. 



I. This represents the number of battleships and scout cruisers 
authorised and laid down from December 31, 1904, to January i, 
1 91 4. 

And since January i, 1914, Great Britain, Germany and Japan 
have rushed construction of scout cruisers at an enormous rate. 
We have neither authorised nor laid down a single scout cruiser 
since December 31, 1904, and we have only three defective ones 
in our entire navy. 



146 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

If you glance over the reports of the Secretary of 
the Navy, you will arrive at the conclusion that we 
have thirty-three first-class battleships capable of 
defending our shores. But the ordinary reader 
does not understand that when a ship is ''out of 
commission" or "in ordinary" or *'in reserve," it is 
temporarily or permanently useless. 

"A battleship 'in ordinary,' as it is called, with 
less than a hundred men on board might as well be 
eliminated from the lists of ships available for any 
service within reasonable length of time." "^ 

And when a ship is "out of commission" it takes 
months to repair it. The overhauling and repair- 
ing of the engines and machinery of a fifteen to 
eighteen million dollar fighting machine cannot be 
done in a few short weeks. 

At the present day a navy is of value for defen- 
sive purposes only if it is ready in both material 
and personnel for immediate action. If Winston 
Churchill had not kept the British Navy in such a 
state of preparation that it could sail to sea on 
twelve hours' notice, England would now be a con- 
quered province of the German Empire. If Eng- 
land had found it necessary to take even sixty days 
to put her fleet in order, the German fleet could 
have bombarded the towns of northern France, the 
Germans would have reached Paris and, the German 
fleet controlling the channel, the Germans could 
have landed an arrhy of five hundred thousand men 



THE GUARDS WITHOUT 147 

in England before England could have mobilised 
more than 200,000 soldiers. England's existence 
to-day is due not only to the fact that she had a 
great navy, but that she had it ready to move at 
once. 

As Rear Admiral Knight has stated, "A ship 
v^hich is laid up for repairs is, for all practical pur- 
poses of defence, practically non-existent." The 
rest of a fleet will be defeated before the ships "in 
ordinary" or *'in reserve" can be made ready to be 
of any value to the fleet. 

Of our 33 battleships, 12 are already in one or 
another of the three useless classes; and all of the 
21 remaining are not by any means in first-class 
condition. Many of them are continuously in na- 
val hospitals. Of those in actual commission, ten 
only are ships of the first line and eleven of the sec- 
ond line. Of the ten of the first line, two are so 
out of date that they are to be relegated to the sec- 
ond line within three months. So by June ipi6 
we shall have only eight first-class battleships in 
the entire American navy; and not one of these bat- 
tleships can maintain a speed of more than ^^V2 
knots, not one has a gun that can be elevated more 
than fifteen degrees and every one is weighted down 
with over-heavy armour. 

To man our ships in time of war with the small- 
est possible crews would require 72,500 men. We 



148 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

have 53,000. Our torpedo boats have but two offi- 
cers each. They should have six. 

As previously stated, our only purpose in desiring 
an efficient navy is to protect ourselves from battle 
fleets coming to our shores with the intention of in- 
flicting damage upon us or of demanding conces- 
sions and indemnities from us. We want a fleet 
that can prevent the landing of foreign troops on 
our coast. 

The great navy of England has been developed 
for defensive purposes; first to reach out and de- 
fend its colonies and its commerce with them and 
other countries ; and second, to defend Great Britain 
itself from invasion. The German Navy has been 
built up to defend German commerce and to defend 
Germany's commercial ports, in case Great Britain 
should ever attempt to bombard Hamburg and Bre- 
men, as she bombarded Copenhagen and Amster- 
dam to destroy their commerce when they were 
ports of world importance. 

From the defensive standpoint, therefore, a navy 
is of value proportionately to the length of its coast- 
line ; a navy is of value in proportion to the popula- 
tion of the country it has to defend — if the com- 
merce of that country is destroyed all of the people 
will suffer; and a navy is of value in proportion to 
the area of the country it has to defend, inasmuch 
as the value of areal products will decrease in pro- 
portion to interference with the country's interna- 




THE GUARDS WITHOUT 149 

Compapolfve 
NoYalProtectfon Dfven Eadi dtiiea 

Japan ■■ 

Mi 

Qenna 
QF£nta 

NovolProteclfonpeFMfleof Coast Lfine 

U.SA. ■ 1 

Japan ■§ 

QcBrttafn 

Q^mony 

Naval-PFotedf on Qiven HomeLands 

By 

U.S.A. I 

Japan 

Oermany 

Qr.BFitain 




150 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

tional trade. This is the only true way of valuing 
a navy. 

Germany has a coast-line of i,ooo miles; Great 
Britain and Ireland have a coast-line of 3,700 miles, 
Japan has a coast-line of 6,600 miles. From the 
defensive standpoint (as we have an enemy in the 
Orient) our coast-line stretches from Maine to 
Florida, from Florida to Mexico, from Mexico to 
Porto Rico, and from Porto Rico to Panama; on 
the west it stretches from Panama to Lower Cali- 
fornia, from Lower California to British Colum- 
bia, along the shores of Alaska; and then there are 
the Hawaiian Islands, Guam and the Philippine Is- 
lands. The Hon. Henry L. Stimson, ex-Secretary 
of War, states that the coast-line we must defend 
equals 21,000 miles. Comparing the greater popu- 
lation of the United States with that of other coun- 
tries, its greater territory with theirs, its greater 
coast-line with theirs, our navy is pitiably small and 
inefficient. 

Even though our battleships outnumbered and 
outclassed those of the enemy; even though we had 
a sufficient number of high-speed cruisers; even 
though our coast forts had guns of fifteen-mile 
range, instead of seven and a half — of what value 
will our guards be to us if we leave them as now 
with ammunition enough for only thirty minutes' 
fighting ? 

"The amount actually available for the guns 



THE GUARDS WITHOUT 151 

in some of our most important batteries is 
sufficient for only thirty or forty minutes' fir- 
ing." « 

But lack of sufficient trained personnel is even 
more serious than lack of ammunition — because 
ammunition can be more easily obtained. 

QUOTATION REFERENCES 

^ Page 127. Editorial, Indiana newspaper. 

' Page 128. National Defense, Vol I, No. 2. 

^ Page 131. Associated Press report. 

* Page 134. Press report of an interview with an Ameri- 
can naval officer. 

^ Page 134. Associated Press report of interview with 
John Hays Hammond, Jr. 

^ Page 138. The Hon. Henry L. Stimson, ex-Secretary 
of War. 

' Page 146. Rear-Admiral Austin Knight. 

^ Page 151. Report of the Army Committee of the 
National Security League, including : Hon. Henry L. Stim- 
son, ex-Secretary of War ; Colonel William C. Church, edi- 
tor Army and Navy Journal; Captain Matthew Hannah; 
General Francis V. Greene; Major George Haven Putnam; 
Colonel S. Creighton Webb, and others. 



CHAPTER II 
tut GUARDS AT The; door 

THE ordinary American citizen believes that the 
guns of our harbour defence would be able to 
prevent a landing of troops on our shores ; but the 
layman does not make a distinction between harbour 
defences and land coast defences. The guns of our 
harbour forts may be of value in opposing an attack 
upon our cities and may be of value in preventing 
ships entering the harbour, but of land coast de- 
fences, we have none! There are i,ooo miles of 
good beach on our Atlantic coast on which an ene- 
my's fleet could land without the least opposition 
any number of troops they might transport to our 
shores. 

We have no guns there; we have no railroad 
tracks capable of carrying guns to those points ; we 
have not a single armoured train in this country 
for the transportation of troops, guns and ammu- 
nition — the ordinary freight car under fire of an 
enemy would be almost useless. So far as prevent- 
ing armed invasion of our country, the guns at our 
harbour defences are absolutely useless. 

152 



THE GUARDS AT THE DOOR 153 

We have forts at Boston, New York, at the moutK 
of the Chesapeake and on the Pacific coast. The 
gun range of these forts is less than seven and a 
half miles — four and a half miles short of the 
range of the guns of the battleships which would be 
sent to attack us. The main entrance of the Chesa- 
peake, leading to Washington, is one and a half 
miles beyond the extreme range of the guns at Fort 
Monroe. So that an entire fleet of the enemy could 
steam through, more than a mile beyond the reach 
■of Fort Henry's guns. 

The largest guns we have mounted on our Atlan- 
tic coast defences are twelve-inch. They carry 7^ 
miles. General Crozier, Chief of Ordnance, who 
has been in the army twenty years, states that if we 
remount these guns so as to make greater elevation 
and consequently longer range possible, we must re- 
duce the bursting charge or weaken the penetrating 
power of the shell. 

These guns might be so mounted as to have a 
range of fifteen miles. At such a distance the 
*'angle of fall" is so great that the principal effect 
is obtained by the shell falling on the deck. If 
these guns were remounted so as to have a range of 
even fifteen miles, the penetrating power of their 
shells would become practically nil. The penetrat- 
ing power of the shell, reduced in size from 1,000 
pounds to 700 pounds, would be but six inches. Six- 
inch penetration power against modern battleships 



154 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

renders a shell practically useless so far as penetra- 
tion is concerned. The explosion of a shell which 
penetrates battleship armour but six inches takes 
place in the air outside the ship. The real value 
of an explosive shell is in exploding within the ship, 
either after penetrating the armour or falling on 
the deck. In other words, for adequate long-dis- 
tance defence our harbour guns are useless because 
of their short length. They would be relatively 
weak if remounted, for either armour or deck 
attack. 

We are, however, soon to mount two new gigan- 
tic guns of long range at Sandy Hook. These two 
guns are to operate in a single turret, hence it will 
be possible to aim them at but one point at a time. 
If a fleet of thirty dreadnoughts and battle cruisers 
attacked New York, each of the thirty ships could 
move about at will, changing its location as often as 
desired, so that the turret to be placed at Sandy 
Hook, to be effective against such a fleet, would be 
compelled to get thirty different aim ranges at the 
same time for thirty different battleships. But the 
ships, moving themselves about as much as they 
pleased, could centre their one hundred and fifty 
guns at the same moment on the one fixed turret at 
Sandy Hook. Thirty different battleships from 
thirty different locations could concentrate the shot 
of one hundred fifty guns on the single turret at 



THE GUARDS AT THE DOOR 155 

Sandy Hook ; yet it could fire at but one single bat- 
tleship at a time. 

While these two long-range guns could fire twenty 
shots at thirty different moving ships, the battle- 
ships could hurl 2,000 huge explosive shells upon 
that fixed turret. And all other coast defence guns 
would be useless in such a conflict because of their 
short range. 

''Most of the guns that are mounted on our coast 
fortifications, that is — all those of the 8-inch, 10- 
inch, and 12-inch calibre — date back to a design that 
was made in the early nineties and late eighties." * 

The good 12-inch guns made for the defences of 
Panama, after having rested for months and even 
years on the Cristobel Docks, are at last mounted; 
but our one big gun there, the 16-inch gun, which 
we have been told was so powerful a defence for 
the canal, was still unmounted last January. It was 
tested in ipoj and then it rested ten years on the 
beach. When General Wood took charge he imme- 
diately called for blue prints of the carriage of this 
gun, but was astonished to find that the War De- 
partment had never even made a design for the 
carriage. In spite of his urging, it took the depart- 
ment just two years to get the designs ready, and 
the carriage was not finished in January 1916, 
though the gun was finished and tested thirteen 
years ago. This, in itself, is an adequate answer 
to Secretary Daniels' proposal to have the United 



156 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

States Government make its own armour, manu- 
facture its large guns, shells and ammunitions. 

Panama is better fortified than any other portion 
of our coast or any other harbour, yet we have on 
hand such an insufficient amount of ammunition 
that after two hours' fire there would not be one 
single shell for the Panama guns within a thousand 
miles of the Canal. In fact, for the sixteen-inch 
gun, no shells are yet made. Congress has ex- 
travagantly ordered J5 rounds for this gun, and this 
is under manufacture but not yet ready to ship. 
For the twelve-inch guns at Panama, only 2,^00 
rounds have been shipped. 

"It must be borne in mind that an hour and forty- 
six minutes would suffice to exhaust the last round 
of ammunition if the guns were fired at their max- 
imum rate." ^ 

It is assumed by the American people that if war 
broke out, we could manufacture ammunition 
quickly. We are misled as to our ability to quickly 
produce sufficient ammunition by what seems to us 
the enormous war orders which we are filling for 
Europe. That war has been going on for sixteen 
months. Every manufacturer in the United States 
can sell two and three and four hundred per cent, 
more shells a day than it is possible for us to manu- 
facture. The big industrial arms and steel fac- 
tories of the United States have turned their forces 
to filling these orders because they can obtain almost 



THE GUARDS AT THE DOOR 157 

ppoduGtion o/ArlillepyAmrnunilloii 

fnU.S. 



/25,000 




^ 6Q000 






C 

fgOOO 





A. Rounds of artillery ammunition now used every day by France. 
The figures are given on the authority of a Major-General of the 
United States Army. 

B. The number of rounds of artillery ammunition used every day 
by the British forces in France. The figures are given by the 
same authority as the above. 

C. The number of rounds of artillery ammunition which all the 
United States Government factories and all the private ammuni- 
tion plants are able to produce daily, after twenty months of in- 
tense effort on the part of our greatest industrial corporations, 
backed by our greatest financiers, both endeavouring to turn out 
the largest possible number of shells. 

England and France alone are now using every twenty-four hours 
not only as many shells as all the U. S. Government and private 
manufacturers in the United States can turn out, but 873 per cent, 
more. 



158 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

any price asked, yet with all the push of big busi- 
ness, knowing that enormous profits await them, 
after sixteen months' effort, all the industrial re- 
sources, governmental and private, are turning out 
only ig,ooo a day. One of the highest officials of 
the United States Army states that France alone 
is using 12^,000 shells a day and England 60,000. 

But let no layman think that the factories of the 
United States can turn out nineteen thousand shells 
a day for American guns! 

Some of our factories are turning out guns for 
European nations ; other factories are making shells 
for Russia. These guns are made to inch measure. 
The shells are made to the millimetre measure. 
Even though the shells and the bore of the guns are 
almost the same size, the shell made to the milli- 
metre measure cannot be used in the gun made to 
the inch measure. The shell must exactly fit the 
gun — not ''almost" fit it. 

A change of machinery would be necessary to 
make shells to fit American guns and it takes 
months to make the machines that make the shells. 
It takes months to make the machines that in turn 
make the ammunition-making machines. 

It is also urged that we could, if war were de- 
clared, run our factories night and day, and turn 
out enormous amounts of ammunition, thus 
equipping ourselves in a short time. Such an as- 
sumption or such an argument is due to ignorance. 



THE GUARDS AT THE DOOR 159 

At present almost all of the ferro-manganese which 
our steel factories depend upon as the alloy, comes 
from India and Brazil. We can make ferro-man- 
ganese in the United States; but if our munition 
manufacturers should be forced to make it out of; 
our ore, the manganese content would be much 
lower. The product would also cost more; and 
there would be trouble in the factories before our 
chemists became adjusted to the use of the American 
product. 

If we were at war, any foreign navy could easily 
cut off our supply. Two or three Bmdens near the 
coast of Brazil, or near the ports of India, could 
completely bar this material from importation into 
the United States. 

Gun cotton is one of the principal ingredients of 
smokeless powder. But to make gun cotton, it is 
necessary to have nitric acid. Nitric acid is made 
from nitrates. By far the largest source of our 
supply comes from Chile. This supply could also 
be cut off. Our principal sulphur mines are along 
the coast and a foreign navy could easily take pos- 
session of them. 

The time to prepare for war is before the war be- 
gins. The great English drive, which Kitchener 
prophesied would take place last May, failed to ma- 
terialise because General French had shells only for 
one day's fighting out of seven. 

All our forts are but half manned. Those about 



160 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

Boston have an average of less than 240 men each. 
Fort Wadsworth, protecting New York, has a gar- 
rison of about four hundred men, and Fort Hamil- 
ton about one-third more. 

"Unless provision is made in the near future for 
additional Coast Artillery personnel, it will be nec- 
essary to reduce the garrisons to mere caretaker 
detachments at some of the defences of lesser im- 
portance, including Portsmouth, Delaware, Charles- 
ton, Savannah, Key West, New Bedford, Potomac, 
Tampa, Columbia, Baltimore, Cape Fear and Mo- 
bile." ^ 

A short time ago one of the two forts at Key 
West, the true key to the Gulf of Mexico, was 
manned by a sergeant and his family. After the 
death of the Sergeant, the widow and her daughter 
for months formed the garrison of defence. 

General Weaver, Chief of the Coast Artillery 
Division, stated in the Senate that we have 252 
twelve-inch guns already mounted without a single 
person to man them, two fourteen-inch guns mount- 
ed without a single man to operate them and 37 
eight-inch guns mounted and useless with no crew, 
71 ten-inch guns mounted without a single man to 
operate them. Modern guns are not simple cata- 
pults but complicated machineries. One has to be 
trained and skilled to handle them. No matter how 
intelligent the American citizen, he cannot step in 
and at once operate one of these guns off-hand, as 



THE GUARDS AT THE DOOR 161 

men could jump in and operate the guns of a hun- 
dred years ago. 

A century ago the guns used were short-range 
guns. One could look at the object he aimed at 
and by sighting over the gun with his eye, bring 
the gun into line. 

But at the present time gunners manipulating 
even the seven-mile range guns of our harbour de- 
fences are unable to aim by eye. As the gunner 
looks seven miles out at sea, he sees only the mast 
of the ship, very little of the hull. If the ship is 
ten miles away he sees no hull at all. But even if 
he sees the entire deck of a great dreadnought — 
one, six hundred feet long — by holding a cigarette 
in front of his eye at arm's length, the entire ship 
is completely shut off from his vision. The mark 
to be aimed at, so far as the eye is concerned, is less 
than the size of a cigarette. 

For instance, a few years ago large mortars were 
considered practically useless — the aim was so bad. 
However, since the installation of base stations, 
range finding and direction finding instruments, 
these guns are valuable again. The use of these in- 
struments for determining lateral deviation, eleva- 
tion, and the handling of complicated machinery of 
the guns is work for skillfully trained men. 

Aiming to-day is the result of the co-operation of 
three corps of men at three different places. The 
man down in the pit firing the gun is unable to see 



162 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

anything, except the sky above him. To argue that 
an untrained man, even though skilled in other lines 
of mechanics, could step in and efficiently handle 
these guns is as ridiculous as to argue that a man 
who has never touched an automobile could enter 
as a race-driver merely because he knew how to run 
a typewriter. 

But even if more men could be quickly trained, 
large numbers of the guns, in fact, a very large 
number, could not be used because we have not suf- 
ficient range-finders. Direction and fire control 
have been installed only at the most important har- 
bour forts along our coasts. They have not been 
installed in other places, not only because Congress 
has not provided for them, but because we cannot 
import the necessary lenses at the present time. 
Not only are many of the guns of our coast de- 
fence absolutely blind, but many of the guns of 
our army and of our navy could not be used, 
because we neither have glasses, nor can we 
buy them. And, moreover, we cannot manufacture 
them. Our manufacturers are dependent upon Ger- 
many for the glass for the lenses. At present we 
cannot get that glass. If Germany were to attack 
us, she would not kindly send us 50,000 or 100,000 
lenses in advance. If we were at peace with Ger- 
many, and Japan or Great Britain should attack us, 
the navy of Japan or the navy of Great Britain is 
efficient enough to interfere with our imports. 



THE GUARDS AT THE DOOR 163 

In this case, as in the case of munitions, the ques- 
tion is asked : Why can't we get to work and manu- 
facture them? Chemists and workmen who are 
speciaHsts in this Hne are rare. We have very few 
in this country. We have not a sufficient number 
of chemists and workmen speciaHsed in these lines 
to meet the present demand. It takes time for the 
ordinary chemists to become speciaHsts, just as it 
takes time for the ordinary physician to acquire the 
knowledge and technique necessary to make him a 
specialist. 

Our coast fortifications manned with from i6o 
to 600 men can easily be taken from the rear by 
five thousand men, landed eight miles away, beyond 
the range of the guns of the fort. None of the guns 
protecting Boston, New York and the entrance to 
Washington could be used to repel a land attack. 

"Fortified harbours from the days of the Romans, 
to our own have usually fallen to a land attack ren- 
dered possible by naval superiority." * 

All along the Atlantic coast there are excellent 
strips of beach from fifty to two hundred miles in 
length. Speaking of the possibility of landing an 
army on these, General Francis Greene says: 

"From Portland to Portsmouth there is a stretch 
of about fifty miles in which there are no fortifica- 
tions, from Portsmouth to Boston a similar stretch, 
from Boston around to Newport a still longer piece 
of unfortified coast; from Montauk Point to Coney 



164 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

Island and from Sandy Hook to Cape May, similar 
stretches of sandy beach, each more than a hundred 
miles in length." ° 

QUOTATION REFERENCES 

^ Page 155. General Weaver, testifying before Com- 
mittee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives. 

2 Page 156. Huidekoper, in "The Military Unprepared- 
ness of the United States." 

^ Page 160. Brigadier-General E. M. Weaver. 

* Page 163. National Defense, Vol. I, No. 2. 

^ Page 164. General Francis V. Greene, U. S. V., in 
"The Present Military Situation in the United States." 



CHAPTER III 

THE GUARDS WITHIN 

AFTER the mud dikes have been washed away, 
what will there be to stop the flood? 

When the enemy attacks our eastern or our west- 
ern coast, it will be done without warning. It will 
be executed just as Great Britain bombarded Copen- 
hagen in 1807, just as Japan attacked China in 1894, 
just as she unexpectedly attacked the Russian navy 
two days before declaring war against Russia, just 
as Austria sent her soldiers to France in 1914 
three days before she withdrew her ambassador 
from Paris, just as Germany marched into Belgium 
but four hours after the German Ambassador at 
Brussels indignantly intimated to the Belgian for- 
eign office that the latter should not even question 
Germany's honourable intentions respecting Bel- 
gium's neutrality. 

High officials of both Germany and Japan have 
informed their people even in print that when they 
attack the United States it will be done quickly and 
without warning. No time to prepare will be 
given us. 

165 



166 



AWAKE! U. S. A. 



OIIFTreasupeLands>l]idlWe^fllstProled 
andHioseolIlObJUae Powers 



'Holland 
SwltzefioDd 
Serbia 
PoFlujSol 
Uberfa 

Rumanfa 

Sweden 
Persia 
(•Peru 
VS. 



I /im » 

I JtOT 

P jurad < 

I «• . 

I' ««» 

■ H/)" • 

■ WW 






fltvat^mki 



THE GUARDS WITHIN 167 

OiirMeanso/Proledinj5 ouFTreosure Lands 
Compaped wirh those 0/ fifth Rale Powers 

Sweden mmmmmammm^mmmami^mmmmimm^mmm 

6000X 

SerMa mmmmmmmtmm^mmam^^mmm 

^ woes 

SwifzeploDd mm^mammmammmmmmmmmm 

wo coo 

Holland wmmmmmmmmm 

±50000 

Ifberja 
Persia 
Peru 
UFUjjooy 




Although the treasure lands which we have to protect are from 
420 per cent, to 308,330 per cent, greater than the lands of any one 
of the fifth-rate powers, yet the mobile army which we have in 
the United States to protect our lands is but 5.6 per cent, of the 
army of Sweden, and but 30 per cent, of that of Uruguay. 

1. Entire United States Army scattered throughout United States, 
in Porto Rico, in the Philippines, in Hawaii, in Alaska. 

2. The mobile army in continental United States. 



168 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

To defend our eastern coast against a quick at- 
tack we have an army of 6,600 men, stretched 
from Maine to Florida. This army, in number, 
equals one-fifteenth of the army of Paraguay, one- 
sixteenth of the army of Siam, one-seventeenth 
that of Guatemala, one-thirtieth that of Liberia. 

The soldiers of one thousand one hundred and 
nine armies, each equal in size to our entire army 
of the East, have been killed, wounded or taken pris- 
oners during the last twenty-one months in Europe. 

Even the mobile entire army in the United States, 
which General Wood says might possibly be mobil- 
ised in thirty days by taking all of our troops from 
the Mexican border and the Pacific coast, numbers 
only 34,000 men and they are scattered about in 
forty-nine different ports. 

Of course, in extreme necessity, this regular army 
could be reinforced by our reserve army of sixteen 
men! 

The English and French have lost in killed and 
wounded five times as many men as our "Entire mo- 
bile army in the United States on a battle front not 
twenty miles long in Gallipuli alone! 

And the militia ! It also is scattered from Boston 
to Charleston, from Seattle to Los Angeles. On 
paper, our militia numbers 119,000 men. More 
than 60,000 of these men have had no rifle practice 
and only one-third of them have been able to pass 
the test of second-class marksmanship. Thirty 



THE GUARDS WITHIN 169 

ComporaKve 

AFmyEquipmenl Proleclion Qtv^Each ClUzen 

By 

V.S.A. ■ 

Japan ■■ 

QFJBpftofn 

Qeimonyi 

Army-Poliee Proleclion Qlven Eadi Cilizen 

U.S.A. I 

Austpalta 
Old^sysiem 
Sew System 




^SiiiiieFiana 



170 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

thousand have never tried to qualify as third-class 
marksmen. Forty- four thousand seldom appear on 
the rifle ranges from year to year. 

"In no state is the prescribed minimum peace 
strength of all organisations of the organised mili- 
tia maintained, and in many instances the deficiency 
has reached such a figure as to leave the correspond- 
ing organisations such in name only, organisations 
of no value as military assets to the Federal Gov- 
ernment." * 

"It is believed to be a safe conclusion that not a 
single unit at its maximum strength marched a dis- 
tance of 10 miles fully equipped." ^ 

In times of war large cities have to be garri- 
soned. If we were to bunch together all of our 
mobile army and all of our trained militia, we would 
not have a garrison equal to that which Paris re- 
quires at the present time, and Paris is only about 
one-half the size of New York, and about a third 
larger than Chicago. 

If our entire army and every man of our militia 
were to be thinly stretched out in trenches, they 
would cover but two-thirds of the circumference of 
Greater New York alone. If then the entire mobile 
army of the United States and every man of the 
militia of our forty-eight states could be made, as 
by magic, to instantly appear in New York City, 
they could establish one single trench but two-thirds 
the way around Greater New York, leaving for the 



THE GUARDS WITHIN 



171 



U.S. AFmy Pfo tectf on 
per tOOO.OOO Cfifzens 



initio 








inl/iLjO 




in kQ(? 


f'nmi 



In 1810, 1840 and 1890 we found ourselves well along in great 

peace periods. 

The year 1810 was twenty-eight years after the close of the War 

of the Revolution; the year 1840 was twenty-five years after the 

close of the War of 1812; and the year 1890 was twenty-five years 

after the close of the Civil War. 

During such long peace periods without any danger looming up 

before a nation, the people become indifferent to the army and 

the protection it may be called upon to give them. 

Yet to-day, after five years of anarchy to the south of us, with half 

of the entire world at war, with ourselves in^ greater danger than 

at any time since the Civil War, we find that in proportion to each 

million of population, the number of soldiers we have in the United 

States to protect us is only about 25 per cent, of what it was in 

1810. 



172 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

enemy a free open pathway into our interior thirty 
miles wide. 

In proportion to our citizens, in proportion to our 
area, and in proportion to our wealth, we have a 
smaller army than we have had even during the 
great peace periods of the United States. 

In 1810, twenty-eight years after the close of the 
War of the Revolution, Senators and Representa- 
tives in Washington held that the United States 
would never again be involved in war. It was 
during this time that many public men even advo- 
cated the abolition of the army, believing that it 
would never be employed again. 

By 1840, twenty-six years after the War of 1812- 
14, we had been at peace with all Europe for a quar- 
ter of a century. Europe seemed disposed to let 
us alone. There seemed to be no reason why we 
should ever go to war again. And once more prom- 
inent public men at our capital suggested not only 
the abolition of our army, but even the abolition 
of our navy, hinting that the world was so civilised 
that no great war would ever again occur. 

By 1890, twenty-five years after the close of our 
Civil War, we had again had a generation of peace 
and the men in power were of a different age than 
those who had been leaders during the War of the 
Rebellion. These are three great peace periods of 
our national history — periods during which there 
was the least thought of war. 



THE GUARDS WITHIN 



173 



U.S. Army Proleclion 
per 100,000 SquareMiles 



in I ^10 






in/Jiw 






in mo 


/nm7 



In i8io, 1840 and 1890 we found ourselves well along in great peace 
periods. 

The year 1810 was twenty-eight years after the close of the War 
of the Revolution, the year 1840 was twenty-five years after the 
close of the War of 1812 ; the year 1890 was twenty-five years after 
the close of the Civil War. 

During such long peace periods without any danger looming before 
a nation, the people become indifferent to the army and the pro- 
tection it may be called upon to give them. 

Because of the great increase of our territory out of all propor- 
tion to the increase of our army, the number of soldiers we have 
to protect every thousand square miles from invasion is, to-day, but 
one-half of what it was in 1810. 



174 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

In a democracy like that of the United States, the 
one purpose of the army is to protect the nation 
from rebellion, to protect the nation from outside 
attack. It is the idea and duty of the army to pro- 
tect its citizens, to protect its land, to protect its 
wealth. But in times of peace, especially after a 
whole generation of peace, there is a tendency to 
forget the value of any army — to forget that a na- 
tion's citizens, that a nation's wealth needs a stand- 
ing army for its protection. Hence we might ex- 
pect that in 1810, 1840, 1890 the army of the 
United States would have been smaller in propor- 
tion to the number of its citizens, in proportion to 
its area and in proportion to its wealth than to-day 
when nations and colonies of four of the five con- 
tinents are at war. 

But in proportion to our population our mobile 
army in the United States furnishes us to-day but 
S97 soldiers per million population against 4^6 in 
1890, 621 in 1840 and 1417 in 18 10. 

In proportion to each hundred thousand square 
miles of our territory, the mobile army in the Unit- 
ed States to-day furnishes, for the protection of that 
unit of area, but 10^4. soldiers, as against 104.1 in 
1890, 1/74 in 1840, i<)84. in 18 10. 

That which will most tempt foreign nations, how- 
ever, is not the number of our people nor the 
amount of land we have — each of the hungry na- 
tions can secure undeveloped lands in South Amer- 



THE GUARDS WITHIN 



175 



U.S. AFmy Pvotection 
perBilUon of US.Wealfh 




Our wealth tempts foreign nations more than our population, more 

even than our land. 

One week's bombardment of New York, Philadelphia, Washington, 

Boston, San Francisco and Seattle might win for a foreign power 

indemnities of fifteen billions of dollars. 

To-day more than any other time in our national history we need 

an army to protect our wealth. 

The army we now have to protect each billion of wealth is ridicu- 
lously small compared with that which we had in 1810, 1840, and 
1890, when we appeared to be in no danger. 

Per billion of wealth, our army in 1890 was nearly 100 per cent, 
greater than it is to-day; in 1840 it was nearly 550 per cent, greater; 
and in 1810 it was 2,100 per cent, greater. 



176 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

ica — but our wealth tempts them ! In proportion to 
each billion of wealth our mobile army in the United 
States at the present time furnishes us but 24^ sol- 
diers against 4^1 in 1890, 1/61 in 1840, 4960 in 
1 8 10. Yet there are those who fear that we are 
becoming militaristic ! 

We have grown so rapidly in population, we have 
added to our territory so greatly and we have grown 
in wealth so enormously that our army to-day is but 
a handful, so far as its ability to protect, compared 
to the army we supported in the peaceful days of 
1810. And in 1810 there had not been, during the 
years previous to that time, any great change in the 
matter of guns and equipment; but to-day things 
have changed. 

If we to-day had an army proportionate in num- 
bers to our present wealth, as the army of 18 10 was 
to the wealth of the nation at that time, it would 
give us to-day a mobile force in the United States of 
702,697 fighting men. 

Neither Thomas Jefferson nor President Madi- 
son thought the army in their day too large, 
although both were opponents of a big standing 
army. But if our wealth in 1810 had been as great 
as it is to-day the peace-loving Jefferson and the pa- 
cifically-inclined Madison would probably have had 
an army of at least 700,000 men, especially if the 
population of the United States had then been 
ninety-seven millions. If the army of 18 10 had 



THE GUARDS WITHIN 177 

been reduced so that the number of men stood to 
their wealth as the number of men in our army to- 
day stands to our present wealth, the United States 
would have had an army in 1810 of just 4^1 men. 

Our little army has practically no field guns. 

"We now have less than 800 guns and ammuni- 
tion to serve them less than one and one-half days !" 

*'To send our modern infantry without the pro- 
tection of field guns against an enemy armed with 
them is simply murder." 

"After war breaks out, field guns cannot be pur- 
chased abroad, nor can they be extemporised at 
home. From the date of giving the order for the 
manufacture of such guns to the date of delivery of 
the first gun, an interval of at least five months 
must necessarily elapse." ^ 

In Europe they are using 12^ and 163^ inch 
howitzers. Although by June i, 1915, the war in 
Europe had been in progress five months, the Unit- 
ed States did not then have a single field howitzer 
greater than the six-inch ; and the United States had 
only thirty-two of these in all the United States, 
Philippines and Hawaii combined. Of the remain- 
ing, 85 per cent, are less than 4 inch and, moreover, 
80 of these are old mountain guns absolutely ob- 
solete. 

"We own little over half the guns which Russia 
had at the battle of Mukden. Yet any ordinary 



178 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

engagement of the European war makes the battle 
of Mukden look like a peace conference." * 

The equipment of the militia is worse than that 
of the regular army. It has no siege artillery at 
all, no large field mortars nor howitzers ; and both 
the batteries of the regular army and the militia are 
without sufficient horses to draw them. 

"The militia needs 316 of these guns to complete 
its equipment." ^ 

For the guns which the army has and for the 
guns which the militia have there is not half enough 
ammunition. 

For years Congress has been urged to appropriate 
enough money to provide our field guns with an am- 
munition reserve of 1856 rounds per gun. This to 
Congress seemed enormous, although it is 66 per 
cent, of the minimum number of rounds that Ger- 
many kept on hand in peace times. Year after 
year Congress has failed to provide for this ammu- 
nition reserve. And at the rate of its past appro- 
priations, it will take five years to bring it up to this 
34 to 40 per cent, deficiency, compared with the 
number of rounds other nations kept on hand when 
at peace. At present, for the guns actually made, 
we have only 27 per cent, of the ammunition asked 
for — 27 per cent, of the estimate which is infinitely 
lower than the minimum supply kept on hand by 
other nations during peace times. At present Ger- 



THE GUARDS WITHIN 179 



Ariilleiy Equipment 
Oennony mmmammmmmmm 
Enj^lond 
Jopan 

U.S. 



This chart represents only the number of guns. 
It is almost needless to reiterate that the guns of our army are 
toy pistols compared to the great guns of other powers. 
Germany has gigantic fourteen-, fifteen- and sixteen-inch guns. 
England has hundreds of nine- and twelve-inch guns. 
The United States, on the ist of January, 1915, as admitted by the 
Secretary of War, had but 634 guns completed. 
It is now rumoured that we have 850, and this chart takes advantage 
of the rumour. 

Of the actual number of guns on hand January i, 1915, 85 per cent, 
were less than 4-inch and eighty of these were old 3-inch mountain 
guns, absolutely obsolete. 

I. This estimate of the number of German guns is very conserva- 
tive, as is also the estimate as to the English guns. A former 
officer of staff of the United States Army personally informed 
the author in January, 1916, that Germany had at least 21,000 guns. 



180 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

many and France are using three hundred per cent, 
more than their pre-zvar maximum estimate. The 
number of rounds now allotted to each gun in the 
German army is more than 3,000 per cent, greater 
than the number of rounds we have on hand per gun 
in the United States. 

For the guns which the army has and for the 
guns which the militia have, there is not half 
enough ammunition. 

"And we have ammunition to serve those guns, 
at the rate ammunition is now used, rather less than 
one day and a half of fighting." ^ 

Sixty years ago cavalry scouts acted as eyes for 
the army, reconnoitring and reporting the location 
of the enemy. To-day they are about as efficient as 
blind men. Reconnoitring is now done by aero- 
plane. 

"An army without aerial scouts and aerial aux- 
iliary can be coralled and slaughtered like a herd of 
sheep; a harbour or naval station without aerial 
defence is at the mercy of every puny submarine 
and cruiser." ^ 

At the beginning of the war, England had four 
hundred aeroplanes and she now finds it necessary 
to manufacture about five hundred a week to meet 
her needs and those of her allies. Germany at the 
beginning of the war had about one thousand aero- 
planes and is now manufacturing at least four 



THE GUARDS WITHIN 



181 



Hounds of AFiiUery Ammunition 



Q 

J356 




B 
SOU 






27U 





A. Daily rate at which ammunition has been used on present Euro- 
pean battlefields as actually observed by an American military au- 
thority, from the fire of two German guns. 

B. Actual daily rate of fire per gun of the First Battery of the 
Ninth Artillery Brigade at the Battle of Mudken, March 3, 1905. 

C. Actual daily amount of ammunition per gun, including all the 
reserve ammunition in the United States, if pieced out to last forty- 
eight hours. This amount was actually used in two and a half 
hours by a German gun, as witnessed by an American military 
observer. 

We have on hand in the army and in reserve but 27 per cent, of 

the minimum peace estimate of the Wai Department. But our 

minimum estimate for times of peace is 34 per cent, less than the 

minimum estimate made by Germany for each gun in times of 

peace. 

This means that — in all our reserves — we have on hand for each 

gun but ID per cent, of the minimum per gun peace estimate of 

Germany. 

Germany is now using three times her maximum estimate. Hence 

we have on hand for each gun but 2.5 per cent, of the ammunition 

Germany can use per gun each twenty-four hours. 



182 AWAKE! U. S. A. 



hundred weekly. The United States Government 
has about thirty useless ones. We have fewer aero- 
planes than has Chile, Greece, Spain or Brazil. 
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy, testifying, 
stated that the aeroplanes of the navy were of the 
oldest makes and that none of them were armoured. 

"On the day President Wilson's note was trans- 
mitted to Germany, the United States Navy had 
only three aeroplanes in commission and the Army 
barely twice as many. Of the 150 licensed civil 
aviators in the United States, only half have made 
flights of more than fifty miles, and none have ex- 
perience in cross-country flying or know even the 
rudiments of military aeronautical requirements. 
Our Army, Navy, National Guard and Naval Mili- 
tia have had practically no experience in handling 
air craft." ^ 

The Chief of the Department of Aerial Defence 
estimates that if every aeroplane factory in the en- 
tire United States were run to its full capacity, 
night and day, we could turn out only three hun- 
dred weekly. 

One of our greatest military authorities, how- 
ever — Mr. Carnegie — believes that we do not need 
guns, ammunition, aeroplanes or other equipment, 
not even rifles, so long as we have in the United 
States sixteen million men willing to die for their 
native land: 

"I have always said that if at any time any 



THE GUARDS WITHIN 183 



ThM Fourth and Rffli Rale Powers 
Surpossiiig us in Aeronautic Equipment 



BuIjSapio 
Rumania 
Serbia 
Spoin 
Switzerland 
U.S. I ■ 

US. 2 ■ 

U.5. 3 • 




The number of aeroplanes respectively possessed by Bulgaria, 
Rumania, Serbia, Spain and Switzerland is greater than repre- 
sented here because of the fact that these nations have been adding 
aeroplanes to their service since the beginning of the war — and full 
details of these additions have not been given out. 

1. Of the aeroplanes of the United States, no two are like any 
other two; twenty-three are absolutely obsolete and useless; and 
none are armoured. 

2. Number of aeroplanes supposedly capable of service which the 
United States was able to get together to aid in the punitive ex- 
pedition into Mexico. 

3. The number of aeroplanes that could actually aid in this puni- 
tive expedition, all others being unfit for service or breaking down 
on first trial. 

On the day President Wilson's first note was sent to Germany 
the United States had eight unarmoured aeroplanes in comrmssion; 
three in the navy and five in the army. 



184 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

country was foolish enough to attempt invasion, 
the best possible plan would be to make their land- 
ing as easy as possible, point out to them the best 
possible roads, and allow them to go as far as they 
desired to go, inland. Then warn them to look 
out, and turn a million of our 16,000,000 militia 
upon them." ^ 

But what would the invading enemy be doing 
while we were arming a million men? Arming 
them with rifles alone would be useless against the 
shrapnel-throwers and rapid-fire machine guns of 
an invading army. But how are we going to in- 
stantly get a million rifles even, not to say any- 
thing of the larger guns! 

Even if we could raise a million men in a day, 
even if we could arm every man with the best rifle 
in the world and supply them with an abundance 
of ammunition for that rifle; what would happen 
if we tried to oppose the advance of 250,000 sol- 
diers, or 100,000 or even 10,000 men well equipped 
with fan-sweeping mitrailleuses and shrapnel 
guns? Our men would be compelled to advance 
over a strip of land four miles wide before they 
could get within rifle range of the foe. During 
every step of that four-mile march, our men would 
be swept by shrapnel ! 

If a million men in any army of Europe should 
be so foolhardy as to attempt, without the aid of 
successive trenches and the protection of heavy 



THE GUARDS WITHIN 185 

artillery, to advance against 250,000 men equipped 
with mitrailleuses the entire million men could be 
wiped out ill an hour. 

Armies of Europe are provided with one or more 
mitrailleuses for every hundred men. The mitrail- 
leuse is a fan-sweeping rapid-fire rifle. It swings 
in a fan movement from left to right and from 
right to left, firing from three to seven hundred 
bullets at terrific speed every minute. 

The only protection against them is digging into 
trenches; the only machines to combat them are 
heavy artillery and shrapnel-throwers. To send 
a million rifle-armed citizen soldiery against such 
guns would result, just as General Wood and 
Henry L. Stimson have said it would result, in 
nothing less than murder. 

A land force of two hundred thousand invading 
men would bring with them at least two thousand 
five hundred mitrailleuses, for immediate use, be- 
sides those which they would keep in reserve. 
These guns can be carried on a soldier's back, 
pulled by trained dogs, attached to motorcycles, or 
even bicycles. Such an invading army could easily 
bring 75,000 such guns if it should be deemed nec- 
essary. 

But even two thousand five hundred of these 
guns could fire in three hours, allowing for changes 
of belts, cooling time and so forth, 900,000,000 
shots. 



il86 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

Modern warfare is a contest of trained brains 
directing delicate, complicated, high-speed, death- 
dealing machines ! No matter how strong the men, 
how brave the heart, how noble the soul, citizen 
soldiery unequipped with like instruments and un- 
directed by like brains are but food for Moloch! 

But we would not even be allowed to arm. Two 
hundred thousand equipped troops landed at Bos- 
ton, New York, Philadelphia and Washington 
could almost immediately seize all our eastern ar- 
senals, our gun factories, our ammunition, explo- 
sive and powder works; so that we could arm our 
million men only with golf clubs, walking sticks, 
and pocket knives. 

Many of the large government ammunition 
works, gun factories, naval stations, arsenals and 
submarine bases are on the coast and could be 
easily destroyed by bombardment from enemy's 
ships standing off ten miles completely out of 
range of our coast guns. The enemy, if they so 
wished, could destroy the five big gun and am- 
munition works at Bridgeport; the Winchester 
Arms Company and the Modern Firearms Company 
at New Haven, the U. S. Naval Magazine at Hing- 
ham, Mass., the United States Submarine Station 
at Newport, the Bliss Torpedo Works at Brooklyn, 
the United States Navy Yards at Portsmouth, Bos- * 
ton, Brooklyn, Philadelphia, Norfolk, Washington 
and Charleston, the United States Arsenal at Gov- 



THE GUARDS WITHIN 187 

ernor's Island, the Proving Grounds at Indian 
Head, the Marine Barracks at Washington and 
Port Royal, the Naval Stations at Key West and 
Guantanamo, the new Du Pont factories at City 
Point, Virginia. 

The location of these works is exactly known to 
the navies of all foreign nations. Unlike the guns 
of our harbour defences, they are not hidden in pits 
from the sight of the enemy. While there is a 
dumb hope among us that by some miraculous 
means we may be able to prevent the guns of for- 
eign fleets destroying these factories, that hope is 
indeed vain. 

Every man knows that a difference of even an 
inch in the reach of a prize fighter gives him a 
great advantage over an opponent whose reach is 
one inch less. But what chance would a prize 
fighter have with arms 32 inches long if he were 
to attempt to combat with a man with arms 64 
inches long? Even if it were possible to install 
guns to protect these works their effective range 
compared with the range of the guns of foreign 
battleships would be as 32 to 64. 

The largest United States arsenal for the manu- 
facture and storage of rifles is at Springfield, 
Massachusetts, three hours by train from Boston 
and three and a half hours from New York. At 
Dover, New Jersey — less than two hours from New 



188 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

York — are located the big naval depots for explo- 
sives and ammunition for the Atlantic fleet and 
the United States Army arsenal, at which prac- 
tically all the high explosives and smokeless pow- 
der of the United States Government are kept. 

Nine-tenths of all the large private manufac- 
tories of rifles, rapid-fire guns, heavy artillery,, 
shrapnel, smokeless gunpowder, torpedoes and 
high explosives are within three and a half hours 
by train from Boston, New York or Philadelphia. 

The principal private gun, ammunition, powder, 
shrapnel and explosive factories are located as 
follows : 

At Hartford, Connecticut, which is but three 
hours by train from New York and three hours 
from Boston, are the Colt Patent Fire Arms Com- 
pany and Pratt and Whitney Works; 

At New Haven, three hours from Boston and 
three and a half hours from New York, is the 
Smith & Wesson Revolver Co. ; 

At Bridgeport, one hour and a half from New 
York, are the Bridgeport Arms Company (which is 
of such magnitude that it has been able to take many 
enormous European war order contracts — one or- 
der alone amounting to i68 millions of dollars), 
the Union Metallic Cartridge Company, the Ameri- 
can-British Manufacturing Company, which makes 
rapid-fire guns, and the Locomobile Company; 

At Troy, New York, four hours from New 



THE GUARDS WITHIN 189 

York, are big gun factories and one of the most 
important high explosive works in the United 
States; 

At Schenectady, four hours from New York, is 
the General Electric Co., which has already con- 
tracted for $100,000,000 European war orders; 

At Utica, which is distant from New York but 
nine and ten hours by two different routes, is the 
Savage Arms Company; 

At Ilion, nine hours from New York, is the Rem- 
ington Small Arms Company; 

At Carney's Point, Parlin Lakes and Pompton 
Lakes, each not more than two hours from New 
York, are the Du Pont Smokeless Powder Works; 

At Dover, New Jersey, but one hour and a half 
from New York, is the Picantinny Arsenal ; 

At Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, only three hours 
from New York, is the Bethlehem Steel Works, 
with its big gun factories, shrapnel and torpedo 
works ; 

At Philadelphia, two hours from New York and 
on the Atlantic Coast, is the Baldwin Locomotive 
Company ; 

At City Point, Virginia, is the new mammoth Du 
Pont Powder Works. 

And there are also the Westinghouse Company, 
the American Car & Foundry Company, the Ameri- 
can Locomotive Company, the ^tna Explosive 
Company, the Pressed Steel Car Company, the New, 



190 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

York Air Brake Company, the Crucible Steel Com- 
pany, the Hercules Powder Company, and the 
Studebaker Corporation — all fitted to make supplies 
of war. 

But with the exception of a very few establish- 
ments, all of the foregoing are within ten hours by 
rail of New York. Even Pittsburg, the centre of 
the steel industry of the United States, is, for a 
military train making no stops except for change 
of engines, but ten hours either from New York 
or Washington. 

Before a foreign army landed, patriotic citizens 
of foreign governments naturally loyal to their fa- 
therlands, yet living in the United States, could cut 
all telegraphic and telephonic cables between New 
York and the West, and five hundred of these 
men by quick and unexpected attacks could seize 
and control the wireless stations. 

They could establish themselves in accordance to 
previous instructions along the principal railways 
leading out of New York City, protecting the rail- 
ways from damage, and easily keeping them clear 
for the movement of foreign troops. 

I am well aware that not one out of ten thou- 
sand Americans will believe that there is, within 
the United States, any military supervision of the 
citizens of foreign governments. The sun shines, 
however, even though blind men fail to see it. 
And if we do not wake up to the fact that there 



THE GUARDS WITHIN 191 

are in the United States at present semi-organised 
military units of at least four different foreign gov- 
ernments, and if we do not immediately prepare 
to interfere with the plans of those foreign gov- 
ernments, we shall see enacted here in our own 
land exactly what happened less than twenty-two 
months ago in France, in Austria and in eastern 
Prussia. 

When in 191 2 and 1913 I made statements to 
Germans of Russia's activity in East Prussia, when 
I informed French friends in the Ministere de la 
Marine as to German war preparation in northern 
and eastern France, each and all shrugged their 
shoulders, smiled patiently and indulgently, think- 
ing me obsessed. 

The Russians had prepared the way into Eastern 
Prussia and into Austria. The movement into 
Austria failed because of the activities of the secret 
agents of the Austrian government; but even the 
Wilhelmstrasse was not awake to what the Rus- 
sians had been doing in Eastern Prussia. General 
von Hindenburg for more than half a generation 
had been fortifying East Prussia until its defences 
against Russian invasion were, according to all Eu- 
ropean military critics, the strongest in the world. 
Ytt Cossacks, unequipped with heavy artillery, made 
an advance of scores of miles past these "strongest 
and heaviest fortifications." They wxre able to 
do so only because the gates were opened to them 



192 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

by Teutonic-Russians living in Eastern Prussia and 
because mines were sprung, opening up passage- 
ways. 

And the Germans' advance to the very gates of 
Paris was due, partially at least, to two gates 
opened to them, one on either side of Lille. Six 
months after the war began it was found that a 
private assistant of one of the most important mili- 
tary men in France was of foreign parentage, al- 
though he possessed the birth certificate and mili- 
tary training papers of a young French lad who 
had died in a foreign country and whose death had 
not been reported at home. Even nine months 
after the beginning of the war a way was again 
opened — the entire aerial defences of Paris were 
misdirected — permitting a Zeppelin raid on that 
city in March, 191 5. 

In New York City, during the last few months, 
I have heard discussed by citizens of three differ- 
ent foreign countries the methods by which a ma- 
jority of the taxies and private automobiles of the 
city of New York could be mobilised within five 
hours after the general order was given to chauf- 
feurs of foreign citizenship; I have heard explana- 
tions of the intelligence system by which foreigners 
employed as drivers of large trucks can be given 
their instructions as to what they are to do and 
how they are to do it; I have heard described the 
method of withholding food supplies from the pop- 



THE GUARDS WITHIN 193 

ulation of New York and the subsequent delivery of 
these supplies to the invading army; I have heard 
explanations of the system by which patrols can be 
established on an hour's notice on all roads leading 
out of New York, Jersey City and Hoboken, pre- 
venting the passage of any automobile that has not a 
permit; the arrangement for cutting off the light 
and the power, if that should be deemed necessary; 
the organisation of foreign engineers, repairmen, 
and railroad workmen for the repairing of any 
damage to railroads occasioned by American citi- 
zens wishing to stop the advance of a foreign foe. 

I am not writing of the agents and officers of 
any one country; these things have been planned 
by citizens of at least four different foreign nations. 

And why should they not do so? If foreign gov- 
ernments are planning to seize our cities and hold 
them for ransom, it would be foolish not to prepare 
the way for the advance of their invading forces 
to our ammunition works, gun factories and 
arsenals? 

There are living in the United States one mil- 
lion British subjects; at least seventy thousand 
trained Japanese soldiers; and two hundred thou- 
sand loyal German and Austrian men, not German- 
Americans, but Germans and Austrians who have 
no desire to become citizens, who have never de- 
clared their intentions of doing so and who are 
now reservists of the German and Austrian arm- 



194. AWAKE! U. S. A. 

ies, under the command of their respective Em- 
perors. 

Within an hour after the landing of a hostile 
army in New York every railroad station could be 
seized. 

Dover, where practically all the high explosives 
of the United States are stored and where the great 
naval depot is located, is but one hour and a half 
from New York, even by slow train. Three trains 
of ten cars each running fifteen minutes apart could 
easily convey to Dover one thousand trained sol- 
diers with all their light equipment, including one 
hundred motorcycles, with rapid-fire fan-sweeping 
mitrailleuses. If they could not at once take pos- 
session of the factories and arsenals they could 
absolutely control the situation until reinforcements 
and heavy guns arrived. 

I saw a French lad of twenty-three, wounded in 
the arm and in the head, brought into one of the 
hospitals after the battle of the Marne. He and 
his companion had operated one mitrailleuse. 
This they had placed in a small opening between 
two rocks, so that they were fairly well sheltered. 
These two boys effectively worked their one ma- 
chine-gun for three hours. When the enemy was 
finally driven back it was found that ip6_^ dead 
bodies had been left in the fan-stveep of this one 
gun. 

Bridgeport at the east — the Essen of the United 



THE GUARDS WITHIN 195 

States — is but one and one-half hours from New 
York. This could be taken and held, with the aid 
of bombardment from the sea, more easily even 
than Dover. With gatling guns once established, 
the factories could be held by five hundred men. 
Other divisions could then move on to New Haven 
and later to Hartford. Another division could 
move to Springfield from Boston, only three hours 
by rail. From the Pennsylvania Station alone, 
trains of ten cars could be run to the west every 
fifteen minutes, if necessary. A hundred thousand 
troops could be moved in seventy-two hours to cap- 
ture all the plants in New Jersey and Eastern Penn- 
sylvania. 

Pompton Lake, Carney's Point, Parlin Lake and 
all the important ammunition, powder and explosive 
factories in New Jersey could be reached from 
New York in less than four hours. Bethlehem it-« 
self and the eastern coal fields are but three hours 
away. 

From the New York Central an equal number 
of trains could carry an equal number of troops 
to capture the arms and ammunition factories in 
Eastern New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut 
and Rhode Island. 

But could a foreign army accomplish all this in 
the face of the opposition of individual American 
citizens? 



196 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

At the beginning of the European war France 
mobilised one million men in the first six days; 
Belgium had two hundred thousand regulars, re- 
serves and garde civique, and England within fif- 
teen days had at least forty-five thousand men on 
the continent. Yet three hundred and fifty thou- 
sand Germans (an army no larger than that which 
could be easily landed at New York either by Great 
Britain or Germany) although opposed by a stub- 
born resistance of the Belgians, forty-five thousand 
British and at least one-third of the million the 
French had mobilised, ploughed their way through 
Belgium, passed through the open gates at either 
side of Lille and advanced 200 miles in the face of 
that opposition, to the very suburbs of Paris. 

Every official of importance in the United States 
army and every military authority of the United 
States who has expressed his opinion regarding 
this matter has asserted that a small foreign army 
equipped, as European armies are equipped to-day, 
could easily land on our coast, take our port forti- 
fications by rear action and advance into the coun- 
try, taking possession of practically all our am- 
munition supplies, our gun factories, our explo- 
sive and torpedo works, our arsenals and our de- 
pots of military and naval supplies. 

Of course, if we should kindly be given six days' 
notice, we could mobilise our twelve little field guns 
€^st of the Mississippi, We could send one toward 



THE GUARDS WITHIN 197 

Boston to stop the movement of foreign troops ad- 
vancing upon the United States Arsenal at Spring- 
field. Two more guns could be sent up the Hudson 
to prevent the advancing hosts moving on toward 
Troy, where most important high explosive works 
are located. Three might be sent to stop the ad- 
vance through New Jersey and eastern Pennsyl- 
vania ; two to Philadelphia and two to Washington. 
The other two would probably be kept to equip our 
Army of the East in line of defence. Thus we 
might arrest the invading armies. 

But if these guns should not stop or annihilate 
the enemy, the only opposition possible (if we do 
not at once prepare) would be an avalanche of men 
and our only victory — "a flood of blood." 

"The president knows that if this country needed 
a million men, and needed them in a day, the call 
could go out at sunrise and the sun would go down 
on a million men in arms." ^^ 

"American daring and patriotism will drive back 
with terrible blows any foe that dares put his foot 
upon the land of the free." " 

Before the present European war, the forts of 
Liege, Namur and Antwerp were considered the 
strongest in the world. Military experts agreed 
that they could never be taken nor destroyed. Yet 
the great German howitzers (which the French- 
English-American experts asserted existed "only 



198 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

in imagination") cracked open the Belgian forts 
as though they were egg shells. 

War to-day is a matter of machinery — howitzers, 
shrapnel-throwers and rapid-fire machine guns. 
Any army, not fully equipped with all of these, 
must bow to defeat, no matter how courageous and 
stubborn the individual fighting of its soldiers. If 
any army lacks but one element of such equipment, 
that lack will in all probability lead to at least tem- 
porary defeat. 

At the beginning of the war the French were 
not as well armed with rifles as were the Germans ; 
they were not as well supplied with rapid-fire guns ; 
they were not as well equipped with shrapnel- 
throwing guns, nor with heavy artillery. Conse- 
quently the Germans forced their way from the 
western boundary of Belgium and Luxembourg to 
the suburbs of Paris in four weeks. 

The English in retreat were mown down and 
slaughtered, not by individuals, but by German war- 
machines. In one little spot in southwestern Bel- 
gium two thousand three hundred nine British sol- 
diers lay in one place as a result of two hours' 
work of German shrapnel and rapid-fire guns. It 
was the price paid for non-equipment! 

In November, a year ago. General von Hinden- 
burg made a statement that his field and machine 
guns had filled in the swamps of eastern Prussia 
with the dead bodies of the Russian Cossacks, who 



THE GUARDS WITHIN 199" 

had been armed only with rifles and lances. The 
Germans themselves have never spoken disparag- 
ingly of the courage, bravery and stubborn resist- 
ance of the Russian soldiers; time and again they 
have justly praised their fighting qualities. Yet 
Russia, with a reserve of 13,000,000 men of mili- 
tary age, has been driven back two hundred thirty 
miles because her armies were not efficiently 
equipped with guns and ammunition. 

Since France has acquired a supply of 75's and 
155's and a plentitude of rapid-fire machine guns 
she has been able to hold in check and to drive back 
little by little the well-equipped Germans. 

A small army, not numbering more than fifty 
thousand, if well equipped with field artillery, 
shrapnel-throwers, and rapid-fire machine guns 
drawn by dogs or carried on bicycles, can wipe an 
army of half a million men equipped as we are 
equipped to-day. 

Remember, two French boys, with one machine 
gun held thousands of equipped Germans at bay; 
and as a result of only three hours' fighting the 
one gun garnered a toll of 1963 dead bodies. 
There would be no possible means of preventing 
the investment and capture of all the arms and 
ammunition works, arsenals and naval depots of 
Dover. 

No more striking remark was made at Platts- 



200 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

burg than that of the instructor in artillery prac- 
tice, who said in substance: 

"General Longstreet and General Hill in the 
Battle of Gettysburg had in their corps, in service, 
only nine fewer field guns than there are in the 
regular army in the United States to-day. We 
have nine less guns than were used by two corps 
at the Battle of Gettysburg — a sad reminder of the 
fact that the regular army has to-day, east of the 
Mississippi, only three batteries (12 guns) of field 
artillery." 

Twelve guns to hold back an army advancing 
from Portland, or Boston, or New York, or Phil- 
adelphia, or Washington, or Charleston or Savan- 
nah. 

**The fire of modern field-artillery is so deadly 
that troops cannot advance over terrain swept by 
these guns without prohibitive losses. It is there- 
fore necessary to neutralise the fire of hostile guns 
before our troops can advance, and the only way to 
neutralise the fire of this hostile field-artillery is 
by field-artillery guns, for troops armed with the 
small arms are about as effectual against this fire, 
until they arrive at 2000 yards, as though they 
were armed with knives. ^^ 

No enemy would attempt to land on our shores 
with less than two hundred thousand men, com- 
pletely armed and perfectly equipped. Our entire, 
army of the East is but 6,600 men and they are 



THE GUARDS WITHIN 201 

scattered over a strip three thousand miles long. 
They have but twelve pieces and but 44% of the 
ammunition necessary for immediate use. 

"The Secretary of War (Mr. Garrison) has 
stated on several occasions, although not in public 
utterance, that we have on hand but one round of 
ammunition for our field artillery." *^ 

I have before me a personal letter from one of 
the aides attached to the staff of General Joffre, in 
which he writes me of the value of the motorcycle 
mitrailleuse and its destructiveness as demon- 
strated in the present war. I quote a portion of 
that letter. 

"The motorcyclette armed with a small mitrail- 
leuse such as we now employ is much more useful 
than the armoured motor-car. It is very small; 
one can come very near to the enemy without being 
seen ; one can hide behind trees, bordering the road, 
make an attack upon an advance guard and get 
away quickly and safely. If the road is bad, one 
can take the muddy sides and avoid the big holes 
which are disastrous for heavy carriage ; one clever 
rider and skillful operator can do great harm in a 
few minutes. As soon as he arrives at the place from 
which he wishes to attack, he can put his mitrail- 
leuse in position and destroy a patrol, or a convoy^, 
or even an advance guard and speed back to his 
own lines at eighty kilometres an hour. He can 
change his position so often and so quickly that 



202 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

the enemy's detachment cannot find his firing posi- 
tion. In the country he offers only a very small 
target compared with the big side of a steel-covered 
motor-car. 

"Three of our cycle-mitrailleuse accomplished 
here yesterday a wonderful raid. They heard that a 
German regiment was going to enter, music ahead, 
a village. They arrived in front of the column 
and hid behind bushes. As the first ranks of the 
Germans entered, our three men fanned them with 
the three motor-cycle guns. Every man in the 
German regiment was not only wounded, but 
killed." '' 

If a million of our noblest men 'sprang to arms' 
providing themselves with clubs, knives, crowbars, 
revolvers, shot guns and rifles, they would be mur- 
dered as they advanced under the range of the 
enemy's shrapnel-shell throwers and rapid-fire fan- 
sweeping guns. If we remain unprepared, a half 
of our "million men" will be slaughtered in this 
way: and then those who now advocate such a 
system of defence should be held as "guilty of 
murder in the second degree." 

We can raise a million in a day ! 

And we can send forward a million men, un- 
drilled, untrained and only partially armed to meet 
the field artillery, the shrapnel and the rapid-fire 
machine guns of the present-day warfare! But if 



THE GUARDS WITHIN 203 

we do so, we shall form lakes in our fields, our low- 
lands and our meadows — out of their blood! 

Let us not go into the darkness again with un- 
filled lamps! 

We have listened before to the Randolphs and 
the Buchanans! We have listened to those who 
preferred peace-at-any-price; we have in the past 
heeded those who wished us to prepare only after 
the calamity was upon us ; we have followed those 
who feared that sane preparation would turn us 
into a military camp! And each time, because of 
our stupidity, we paid a tragic price ten-fold too 
great ! 

It is sad for a nation to lose its men on the bat- 
tlefield, even when fighting for that which is right- 
eous; but it is vicious to live cowardly in the face 
of the evils which threaten us. Let us be as will- 
ing to pay the just price as were the Christian 
martyrs at Rome; but let us not, by listening to 
false prophets, permit ourselves to be once more 
forced to pay a tragically vain, needlessly wasteful, 
wanton toll of blood again! 

Yet even this would not be the full price, how- 
ever. Boston, New York, Philadelphia and Wash- 
ington would be bombarded if we refused to guar- 
antee gigantic indemnities, refused to abandon the 
Monroe Doctrine, refused to turn over the trade 
of South America and the control of the Panama 
Canal to our foreign foe. 



204. AWAKE! U. S. A. 

Then we would be compelled to take a new posi- 
tion in the world of affairs! It might correspond 
to our present position as Persia's status to-day- 
corresponds to the station she occupied before she 
was conquered by Alexander; it might correspond 
to our present position as Spain's present interna- 
tional status compares with her seventeenth century 
prosperity and world power ; it might correspond to 
our present world status as little Holland of to-day 
compares with the mighty Netherlands of less than 
three centuries ago; and it might correspond to 
our present supremacy as the condition of Poland' 
divided into Austrian, German and Russian pro- 
vinces corresponds to the position occupied by that 
renowned kingdom before she was apportioned 
among the three hungry nations of her day. 



QUOTATION REFERENCES 

^ Page 170. Brigadier-General Miles, Chief of the 
Militia Division of the War Department, United States 
Government. 

^ Page 170. Report of General Wotherspoon, Chief of 
Staff, United States Army. 

^ Page 177. From address to Merchants' Association 
by the Hon. Henry L. Stimson, ex-Secretary of War. 

* Page 178. The Hon. Augustus P. Gardner, Congress- 
man from Massachusetts. 

^ Page 178. Report of the Army Committee of the Na- 
tional Security League, including: Hon. Henry L. Stim- 



THE GUARDS WITHIN 206 

son, ex-Secretary of War ; Colonel William C. Church, edi- 
tor Army and Navy Journal; Captain Matthew Hannah ; 
General Francis V. Greene; Major George Haven Put- 
nam ; Colonel S. Creighton Webb, and others. 

^ Page 1 80. (See note 4.) 

■^ Page 180. Alan R. Hawley, President Aero Club of 
America. 

* Page 182. (See note 7.) 

" Page 184. Interview of Andrew Carnegie, as reported 
by the Associated Press. 

^" Page 197. Hon. William Jennings Bryan, in address 
to the Baltimore Bar Association. 

" Page 197. American newspaper editorial. 

^2 Page 200. General Leonard Wood, Commander of 
the Army of the East. 

" Page 201. George Lauferti, in "United States and the 
Next War." 

" Page 202. From personal letter from a member of the 
staff of General Joffre. 



PART THREE: WHAT ARE OUR 
CHANCES? 



PART THREE: WHAT ARE OUR 
CHANCES? 

CHAPTER I 

WHEN THE SPIKED HELMET COMES 

THE German Navy is practically twice as 
strong as ours, even if we accept the official 
figures of Berlin and Washington as the standards 
of comparison. But most of the German ships 
have been built during the last twenty years. Ger- 
man ships are of the most modern construction, 
while many of our listed ships are out of commis- 
sion, ''grey-bearded" or in their "second childhood" 
— one y2 years old has just this year been disposed 
of by the Navy Department. 

How misleading comparisons, made by listing 
anything and everything, really are, can be judged 
from the official statement of Naval Intelligence, 
United States Navy Department, issued only thirty 
days previous to the beginning of the present Eu- 
ropean War. It assured us in figures that we had 
three more submarines than Germany had and that 
we were building more than Germany. 

Very few of our ships have guns that can be ele- 

209 



210 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

vated more than lo degrees; a few can be elevated 
15 degrees. Most of the German ships have guns 
that can be elevated from 20 to 28 degrees. This 
is of supreme importance! Even the eleven-inch 
guns of the Germans because of this advantage can 
throw explosives fourteen miles. 

"Germany can oppose twenty dreadnoughts to 
our ten, and, judging from such naval actions as 
were fought in the late war, in which both the gun- 
nery and the seamanship of the Germans was ex- 
cellent, there can be little doubt that with such 
great odds against us we should be defeated." ^ 

Germany could send against us nearly twice as 
many dreadnoughts and battleships as we could to 
oppose their attack. And the German dreadnoughts 
have greater speed; their guns have longer range 
and can be elevated twice as high as the guns on 
our ships. Germany can send against us six times 
as many swift cruisers as we have. Germany could 
send against us more than twice as many destroyers 
as we could employ in opposition; Germany could 
easily send fifty of the most modern submarines. 
On the Atlantic coast we have eighteen. Five of 
these are located at Panama. Two, north of Pan- 
ama, are capable of operation under water. 

If they wished they could easily transport to our 
shores five hundred thousand men, but the General 
Staflf at Berlin knows that 250,000 veterans are 
sufficient. Consequently their definite plans are 



WHEN THE SPIKED HELMET COMES 211 



Our Chances ot Sea against a Qennan Altadi i 



Oermaay 



U.S.A. 



BoMeslifps 

AverajSe Speed 
OimRonjSC- . 
QunElevQdoi 
ToqiedoTiiIies 

Baffle crafsers.. 

ScoufCtuisers 

DestroycFS. 

SubmoFines... 




N. B. Lines representing the same United States factors of defence 
may vary on different charts because they represent proportional 
values. 

1. This chart represents battleships, battle cruisers, scout cruisers 
and destroyers authorised and laid down by Germany and the 
United States from December 31, 1904, to January, 1914. These 
modern boats are the ones that determine sea battles. Grey beards, 
ships in reserve and ships in ordinary are not an aid. They hinder 
the speed of the fleet, they have to be taken care of by the modern 
ships ; hence, their detrimental value in modern battle. 

Since January i, 1914, Germany has been building modern battle- 
ships, battle cruisers, scout cruisers, destroyers and submarines at 
a tremendous rate. We have been lagging woefully behind. 

2. Torpedo tubes for modern torpedoes which we Tinll have after 
the Oklahoma and Nevada are in service. 

3. The three scout cruisers we have are of doubtful value, because 
of their defective furnaces. 

4. Representing the proportion of all our useless submarines to 
the submarines Germany could spare from European waters. 

5. Representing the proportion of submarines able to submerge, to 
those Germany could send to attack us. 



212 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

made for the transportation of but a quarter mil- 
lion well-equipped perfectly armed men. 

"Germany has the second largest merchant ma- 
rine in the world, which affords a first-class trans- 
port fleet, not surpassed even by England's." 

''Germany has greater resources for enterprises 
of this kind, and is more efficient than any other 
country." 

*'In our loading of East Asia transports, it re- 
quired one to one and one-half hours to load one 
battalion. The speed of our loading has amazed 
departmental circles in general." 

**For long-distance transportation our large har- 
bours on the North and East Seas can be utilised 
equally well for embarkation. Speed is the chief 
requisite/* 

"Especially suitable harbours on the North Sea 
are Emden, Wilhelmshaven and Bremerhaven in 
connection with Bremen, and Cuxhaven with Ham- 
burg and Gluckstadt." 

"Bremerhaven is by far the best. From this 
point two or more divisions could he shipped daily 
without difficulty. Cuxhaven is not so well situated, 
but its connection with Hamburg is important. H 
it were brought up to full development it could 
take care of two divisions a day, which Hamburg 
could well supply." 

"The United States at this time is not in a posi- 



WHEN THE SPIKED HELMET COMES 213 

tion to oppose our troops with an army of equal 
rank. Its regular army actually totals 65,000 men, 
of whom not more than 30,000 are ready to defend 
the home country." ^ 

Certainly the Germans would not land an invad- 
ing army without thoroughly equipping them. 
Their 250,000 men would bring with them 148 bat- 
teries of six guns each — 888 guns. It is reported by 
several different military authorities that we have 
twelve field guns east of the Mississippi ; even should 
this number be tripled, we would have but one field 
gun to every 24 of the Germans. Germany, accord- 
ing to the present minimum armament of the men 
she has in the field (and her men must be well 
equipped or they could not hold their trenches) has 
now a reserve of 19,400 field guns, while we have 
but 850. The average size of the German guns is 
twice the size of ours. 

The German army would be amply supplied with 
ammunition. Germany has shown for twenty-two 
months that she does not start a campaign until she 
is able to furnish sufficient supplies. 

"It is almost a certainty that a victorious assault 
on the Atlantic coast, tying up the importing and 
exporting business of the whole country, would 
bring about such an annoying situation that the 
government (U. S. A.) would be willing to treat for 
peace." 

*'To accomplish this end, the invaders would have 



214 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

to INFLICT REAL MATERIAL DAMAGE by 
injuring the whole country through the successful 
seizure of many of the Atlantic seaports in which 
the threads of the entire wealth of the nation 
meet." ® 

(The italics and capitals are the author's.) 
Only peace-at-any-price insanity can prevent us 
from realising that once the Germans have crossed 
the Atlantic, they will, unless we agree to their 
demands, carry on a campaign of destructiveness 
{real material damage). 

On the chart "Our Chances on Land Against 
German Invasion," as well as on the chart, *'Our 
Chances on Land Against British Invasion," every 
fighting factor of the United States is not only 
given at its full value, but oftentimes greatly exag- 
gerated. This is done not to mislead, but because 
of my desire not to underestimate any factor of our 
resources. For instance, the line representing the 
guns with our Army of the East (the only army 
together with the Eastern Militia that could be 
gathered quickly enough to meet a rapid invasion) 
is poo% longer than it ought really to be! It is 
made thus because it is hoped that, by some mi- 
raculous means, a few of the guns west of the Mis- 
sissippi might be rushed to the Eastern coast in 
time to be of some value. The most sanguine opti- 
mist, however, can hardly expect me to give greater 
leeway than an exaggerated estimate of 900%. 



WHEN THE SPIKED HELMET COMES 215 

Our Oiances on land a0afh8t Qennon Invosfon 
(bmpopatfve Values 



Invadfn^Anny Qepj 
OpposfniJAFniy U.S.i 



0un8witIiAnny 

QunsfnIl9seiTe 

SlKeofQuns 



Qeci 
US.I 

Qer.i 
U.S.I 

Qerj 

USj 



AmmiinftCon Supply: 
lsll8hoursI^^^J' 



Merwanls ^®^ 



VJS. ? 



N. B. Lines representing the same U. S. factors of defence may 
vary on different charts because they represent proportional values, 
(i) Representing the entire army which can be mobilised in thirty 
days, men in our Atlantic Coast defences, and the militia of the 
Eastern States. 

(2) Representing 900 per cent, more field guns than we now have 
with our entire army east of the Mississippi River. 

(3) And in addition, a line 500 per cent, longer. 

(4) Representing all of the field guns in the United States. 



216 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

All lines representing supplies are of course greater 
than the actual amount on hand. 

At the same time the invader could without doubt 
have the aid of warring factions in Mexico whose 
attempted invasion of the United States from the 
south would compel us to keep on the Texan border 
the eighteen thousand troops we already have sta- 
tioned there. 

To meet the Atlantic invasion we would then 
have an army of 6,600 men, supplied with enough 
ammunition, stored in many different arsenals in 
various parts of the United States, to fight for 
thirty-six hours. Besides these regular troops, 
we might oppose them with unarmed volunteers. 

"Two real defenders of the country that must 
not be forgotten are Major-General Frederick 
Funston, and Major-General Leonard Wood. 
General Funston has 11,000 men under his com- 
mand in the Department of the South, including 
Texas, through which hostile forces might seek to 
come from Mexico. He is a veteran and knows 
how to handle troops. General Wood commands 
the Eastern Division and has 6,600 men under his 
command. * 

No one doubts for a moment the ability, the 
saneness and the justly honoured efficiency of Gen- 
eral Wood; and for that very reason we ought to 
accept his opinion as to what he could do with the 
army in its present condition. He has definitely 



WHEN THE SPIKED HELMET COMES 217 

stated that it would take at least thirty days to 
mobilise our present army of 34,000 men, to say 
nothing of enlisting, organising and equipping a 
citizen soldiery. 

Does the newspaper editor above quoted expect 
that a quarter-million German veterans, who have 
performed deeds of valour in Belgium, would, if 
General Wood should mount the base of the Statue 
of Liberty and wave his arms in the air, take fright 
and drown themselves by plunging in terror into 
the sea? 

QUOTATION REFERENCES 

* Page 210. J, Bernard Walker, Chairman of the Navy 
Committee, National Security League, and editor Scientific 
American. 

^ Page 213. From book outlining Germany's means and 
method of attacking England and the United States; pre- 
pared by Freiherr von Edelsheim, when member of the 
General Staff at Berlin; book approved by the Kaiser and 
widely circulated. 

^ Page 214. (See note 2.) 

"* Page 216. Indiana newspaper editorial. 



CHAPTER II 

WHEN THE BROWN MAN COM^S 

THE Japanese cannot afford another war ; their 
national debt is now one-eighth their national 
wealth." 

"The Japanese might attack the Philippines, but 
they would not attempt to bring an army across 
the Pacific; they could not do so if they wished — 
such a feat is impossible !" 

"Besides the fleet on the Pacific, the United/ 
States has eight submarines here and coast forts 
that are declared impregnable. Certainly an enemy 
would find itself as hard put in attempting to in- 
vade our west coast as the Allies are in attempting 
to storm the Dardanelles." 

"If the Japanese ever come to attack us, we'll 
drown them like rats in the Pacific." ^ 

Our greatest danger in connection with the Japa- 
nese is that we stupidly laugh at the idea that they 
may attack us and refuse to see things as they 
are. 

It is possible for Japan, if she wishes, to send 
three hundred thousand or half a million troops to 

218 



WHEN THE BROWN MAN COMES 219 

our shores. With the exception of one British 
steamship line, all the traffic between America and 
Japan is now in the hands of the Japanese. The 
Nippon Yusen line alone has a tonnage of three 
hundred thousand tons. The Toyo Kisen Kaisha 
has an enormous tonnage. To-day Japan controls 
all but about 70,000 tonnage of the Pacific trade. 
But Japan would not even need these. 

"Japan has a major transport fleet, as shown by 
the figures in 1909, of forty steamers, with a troop 
capacity of 114,235, and a minor transport fleet of 
fifty-five steamers, with a troop capacity of 85,292; 
or 199,526 in all. These are army transports 
alone, and do not include passenger ships which 
could be utilised. Compared with this the United 
States has a transport fleet of ten ships, with a 
troop capacity of 15,758. There are only four 
transport ships on the Pacific coast." ^ 

The marvellous transportation system of the 
Japanese makes us understand why they laugh at 
ours. When General Funston was ordered in April, 
1914, to take his command from Galveston to Vera 
Cruz a major portion of the troops had to be left 
behind because there were not sufficient transports 
to carry them. Consequently he could take to Vera 
Cruz less than 4,200 men. Moreover, much of the 
field artillery and cavalry had to be left behind. 

Compare the inefficiency of our transportation 
system, which, after months of strain with Mexico, 



220 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

was unable to handle four thousand men with the 
efficient Japanese transportation system, which has 
a troop capacity of 199,000 independent of her 
passenger ships. 

But to land Japanese troops and to furnish sup- 
plies for those already in the United States, their 
navy must meet our navy in the Pacific. 

Our navy has more ships than the Japanese. But 
we could not run the risk of sending our complete 
navy to the Pacific in time to decide a naval battle 
even were it possible to do so. 

The Japanese have four super-dreadnoughts of 
high speed with guns capable of higher elevation 
than ours. We have not a single dreadnought of 
this class. Japan will have two more finished this 
year. If Congress orders one or one-and-a-half or 
two, they cannot be finished within three or four 
years. 

As fighting ships we include everything, no mat- 
ter what the size, the age, or the uselessness of the 
craft. A very few of our ships of our Pacific fleet 
have four eight-inch guns each. Most of them are 
equipped with only six-, five- and three-inch guns. 
These compare to the mammoth guns on the Japa- 
nese ships about as a boy's Fourth of July toy 
pistol compares to a .38 Smith and Wesson. Our 
largest ship in the Pacific has a displacement of a 
little over 13,000 tons, while the Japanese have bat- 
tleships with displacements of from 25,000 to 31,- 



WHEN THE BROWN MAN COMES 221 

ooo tons. One can judge best of their real value 
by their cost. A good battleship to-day costs from 
$15,000,000 to $18,000,000. We have three in the 
Pacific which cost a little over five million ; a few 
others are one-and-a-half- and two-million-dollar 
ships; some cost less than one-quarter of one mil- 
lion dollars. Japan has twenty-five fighting ships 
each of which cost from five to fifteen million 
dollars. 

More striking still than the difference in number 
and differences of grade, stated separately, is a 
comparison of the number of Japanese battleships 
that surpasses the best we have in the Pacific. 
Japan has twenty ships, every one of which is su- 
perior to the very best zve have in the Pacific. 
What chance, then, would our tug boats and our 
gun boats and our old light-armoured cruisers have 
against the Japanese navy? 

We have in the Pacific less than twenty ships. 
Japan has a navy of modern battleships. 

The Fuso has twelve 14-inch guns, as well as 
more smaller ones than we have on any one ship in 
the Pacific. The Haruna, Hiyei, Kirishima, and 
Kongo each have eight 14-inch guns. The Ka- 
waychi has twelve 12-inch guns. There are three 
more battleships of the Fuso class which are al- 
most finished. These ships alone have 64 torpedo 
tubes. Our ships on the Pacific have a total of 



i^^WAKE! U. S. A. 



eighteen torpedo tubes and all of them are admitted 
to be useless. 

Some of Japan's ships have a speed of 2y knots. 
We have not a single battleship in our navy that 
can maintain a speed of more than 22 knots. 

All of our F type submarines which were lately 
accepted and stationed at Honolulu are now admit- 
ted to be useless because of faulty construction. 
They are reported out of commission. 

Our Pacific fleet, besides being inefficient, is 
without sufficient ammunition and often has not had 
coal enough to steam from our Pacific ports to 
Honolulu and back again! Even though govern- 
ments at Washington have known — twice in the 
last five years — that a Japanese attack might be 
made at any hour. 

We have naval stations in the Pacific and on our 
Pacific Coast ; but the nearest naval magazine from 
which our tiny supplies might be drawn is Mifflin, 
Pennsylvania. This, however, is not a very im- 
portant magazine and, next to it, the nearest one to 
the Pacific coast is Dover, New Jersey, — some three 
thousand miles overland from the Pacific coast and 
some ten thousand miles overland from the Philip- 
pines. 

When Japan moves she will do so suddenly and 
without warning. It will be an attack in the night 
and we will not be allowed one moment's prepara- 
tion. 



WHEN THE BROWN MAN COMES 



223 



OurOiances olSea against a Japanese Attack < 

Japan U.S.A. 

SupepDreadnau^btsii^ii^ o 

Battiesnips and . 
Battle Cruisers — 
Average Speed. 

Qun Range .- 

Gun mevatjon 

Torpedo Tubes 

Scout crufSCT^L... 

Destroyers _.... 

Submarines. 




N. B. Lines representing the same United States factors of defence 
may vary on different charts, because they represent proportional 
values. 

1. This chart represents battleships, battle cruisers, scout cruisers 
and destroyers authorised and laid down by Japan and the United 
States from December 31, 1904, to January, 1914. These modern 
boats are the ones that determine sea battles. Grey beards, ships 
in reserve and ships in ordinary are not an aid. They hinder the 
speed of the fleet, they have to be taken care of by the modern 
ships; hence their detrimental value in modern battle. 

Since January i, 1914, Japan has been building modern battleships, 
battle cruisers, scout cruisers, destroyers and submarines at a tre- 
mendous rate. We have been lagging woefully behind. 

2. Torpedo tubes for modern torpedoes which we imll have after 
the Oklahoma and Nevada are in service. 

3. Representing the proportion of all our useless submarines to 
the submarines Japan has. 

4. Representing the proportion of our submarines able to submerge, 
to those Japan could send to attack us. 



224. AWAKE! U. S. A. 

Manila is well fortified but each fort can be eas- 
ily taken from the rear. All the military authori- 
ties agree that landing would be comparatively 
easy. 

"There are no fortifications on Lingayen Bay on 
the North, Balayan Bay on the South, or Lamon 
Bay on the east. A landing at either of these points 
presents no difficulties, and once landed it is but a 
few days' march to the rear of Manila." ^ 

"Little does the United States know that we 
(the Japanese) have many plans arranged for the 
destruction of the Manila forts and guns." ^ 

"There will leave our great naval base at Yok- 
suka 50,000 of our men in a suitable number of 
transports, that will be amply protected by fast 
cruisers. This flotilla will land part of the troops 
at Lingayan and part near Polillo, at the rear of 
Manila. They will take but a short time to disem- 
bark and will advance, converging toward one an- 
other, having all plans laid to attack the port of 
Manila from the rear — which is its weakest part." ^ 

At Honolulu we have spent millions fortifying 
Pearl Harbour, but there is not enough ammunition 
to fight twenty-four hours. 

"Our first move will be to seize Honolulu ! This 
can very simply be done by a fleet of transports car- 
rying 30,000 men and protected by our fast cruis- 
er-class ships. . . . 

"The Hawaiian Islands are only distant from 



WHEN THE BROWN MAN COMES 225 

San Francisco a few hours by our fast warships 
and cruisers, and in the islands are at present 80,- 
000 Japanese — all of them have received army in- 
struction and they know their duty !" ^ 

Experience at the Panama Canal has amply con- 
vinced us that slides are at least possible. 

"The Americans boast of their Panama Canal, 
but it is only too ridiculously simple for us to dyna- 
mite it effectually — at the cost of an old steamship 
loaded with explosives. 

"Or the canal can be instantly dynamited by our 
people, who are living quite near it, and before 
anything can be done by the United States Navy 
our ships will be in full possession of the impor- 
tant points. . . . 

"And before the United States warships can 
come all the way around South America we will 
have seized the islands ! These lie much nearer to 
our shores than they do to the United States coast, 
and it will be a very difficult matter to oust us, — 
our navy is much stronger than the American, bet- 
ter equipped and better officered. . . . 

"The Honolulu group of islands, however, is 
not large enough to adequately support our coun- 
trymen. We can seize the port and fortifications 
(such as they are) with the greatest of ease, thus 
permitting about 60 per cent, of our people already 
there to help in breaking California's shut door." ^ 

The only thing the United States could do to 



226 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

prevent a landing on the Pacific would be to send 
our fleet around South America or our soldiers 
over the mountains. 

Seven-tenths or more of our soldiers are east of 
the Rocky Mountains ; while the Japanese have al- 
ready on our soil, or in Mexico and British Colum- 
bia, adjoining our territory, trained troops which 
number 251,000 men — seven times as many as our 
entire mobile army in the United States. 

There are already 35,000 trained Japanese troops 
in Hawaii, 55,000 in the Philippines, 100,000 in 
Mexico, 61,000 in California, Oregon and Washing- 
ton. And these troops are where they can be in- 
stantly used the moment the transports land ma- 
chine guns on our coast. Every Japanese in Cali- 
fornia reports to his consul once every week to re- 
ceive instructions. 

''We have tricked California, however, by sending 
our men as residents to the Hawaiian Islands. 
There they become 'citizens' and from there, after 
a certain time, proceed to California. . . . 

"We have sent both army and navy officers in 
the clever disguise of workmen; and they, having 
been thoroughly taught in Japan how to swim, have 
quietly slipped overboard and gained a landing in 
California and Oregon ports, under the very eyes 
of the asinine United States customs and immigra- 
tion officials." ^ 

The Japanese now have a new base from which 



WHEN THE BROWN MAN COMES 22T 

they can direct their operations. The Marshall 
Islands form an important naval station 2600 miles 
nearer our Pacific coast than Tokyo! Her engi- 
neers and army officials are working night and day 
constructing new concrete fortifications. Our Pa- 
cific forts are of little value in protecting our ports. 
They are old. For years the War Department has 
not sent sufficient ammunition to the Pacific coast 
to give the garrison two hours' practice per month. 

The Japanese, when they sent their fleet on its 
tour of the Pacific, demonstrated that they could 
enter our ports, with lights out, without local 
pilots. From the Japanese who already live in the 
western states they would have ample aid in land- 
ing anywhere along the Pacific coast. 

''There are officers of ours scattered everywhere 
on the Pacific coast to-day. We do not need to ex- 
plain why they are there !" ^ 

And what could not happen in twenty- four 
hours? Most of our army and practically all of 
our ammunition is east of the Rocky Mountains. 
These inoiintains fonn tJie greatest natural barrier 
in the world. 

We have six railway lines crossing them — the 
Santa Fe, Southern Pacific, Western Pacific, Union 
Pacific, Northern Pacific, Great Northern, and 
Milwaukee, Chicago and St. Paul. These rail- 
roads climb, in traversing the mountains, to great 
heights, pass through many tunnels and creep over 



228 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

long dizzy trestles. It took years to construct 
these bridges and tunnels. At every strategic point 
along these railroads there are colonies of Japanese 
labourers, who are in reality Japanese soldiers and 
engineers. 

In every group there are several who are in 
the secret service of Japan. They would be in- 
formed of any premeditated attack, even of the 
exact hour, long before any American had knowl- 
edge of it. 

All our transcontinental telephone and telegraph 
wires follow the lines of the railroads. Upon re- 
ceiving code instructions by telegraph or wire- 
less they could, in one hour, cut every telephonic 
and telegraphic wire connecting the east with the 
west. In one night the railway guards could be 
overpowered and every tunnel blown up and every 
trestle ruined. 

The coast states would be cut off from their meat 
supply and California from her grain and wheat 
supply; the vegetable farms and markets are al- 
ready in the hands of the Japanese. 

Within twenty-four hours after landing, trains 
could be seized by trained Japanese now working 
as common labourers along the railroads, and 
twenty thousand trained Japanese already living in 
California could be hurried to the mountain fast- 
nesses where the railroads cross the summits. In 
each of these places a thousand men with the ma- 



WHEN THE BROWN MAN COMES 229 

chine guns brought by their transports could hold 
at bay our entire mobile army in the United States. 

But they need not wait for mitrailleuses from 
their transport ships. There are scores of secret 
Japanese stores of arms on the Pacific ; and no one 
can compute the ammunition and equipment 
stored in Southern California. Only lately four 
warships were there two weeks (to fish) before 
our Navy Department investigated. In that dry 
land, guns and ammunition can be stored without 
elaborate preparation. The twenty thousand Japa- 
nese soldiers in British Columbia, ready to invade 
from the north, are well equipped. 

Recently in a police raid of a Japanese boarding 
house, it was found that the basement, the attic, 
every cupboard, every cubic foot of space in the 
house was filled with mitrailleuses, other guns 
and ammunition. These guns were of the type 
that could be mounted on bicycles or carried on the 
back. Even the space under the beds was occupied 
by boxes containing ammunition. 

Hence without any supplies or men even from 
Japan, all of the railroads reaching the Pacific in 
the north and all those reaching it in the south, 
could be seized and mountain passes held. X 

We could not march an army over the Rocky 
Mountains in ten years with the Japanese control- 
ling the passes with rapid-fire machine guns. We 
could march army after army to the mountains, 



230 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

but they would never get over and they would never 
come back. 

Even if we gained the summits we could not 
reconstruct the tunnels within twelve months. 

Meanwhile 100,000 of the 200,000 Japanese in 
Mexico could move on Texas and engage most of 
our mobile army. They could be supplied not only 
by arms already stored in Mexico, but by transports 
sent to the Magdalena and to the Turtle Bays. 
Mexico has had an understanding with Japan for 
years. Six years ago Mexican silver was passing 
current in the streets and bazaars of Tokyo. 

If the Japanese, in accordance with their inten- 
tions, were to send an army of two hundred thou- 
sand to our shores, together with the three hun- 
dred fifty thousand already on our territory and 
in Mexico and British Columbia, they would have 
then an attacking force of over half a million 
men. 

West of the Rocky Mountains, at our Pacific 
coast forts and in Alaska, we have about 3,538 
army men and 6,751 paper militia in the coast 
states. But the armies are in five different places 
and the largest group in any one place consists of 
but 1,260 men. The different groups are separated 
by distances of from two hundred to two thousand 
miles. The Japanese, then, would have to combat 
less than two thousand troops at any one place. 

The Japanese army would be equipped with at 



WHEN THE BROWN MAN COMES 231 

TrainedJapanese Men 
Now on U.S.Sofl,fnMexico,and Bridsti Columbia 



&• 






^ 






1 






1 






8 


%■ 


1 


s 






1 


1 


t 


ij 


r^ 


1 


•^ 


S 


■^H 


^■^- 


^ 


es» 


-|- 


1 


1 


1 


1 


1 



USArmy'^' 



I 



I 



1. This number is considered very conservative. An officer of the 
United States Army vi^ho made an investigation of this matter in 
western Mexico, five years ago, estimates that the number of 
trained Japanese men in western Mexico is lOO per cent, greater 
than the number here stated. 

2. The entire mobile army of the United States is scattered 
throughout the forty-eight States of the Union, and over Alaska, 
Porto Rico, Panama Canal Zone, Hawaii, Philippines, and some 
are stationed in China. 

The largest number of United States trained troops that the Jap- 
anese would have to meet at any one place at the present time is 
but 8,000. 



232 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

least eight hundred field guns, their minimum reg- 
ular equipment, and in addition at least two thou- 
sand mitrailleuses. We have on the other side 
of the Rocky Mountains such a small number of 
guns that one hesitates to mention them. 

As a reserve, Japan has two thousand eight hun- 
dred field guns to draw from, while we have but 
eight hundred fifty for our entire army. The 
average size of the Japanese field guns is greater 
than ours. Japan's army would certainly be 
equipped with sufficient ammunition ; for ten years 
we have not had enough on the Pacific coast to 
fight thirty minutes. 

There is little chance that our Pacific and Asiatic 
fleets could render effective resistance to the Japa- 
nese fleet, which contains twenty battleships and 
cruisers, every one of which is better than the 
best ship we have on the Pacific. 

The two flagships in our Asiatic and Pacific 
fleet have a displacement of only 13,000 and 8,00a 
tons, respectively ; cost but five and four million dol- 
lars, respectively, and have main armament which 
consists of but four eight-inch guns each. What 
chance would these have against the great ships 
of the Japanese Navy, having from 27,000 to 30,- 
000 tons displacement, having engines of 40,000 
and 68,000 horse-power, having batteries of enor- 
mous fourteen-inch guns? 

It is common knowledge to the world that the 



WHEN THE BROWN MAN COMES 233 

OuFdiances on Land o|}alnsf Japanese In\asf on 
COmpapoifveyalues 



Invading Arniy JdpdHB 
Opposfn^Amiy U.8.H 2 



6unsivittiAFmyf"f' 



OunsfoReserFe 
SfzeojQuns 



Japj 

U.S.I 

Jaixi 
U.S.I 



Ammunflf on Suppler 

PocMcI^onds Japj 
fst two days U.S.I 



PatfffcCoasi Jap.HHHHBHBHHHBHHHnii 
IstlwD hours U.S.I 



M«?48hoiW"^* 



1. The largest group of United States troops west of the Rocky 
Mountains that the Japanese would be compelled to meet at any 
one place. 

2. Representing all of the regular army in the Philippines, in 
Hawaii, in Alaska, at Panama, in Washington, Oregon and Cali- 
fornia ; men in the Pacific Coast forts ; and the militia of the 
Pacific Coast States. 

3. Representing the guns on the Pacific Coast west of the Rocky 
Mountains. 



S34 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

policy of Japan is always to strike quickly and 
without warning. Without doubt her warships will 
be brought together in such a way as to allay sus- 
picion, ostensibly for a manoeuvre; and that they 
will be half way across the Pacific before we shall 
have the slightest inkling of the fact that Japan 
is planning an immediate attack. 

It is assumed that we could send our Atlantic 
fleet or a portion of it through the Panama Canal 
or around South America in time to decide a naval 
war with Japan. It is very questionable if the 
patriotic Japanese living in the Panama Canal 
Zone would allow o\ir ships to pass through the 
canal when it is possible to prevent them doing so. 
A small amount of dynamite could create such a 
slide — even before we would have knowledge of 
the contemplated innocent Japanese naval manoeu- 
vre — that the canal would be blocked for months. 

If we attempt to send our Atlantic fleet around 
Cape Horn, those battleships must be accompanied 
by supply ships. Even though we have fighting 
vessels that can make 21 knots an hour, the fleet 
would have to be held together. It could travel 
no faster than the slowest ship. To separate it, 
that is, to allow a few ships to enter the Pacific at 
a time, would be the height of folly. Even if all 
were kept together, the fleeter ships of the Japa- 
nese Navy could speed in to the advance column, 
destroy the vanguard and retreat again; and our 



WHEN THE BROWN MAN COMES 235 

ships would be unable to follow, because of their 
slower speed. This could be done over and over 
again — the fleeter Japanese ships each time cen- 
tring their fire on one or two of our slower ships 
and getting away again with little risk of damage 
to themselves. 

What chances have we, in our present state of 
preparation ? 

With wonderful business sagacity we assert tha£ 
they cannot afford another war. This is the great- 
est of all fallacies. The Balkan States are prob- 
ably the poorest states in the world. Only a few 
years ago, when a rich merchant of Montenegro 
purchased an automobile — the first owned by a na- 
tive Montenegrin — the King sent the merchant a 
polite note calling attention to the man's extrava- 
gance and hinting that he, the King of Montene- 
gro, could not afford one. Yet Montenegro and 
Serbia, though two of the poorest little nations in 
the world, have been able to play a remarkable part 
in three wars within five years. 

It is true that the Japanese national debt is one- 
eighth their entire wealth, but their national debt 
per capita is less than the per capita debt of the 
United States. The national debt per capita of 
Japan is twenty-three dollars; and that of the 
United States, thirty-two dollars. Per person, 
we have a greater burden to bear in the payment 



236 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

of our national debt than have the Japanese in the 
payment of their debt. 

The cost of feeding a Japanese soldier is one- 
twelfth the cost of feeding an American. The feed- 
ing cost of an American soldier is $.24 per day, that 
of a Japanese $.02. Moreover, the Japanese sacri- 
fice everything for their country. Japanese mer- 
chants and men of wealth willingly and gladly pay 
large income taxes for the support of the army and 
navy of Japan. 

The Japanese are a marvellous, courageous, am- 
bitious, proud people. They may be slightly smaller 
in body than we are ; but equipment, ability and en- 
durance count to-day in war, not stature. 

We laugh at these little Japanese and talk about 
"drowning them in the Pacific like rats!" 

In Hong Kong, many years ago, it was my hor- 
rible misfortune to be forced to witness a life-and- 
death struggle between a six-foot-four Chinaman 
and an infuriated rat which the Chinaman had been 
torturing to amuse himself. The rat was so small 
and so quick in its assaults that it easily avoided 
the hands that sought to grip it. It was so agile, so 
slippery, so terrific in biting and ripping the throat 
of the Chinaman — running up and down the man's 
back, over his shoulders, under his arms, over and 
over again to the Chinaman's throat, without be- 
ing caught — that the powerful six-foot Chinaman, 
blood spurting from the ripped-open veins, soon fell 



WHEN THE BROWN MAN COMES 237 

to the floor and died before aid could reach him. 
The rat scampered away unhurt. 



QUOTATION REFERENCES 

^ Page 218. Extracts from American newspapers. 

^ Page 219. Henry Litchfield West, Executive Secre- 
tary National Security League. 

^ Page 224. General Francis V. Greene, U. S. V., from 
"The Present Military Situation in the United States." 

* ^ Page 224 ; ^ ' page 225 ; ^ page 226 ; ° page 227. From 
a book circulated by the National Defence Association of 
Japan, the present officers of which are reported to be Count 
Okuma, Premier of Japan, president; Baron Kato, Minis- 
ter of Foreign Affairs of Japan, vice-president. 



CHAPTER III 

IP THE UON COMES 

IF the Allies are successful in Europe, Great Brit- 
ain could send twenty-eight dreadnoughts and 
battleships to make an attack on our Atlantic coast 
and still keep a sufficient number at home to guard 
her interests there. In case of an attack by Great 
Britain or any one else on our Atlantic coast, we 
would not dare to take all the ships of our Pacific 
fleet from the Pacific ; but were we to do so. Great 
Britain's attacking fleet would outnumber our en- 
tire defensive fleet, three to one. 

Great Britain could send against us nine battle 
cruisers, we have none; thirty swift cruisers, we 
have three, and it is even questionable if our three 
could operate for any length of time, because of 
their furnaces. She could send one hundred de- 
stroyers to combat our sixty-two, even if we were 
to bring all of ours from the Pacific. 

Her ships have an average speed of from two 
and a half to three knots an hour greater than ours 
and the average range of her battleship guns is 
greater. 

238 



IF THE LION COMES 



239 



Our Chances at Sea against a British Atta^ i 
arearBntafn U.S.A. 




Bomesnfps 

Avera^eSpeed 
Oun Range. 
Qun Elevation 
ToipedoTul) 

Battle CruiseFS 

Scout Cruisers. 

Des^Foyers 

SuDmaFines.. 



N. B. Lines representing the same United States factors of defence 
may vary on different charts, because they represent proportional 
values, 

1. This chart represents battleships, battle cruisers, scout cruisers 
and destroyers authorised and laid dov^^n by Great Britain and the 
United States from December 31, 1904, to January, 1914. These 
modern boats are the ones that determine sea battles. Grey beards, 
ships in reserve and ships in ordinary are not an aid. They hinder 
the speed of the fleet, they have to be taken care of by the modern 
ships ; hence, their detrimental value in modern battle. 

Since January i, 1914, Great Britain has been building modern bat- 
tleships, battle cruisers, scout cruisers, destroyers and submarines 
at a tremendous rate. We have been lagging woefully behind. 
Secretary Daniels admits that Great Britain has probably added to 
her navy sixteen new^ modern fighting ships since the beginning 
of the war. 

2. Comparative number of torpedo tubes we will have when the 
Oklahoma and the Nevada are in service. All other torpedo tubes 
are useless for modern torpedoes. 

3. The three scout cruisers we have would be doubtful factors, be- 
cause of their defective furnaces. 

4. Representing the actual number of all our useless submarines. 

5. Representing the submarines at Panama and on the Atlantic 
Coast, that have been able to submerge during the last three 
manoeuvres without being convoyed to port. 



240 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

Great Britain's battleships would be equipped 
with 112 modern torpedo tubes. We will soon have 
two ships with four torpedo tubes each that are of 
use for modern torpedoes — no more. 

Great Britain has eighty submarines; she could 
spare forty to send here; we have two on the At- 
lantic coast, north of Panama, that have been able 
to navigate under water without being conveyed 
to port immediately afterwards; we have five more 
at the canal. 

On the chart, "Our Chance at Sea against British 
Attack," every questionable estimate as to the num- 
bers and efficiency of naval factors is charted in 
favour of the United States. All the three swift 
cruisers are represented at full value although they 
are old, slow and their furnaces are inefficient in the 
least wind. If a true comparison of the differ- 
ences were given, the line representing Great Brit- 
ain's equipment in swift cruisers would be forty 
times as long as the line representing ours. She 
has built two, four, six or even eight cruisers of 
the finest speediest type every year during the last 
ten years. 

This chart estimates only the ships that Great 
Britain could spare to send against us during times 
of peace in Europe; while everything we have in the 
Atlantic, in the Caribbean Sea, in our navy yards, 
in our dry docks, even everything laid up for re- 
pairs, is counted in our favour. 



IF THE LION COMES 241 

And yet what chance would we have? 

Japan is bound to England by an offensive and 
defensive treaty, and in case of war with England 
it might be necessary to divide our fleets and fight 
the navies of the two countries. 

Great Britain would not attempt an invasion with 
less than 250,000 trained men. Our entire opposi- 
tion to resist an attack would consist of 46,000 men, 
including the Army of the East, ten thousand men 
now manning our coast forts, and all the available 
eastern militia — thirty thousand ! These could not 
be mobilised even in thirty days. 

Prepared for a quick attack, the English army of 
invasion of 250,000 men would be equipped with 
900 field guns, not counting two or three thousand 
mitrailleuses. Her field guns in size are nearly 
twice as large as ours. More than this, supply- 
ships, arriving later, could bring from her reserve 
of 5,500 guns any number of guns she might de- 
sire. 

Heavy guns can be moved across the water more 
easily than they can be moved on land. England 
has found it possible to transport 93^-inch howit- 
zers across the English Channel. It is infinitely 
more difficult to do this than to send them across the 
Atlantic Ocean. The difficulty in transporting 
large guns is in loading and landing, and the har- 
bours of the Channel are so shallow that large ships 
cannot enter them. 



242 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

As a reserve, Great Britain has now 5,500 guns 
— we have 850 guns, counting every field gun in the 
United States, even those just now completed and 
soon to be completed. 

Great Britain's ammunition supply can be esti- 
mated at one hundred per cent, sufficient. Ours, 
counting all the ammunition stored in the United 
States, is 44 per cent. The amount would feed our 
guns for about a day and a half. Supply-ships 
continuously arriving from Great Britain and sup- 
plies arriving from Canada would maintain her 100 
per cent, sufficiency even after our supply was com- 
pletely exhausted. 

The coast forts near New York City could be 
easily destroyed by explosive shells from British 
battleships, firing from a distance of twelve miles 
and upward, while our antedated guns, even the 
new modern ones just installed at Fort Totten, could 
playfully drop their shells in the water four and a 
half miles short of the ships of the British fleet. 
We have but two coast guns from Panama to Maine 
with a range equal to those of foreign battleships — 
but these are not yet mounted. 

The British navy could also destroy the forts at 
Boston and Philadelphia, without even coming in 
range of the guns there. 

Another division of British dreadnoughts could 
steam past Fort Monroe at the mouth of the Chesa- 
peake, without coming within a mile and a half of 



IF THE LION COMES 243 

OuF Qicmces on Land a^ainsl Brilfsh Invasion. 
CbmpopatJveValues 

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Opposin^Anny U.S.hbhi 

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U.S.I 

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Ammunf fion Supply 
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Afterwards ^'^ 



U.S. ? 



N. B. Lines representing the same United States factors of de- 
fence may vary on different charts, because they represent pro- 
portional values. 

1. Representing the entire army which can be mobilised in thirty 
days, men in our Atlantic Coast defences, and the militia of all the 
Eastern States. 

2. Representing 900 per cent, more field guns than we now have 
with our entire army east of the Mississippi River. 

3. Representing the entire equipment of field guns in the United 
States. 

4. And a line 26e per cent, longer. 



244? AWAKE! U. S. A. 

the extreme limit of the guns of Fort Monroe, and 
destroy Washington or hold it up for ransom or 
treaty concessions. Without even landing a single 
man in New York, the British fleet could with a few 
explosive shells blow up the power stations of our 
subways at Fifty-ninth Street, of our elevated lines 
at Seventy-sixth Street, and of our New York 
Street Railways system at Ninety-first Street. 

The British ability to transport an army to our 
shores is unquestioned. The merchant marine of 
Great Britain has a tonnage of 19,000,000 tons. 

If after the invasion we tried to oppose the ad- 
vance of their army, we would necessarily be forced 
into battle line. 

"An army of a million men, consisting of infan- 
try, armed with modern shoulder-arms, would be 
completely overmatched and easily defeated by an 
army of 25,000 men amply equipped with modern 
field artillery. The infantry would be wholly un- 
able to get within musket range, because they would 
all be destroyed by the shrapnel of the enemy before 
they could get near enough to fire a single effective 
shot." ^ 

Great Britain in an attack upon us would not only 
have the aid of Japan's navy on our Pacific coast, 
but might also be supported by a Mexican invasion, 
as well as a Japanese advance from Mexico. If 
Great Britain and Japan should furnish Mexico 
with money, ammunition and supplies to fight the 



IF THE LION COMES 245 

Gringoes whom the Mexicans so much hate, the 
Mexicans would do so. 

Japan has now at least 100,000 Japanese in Mex- 
ico, and about 20,000 in British Columbia, all of 
whom have had military training. 

On the north we would have to prepare against 
invasion from Canada. Canadians themselves 
might not fight us, but English troops could make 
an invasion through Canada. And if it ever came 
to a draw between the United States and England, 
even the Canadians would certainly join with Eng- 
land. No matter what the blood tie between the 
Canadians and the people of the United States, the 
blood tie between Canada and England is stronger. 
But blood ties do not prevent war when commercial 
interests are at stake. 

"No nation can be trusted farther than it is 
bound by its interests." ^ 

QUOTATION REFERENCES 

^ Page 244. Hiram Maxim, in "Defenceless America." 
^ Page 245. George Washington. 



CHAPTER IV 

MIUTARY CAMPS OR CE:M^TE:RISS 

THERE is a story of foolish virgins and of wise 
ones. The wise ones prepared; the foolish 
ones went out into the darkness with their lamps 
empty. 

Preparation may not always prevent war, but it 
gives a nation a fighting chance to prevent defeat, 
vassalage and annihilation. 

Judea did not harken to the prophet Isaiah who 
called upon her to prepare herself for defence; and 
was overthrown by the hosts of Mesapotamia. 

Greece, unprepared, was made a vassal of Rome; 
and only fragments of her law, her literature, her 
art, her philosophy have come down to us. 

The peace campaign of Hanno prevented men and 
supplies being sent to Hannibal ; and Carthage fell ! 

One hundred years ago Europe was not pre- 
pared ; Napoleon conquered Italy, Egypt, Flanders, 
Holland, Saxony, Bavaria, Austria and Prussia. 
One lesson, however, was enough for the Prussian 
king. When the treaty was signed Napoleon per- 
mitted him a small army of but a few thousand men 

246 



MILITARY CAMPS OR CEMETERIES 247 

— only to preserve order at home! The King of 
Prussia immediately enrolled the allowed number. 
These men were trained, prepared and dismissed; 
another\group was enrolled, trained, prepared and 
dismissed^^and then another, and another and an- 
other, until every man was trained and fit. Then 
Prussia added the balance to the measure that finally 
overthrew the great Corsican. 

France lost Alsace and Lorraine in 1871 because 
the Republicans, for political reasons, obstructed 
the efforts of the government to prepare for the 
coming confict. 

In August, 19 14, three weeks after mobilisation, 
600,000 French soldiers were without rifles. Many 
others had old rifles unfit for service; they could 
not then combat the well-equipped Germans who ad- 
vanced to the very gates of Paris. 

England was warned by Lord Roberts, the mili- 
tary genius; by Winston Churchill, the prophet of 
naval preparedness; and by Robert Blatchford, the 
peace-loving socialist: Blatchford was not stupid 
merely because he believed in the ultimate realisa- 
tion of the brotherhood of man. 

Lord Haldane sent England's army out into the 
night with no oil in its lamps. When England 
should have been enlisting and training a million 
men, Lord Haldane dismissed 80,000 and publically 
threatened to abolish Lord Roberts's pension if the 



248 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

grand old man continued his agitation for prepara- 
tion. 

England lost one man out of four, from Mons to 
Marne, because she did not have sufficient up- 
to-date artillery to protect her soldiers. 

When a nation does not fill its lamps with oil it 
fills them with the blood of its heroes. 

When Marshal Niel was pleading in the French 
Chamber in 1868 in favour of a bill of defence, 
Jules Favre replied: "You, militarists, wish to 
turn France into an armed camp." 

"And you, pacificists," replied Marshal Neil, "are 
taking care to make of it a cemetery." 



PART FOUR: WHY WE ARE NOT 
PREPARED 



PART FOUR: WHY WE ARE NOT 
PREPARED 

CHAPTER I 

PACIFIC MILITARISM FOR POUTICS 

WE are unprepared because we have been bur- 
dened by a particular form of militarism — 
pacific militarism for politics. 

There is militarism and militarism. There is 
militarism for conquest, militarism for protection, 
and militarism for politics of pacifism and pork. 

The last is by far the worst type of militarism. 
It is the type Congress and the people have made 
existent in the United States of America. It has 
come about as a reaction against militarism for 
conquest. It places incompetent men — incompe- 
tent because they have had no experience in the 
work for which they are appointed — at the head 
of the army and navy departments. 

It results to-day — and the history of the United 
States proves that it has always resulted — in blun- 
ders, in negligence, in suppression of the truth, in 
deception of the public, in creation of false ideals 
as to the safety of the nation, and in enormous 

251 



252 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

waste of moneys — a gigantic system of graft, the 
most gigantic and wasteful in the world. 

But these results have not been and are not due 
to the military or the navy. They have grown out 
of the political system which is dominated by the 
ideas of the pacifists — a system which has controlled 
and controls the military and naval organisations — 
thanks to the indifference of the public. 

With very few exceptions, the pacifists do not be- 
lieve in peace at any price ; they do not believe that 
we should give up our sovereignty — tamely submit- 
ting to conquest rather than fighting for independ- 
ence. But they do believe that an adequate trained 
army in times of peace is a danger ; they do believe 
that one should never prepare for war until war is 
upon us — that when the danger arises the mass of 
people, because of their patriotism and loyalty, will 
spring to arms and adequately defend the country. 

The principle and theory of the pacifists is ideal; 
the practice abominable and criminal. 

The waste of billions of dollars, the prolongation 
of months of struggle into years of suffering and 
anguish, the loss of tens of thousands of men by 
sickness and the loss of scores of thousands by 
death have been due above all else to the pacific 
ideas of President Jefferson, President Polk and 
President Buchanan. 

If it had not been for the ultra-pacific ideas of 
Thomas Jefferson and his coterie of followers, we 



PACIFIC MILITARISM FOR POLITICS 253 

would have had in 1812 a trained army of 20,000 
men and the war with England would have been 
ended in one campaign. If it had not been for the 
pacific ideas of Polk and his followers in Congress, 
the Mexican War would not have lasted six months, 
and fifteen thousand instead of a hundred four 
thousand men would have been necessary. If it had 
not been for the pacific ideas of Buchanan and his 
followers, the Civil War would certainly have been 
ended in two years at most and we would have re- 
quired but 300,000 men instead of nearly 3,000,000. 

The military has always opposed the pacifists' 
idea of a voluntary army springing to arms after 
war has been declared. The military consequently 
has always opposed and the leaders of the army and 
navy, have always lamented the enormous political 
waste in men and money due to the political sys- 
tem which grows out of the pacifists' idea of mili- 
tarism. 

We were prepared but once in our history and 
that preparation saved us from what might have 
been the greatest war in which we would have been 
engaged — a war with France, England, Austria 
and Mexico combined. At the close of our Civil 
War we had more than a million trained men. Aus- 
tria had violated the Monroe Doctrine by placing 
Maximilian on the throne of Mexico. England 
was our bitter enemy all through the Civil War and 
would readily have joined the forces of Austria and 



254< AWAKE! U. S. A. 

France ; but, being prepared at the moment, we had 
but to request the withdrawal of the Emperor of 
Mexico. Then France and Austria backed down. If 
we had been unprepared would they have done so so 
readily? And what would have been the result of 
a war between an unprepared nation on this side of 
the water and England, Austria, France and Mex- 
ico combined against us ? 

Because of the fact that we have never met a 
single first-class power using its full forces in any 
war in which we have been engaged, we have con- 
tinued to shut our eyes to all the waste of the past 
and have continued to allow the system to persist 
up to the present time. 

Primarily, the people have been and are at fault 
for permitting such a system to exist; secondly. 
Congress has been and is to blame for pandering to 
this pacific political militarism, thus wasting bil- 
lions of dollars; thirdly, the political administra- 
tions have been and are to blame for conferring the 
offices of Secretary of War and the Secretary of 
the Navy as "plum puddings" to good friends and 
former political helpers. This policy results from 
the pacifists' fear that efficient military and naval 
heads of the departments would put our people in 
danger of military oppression. 

The preparation for protecting against all for- 
eign aggression — the safety of our nation — rests, 
by the appointment of the President, in the hands 



PACIFIC MILITARISM FOR POLITICS 255 

of two men — the Secretary of War and the Secre- 
tary of the Navy. 

No man should be appointed to either of these 
positions merely because he is a ''friend" or a "suc- 
cessful business man" or a "social reformer." A 
man should be picked for his fitness for the work 
to be done. 

This is not a criticism of the present administra- 
tion alone; it is a criticism of the general policy of 
our government. No business corporation would 
tolerate such a policy. The Directors of the United 
States Steel Corporation or any other large busi- 
ness organisation would never choose a man as man- 
ager merely because he came from Georgia instead 
of Michigan or because he had been a successful 
attorney or a successful manufacturer of silk skirts; 
neither would a banking institution choose a man 
as bank president merely because of his taste for 
bon-bons or diluted raspberry juice. 

A political Secretary of War or Secretary of the 
Navy spends his first year in attempting to find out 
what the reports of his subordinates mean; his sec- 
ond year in ascertaining what he is expected to do ; 
his third in getting a glimpse of the needs of the 
department ; his fourth in discussion and investiga- 
tion. Then he goes out of office, and another begins 
the circle! 

The first step in our campaign for adequate prep- 
aration must be insistence upon a change of policy 



256 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

at Washington. The Secretary of War and the 
Secretary of the Navy should be chosen from the 
ranks of men who have worked in the army and 
navy for years; from the group of men who have 
proved their knowledge of the subject, who have 
demonstrated their efficiency ; and who have shown 
that they know how to handle men. 

Moreover, each should have a seat in the House 
and in the Senate so that each can come in contact 
with Congressmen and Senators and inform these 
men as to the real needs of the Army and the Navy. 
Our world to-day is a very busy one ; Americans are 
especially busy. It does not reflect upon the intelli- 
gence of Congressmen from the Kansas cornfields, 
from the Nevada mining towns, from the bluegrass 
meadows of Kentucky, the brewery districts of Mil- 
waukee, the oil-fields of Oklahoma, or the logging 
districts of northern Michigan to state that they do 
not know the real needs of the Army and Navy. 

Each is intelligent, but each has had little time to 
specialize in army and navy matters previous to his 
election. Each, without doubt, has been previously 
occupied by personal business and by the affairs of 
his district. Hence the Secretary of War and the 
Secretary of the Navy should have seats in the Con- 
gress and in the Senate, so that they may enter into 
discussion, elaborating in detail, when advisable, 
the reasons for their recommendations to Congress. 
This would make it possible for Representatives and 



PACIFIC MILITARISM FOR POLITICS 257 

Senators to find out exactly what the needs of the 
army and navy are ; and in this way Congressmen 
and Senators may become convinced of the neces- 
sity of appropriating the moneys asked. 

A political secretary of the Navy or a political 
Secretary of War, previously uninformed of the 
actual needs, is never qualified to speak to Congress 
with authority. 

And another change is vitally needed. 

Congressmen now have the power of determining 
how army and navy appropriations should be spent ; 
their knowledge of the real needs of the army and 
navy depends upon the reports of the Secretaries of 
War and the Navy. As these officials seldom are 
sure enough of themselves to convince Congress 
that they know what they are asking money for. 
Congress naturally concludes that the matter cannot 
be of great consequence. As a result certain Con- 
gressional leaders follow their own inclinations and 
interests and "sluice to the barrels." 

We should do away with the present system of 
appropriation and adopt the budget system. All 
other nations in the world have adopted this policy. 
Even the South American republics are far in ad- 
vance of us in this matter. 

Our present system is a violation of the very prin- 
ciples of our government. According to those prin- 
ciples Congress is the law-making body, the Pres- 
ident and the cabinet are the executives of the 



258 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

nation, and the Supreme Court exercises the judi- 
cial function. 

Congress as the law-making body has the su- 
preme right in determining the appropriations but 
it has assumed the executive function of the gov- 
ernment in determining in detail how the Secretary 
of War and the Secretary of the Navy, members of 
the executive department of the government, shall 
spend the money, even to the number of dollars to 
be paid a scrub woman. 

It seems reasonable that among our one hundred 
million people an efficient Secretary of the Navy 
might hire a departmental assistant at $200 or less 
per month who would be able to hire and discharge 
at reasonable prices, scrub women, ice men and 
laundresses. How ridiculous and wasteful to en- 
gage 536 Senators and Representatives, each at a 
yearly salary of $7,500 — a total of four million 
dollars — not including railway expenses and all the 
expenses of upkeep of the House of Representatives 
and the Senate, to discuss in detail an act to appro- 
priate $360 a year for a common labourer, to em- 
ploy four scrub women at $192, or to engage a chief 
laundress at $240. Would any business corpora- 
tion engage a Board of Directors at a salary of 
$4,220,000 a year — almost $3,000 per working hour, 
to discuss whether they should pay a scrub woman 
$184 a year or $192 a year, and, moreover, not only 
hours, but days and even weeks in such discussions ? 



PACIFIC MILITARISM FOR POLITICS 259 

Think of a Congressional act that requires but 270 
words to appropriate $33,000,000 for ships of the 
navy, and 400 words to determine how ice, reHgious 
books and stationery shall be purchased, and 100 
words to determine the manner in which an enlisted 
man shall be given his shoes, hat, coat, belts and so 
forth. Monumental work for men commanding a 
salary of $4,220,000 a year! 

We are the only nation in the world, even among 
the third-rate powers, that has not adopted the 
budget system. 

First, then, let us urge and insist upon a change 
in our government's policy so that trained and in- 
formed men shall be appointed to direct our depart- 
ments of the army and the navy. 

Second, let us urge and insist that these men be 
given seats in the House of Representatives and in 
the Senate. 

Third, let us urge and insist upon the adoption of 
the budget system of appropriating money for the 
army and navy. 

Let us do away with militarism for pork ! 

The only righteous military system is that which 
is based upon the ideal that all citizens owe a duty 
to their government in return for the protection 
which the government gives to all. This is mili- 
tarism for protection — the service of all for the 
good of all. It is the system of Switzerland and 
Australia. Let us adopt it. 



CHAPTER II 

INEFFICIENCY, NEGLIGENCE AND SUPPRESSION OF 

FACTS 

WE are unprepared because of past inefficiency 
— due to political mismanagement. 

The political head of a military or naval system 
must necessarily be more influenced by the political 
factors than would a permanent naval or military 
board having full executive power and being quite 
independent of politics. 

When there is a difiference of opinion as to what 
the military experts believe is needed and that which 
supporters of the administration believe is neces- 
sary, the political secretary, having been trained in 
the art of listening to the voice of political support- 
ers, is at least more inclined to listen to their plea 
than to that of the military experts. The heroic 
music of the military is strange to him and he does 
not understand it ; but the rag-time approval of his 
political constituents — supporters of the adminis- 
tration — is not only familiar to his ear, but pleasing 
to his temperament. 

Moreover, a temporary political head is not well 
enough informed regarding naval and military or- 

260 



BLUNDERING AND SUPPRESSION 261 

ganisation nor well enough trained in the handling 
of naval or military units to reorganise or build 
up a better organisation when one is needed. 

Our naval promotion system is a burlesque of 
those of Europe ; it seems that everything has been 
done that could have been done to keep able am- 
bitious young men out of the navy. 

No young man, desiring a future, wishes to grow 
gray-haired under a system which holds him in the 
two lowest ranks of the navy until he is two-score 
and ten. There is no efficient arrangement for pro- 
motion even of trained college men. 

"... the promotion of officers is so completely 
blocked that a young man graduating from the 
Naval Academy must look forward to spending all 
the best years of his life in the two lowest grades 
of the service; to performing, as a gray-headed 
man, the same duties he has performed as a boy; 
and to receiving but a very small increase in salary." 

''I ask you to picture the efifect of a condition 
where a young officer, graduating from the Naval 
Academy, full of spirit and enthusiasm, finds him- 
self confronted with a prospect of promotion to the 
grade of Lieutenant at the age of 52 years." ' 

Also in the organisation of our army efficiency 
seems to be the last thing thought about. 

Our army is a badly balanced organisation, and 
for this Congress is to blame. 



262 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

Were it not necessary to increase our army in 
time of war, the number of officers we have in the 
United States Army would be a fair proportion to 
the number of enhsted men. Our standing army, 
however, will be but the nucleus for hundreds of 
thousands of volunteers. Certainly we cannot ex- 
pect to effectively oppose an invading army of 
250,000 trained men with less than one million vol- 
unteers in addition to our present army, inasmuch 
as it took nearly three million Union volunteers to 
defeat the volunteer armies of the South in the Civil 
War. 

Every company of a hundred men needs at least 
four officers. It is better to have six — at least two 
in reserve for each company in time of war. The 
officers in our army are but a little more than 5.3 
per cent, of the enlisted men. Assuming that the 
officers of our militia, each and every one of them, 
should turn out to be efficient officers, which is very 
doubtful, then we should have just 5,015 officers of 
the United States Army to captain our army of 
93,610 men and to train the 1,000,000 volunteers; 
that is, one officer to every 2,012 men. This would 
mean just one-eightieth of the minimum number of 
officers absolutely necessary ; and not a single officer 
in reserve. If our entire mobile army in all the 
United States to-day were officered at this rate, we 
would now have but 17 officers of all ranks. 

Officers promoted from the ranks without pre- 



BLUNDERING AND SUPPRESSION 263 

vious training, are seldom of value ; there are excep- 
tions, of course, which stand out in history, but they 
are few. In our Civil War more than 25,000 men 
made officers by promotion had to be returned to the 
ranks because of their inefficiency. 

Our campaign against Mexico w^as probably the 
most creditable campaign the United States Army 
ever conducted. General Scott has asserted that its 
success would have been doubtful except for the 
percentage of trained men and especially the large 
percentage of trained officers. 

''The magnitude of the task in training volunteer 
officers is apparent when it is realized that it will be 
necessary to develop not less than 25,000 in case we 
should have to mobilise enough additional volun- 
teers to bring our total force up to 1,000,000 
men." ^ 

The more trained officers zue can hav,e on hand, 
in case it becomes necessary to quickly enroll and 
train volunteers, the better our chance of success 
will be. 

Not only is there lack of proper organisation, but 
there is actual blundering ! 

Mere lack of knowledge on the part of a political 
Secretary of the Navy or an untrained Secretary of 
War has led to serious mistakes. 

Our F submarines were authorized in 1908. 
They were accepted as satisfactory in May, 1913, 



264 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

by Secretary Daniels. They are now out of com- 
mission because of faulty construction. Five years 
to build four defective submarines ; and 22 men sent 
to their death ! 

The C-2 was authorized in May, 1908, and is yet 
but nine-tenths complete — a seven-year profitable 
job. 

For the same reason we are still building great 
battleships, costing from fifteen to seventeen million 
dollars, vitally deficient in one great essential — 
speed. 

The keel of the California has just been laid. We 
are told of the wonderful armor it will have, of the 
twelve mighty guns it will carry, of the engines we 
are going to experiment with; yet we are not so 
vividly informed that its speed is to be but tzventy- 
one knots an hour — a deficiency which would have 
outclassed it even three years ago. 

Of course, no intelligent man holding so responsi- 
ble a position as that of Secretary of War or that 
of Secretary of the Navy wishes to make an impor- 
tant decision upon any vital, gigantic question until 
he has informed himself regarding it. This is to 
his credit, but the result of the system is no less 
detrimental to the army or the navy. While he 
seeks information, talks, discusses and investigates, 
opportunities pass. He is unable to judge of the 
true value of new devices. Hence, because of ig- 
norance on the part of secretaries of the Navy and 



BLUNDERING AND SUPPRESSION 265 

of War, because of negligence on the part of Con- 
gress, we have lost opportunities of first equipping 
our army and navy with the most modern means of 
defence. 

Our people have invented the greatest instru- 
ments in modern warfare; yet we have practically 
none of them. While our political secretaries have 
been investigating other nations have taken them 
up and developed them. 

A citizen of the United States made the first aero- 
plane that would fly. Our Army and Navy depart- 
ments have been testing, experimenting, investi- 
gating and talking ever since — but not building. 
When the war opened we had twenty-three obsolete 
aeroplanes, although Germany had a thousand one 
hundred perfected modern aeroplanes and France 
one thousand five hundred. 

An American invented the Audion Amplifier, 
which is used by the French and English armies to 
detect the far approaching aeroplanes and Zeppe- 
lins. We have none for this purpose. 

It was a citizen of the United States who per- 
fected the submarine ; and we have only a few that 
can safely operate under water, although foreign 
nations have scores of submarines capable of mak- 
ing three and four days' trips, even two weeks' voy- 
ages away from the bases of supply. 

An American invented the microphone, which is 
now used by the British Navy to detect approaching 



^m AWAKE! U. S. A. 

submarines under water. We have none for this 
purpose. 

A citizen of the United States invented the great- 
est explosive known yet, when it was first adopted 
we were so doubtful of its value that instead of 
ordering thirty million dollars' worth Congress ap- 
propriated thirty thousand dollars to be divided 
among seven different factories. 

When the government concentrated its forces at 
Manila and a portion of our army at San Diego, the 
Pacific fleet did not have enough coal to steam to 
Honolulu and back. Lack of fuel for the Pacific 
fleet at this time was wholly due to neglect! 

In August, 191 5, when the government felt it 
might be compelled to again order ships to Mexico, 
the Tennessee which was close to New York Har- 
bor could not leave for the south because she could 
not get enough coal to steam even as far as Newport 
News. 

The Tennessee asked the Brooklyn Navy Yard 
for coal and begged for fifty tons only if the Yard 
could not spare more. But the Brooklyn Navy 
Yard did not have fifty tons on hand and did not 
have that amount twenty-four hours later. And 
this shamefully neglectful condition existed after 
four years' tension with Mexico, after an entire 
year of war in Europe, and after four months' 
diplomatic strain with Germany. 

The Brooklyn Navy Yard is one of the great sup- 



BLUNDERING AND SUPPRESSION 267 

ply stations for the Atlantic fleets, with Boston hun- 
dreds of miles to the north and Philadelphia far to 
the south. And this great naval station could not 
supply FIFTY TONS OF COAL when needed, 
even though the department at Washington had 
knozvn for weeks that it might be called upon at any 
time to send ships to the south! 

There are 152 twelve-inch guns mounted without 
a single person to man them; there are two four- 
teen-inch guns mounted to protect our coasts with- 
out a single man trained to operate them ; there are 
71 ten-inch guns and 37 seven-inch, and no one 
trained to handle them in case of need. 

The great 16-inch gun for the defence of the 
Panama Canal was finished and fire-tested in 1903. 
Through neglect it lay on the beach for ten years. 
At the end of that time it was found that not even 
a design had been made for a carriage! And in 
January, 1916, thirteen years after the gun was fin- 
ished and tested, the carriage was not even ready 
to be sent to Panama. Similar facts as to neglect 
in supplying ammunition and supplying men for our 
harbor defences, brought out at the Senate investi- 
gation a year ago, caused one Senator to exclaim : 

"This is nothing less than criminal negligence." 

Perhaps one of the most serious results of our 
policy of placing politicians at the head of the army 



268 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

and navy is the friction that develops between the 
generals of the army and the admirals of the navy 
who have had from 35 to 40 years' practical experi- 
ence on the one hand and the political head with no 
naval or military experience on the other. 

At present we have such a flagrant example of a 
Secretary of the Navy, unwilling and refusing to 
take advice of experienced admirals or the General 
Board, that the weakness, danger and viciousness 
of the political system of appointment is most strik- 
ingly brought home to us. This is not a criticism 
of Secretary Daniels personally, it is a criticism of 
the system that makes such an appointment possible. 

At best it is most embarrassing for a man with 
only a country newspaper experience to step into a 
department of which he knows nothing and at once 
become the superior of hundreds of men who have 
had years of practical and scientific training in the 
navy and in the department. 

Any man placed in such a position feels that ( for 
the good of the service — a service whose efficiency 
depends upon obedience) he must make it known 
that he is the "head." Consequently, if mistakes are 
made or if defects — not due to him at all — are ex- 
posed, he is tempted to justify his political appoint- 
ment and to justify his chief at the head of the Ad- 
ministration, by covering up those mistakes, by shift- 
ing the blame upon a previous administration or by 



BLUNDERING AND SUPPRESSION 269 

suppressing the truth about the defects which exist. 

Perhaps never in the history of the United States 
has there been a time, excepting during the times 
when we were at war, when publicity as to our un- 
preparedness is so much needed as at present, and 
there probably has never been a time in all our his- 
tory, excepting times when we were at war, during 
which the Secretary of the Navy has attempted to 
suppress the truth as to our real condition so auto- 
cratically as at present. 

In the United States knowledge of facts regard- 
ing our unpreparedness need not be withheld be- 
cause of the fear that foreign governments may 
learn of them. Every man of sense knows that the 
secret agents of Germany, Russia, England and 
Japan know about our unpreparedness. Their 
agents have been at the business of finding out a 
long time and they were well qualified for their task 
in the beginning. Every fact that has been given 
us during that last two years, every astonishing 
revelation made as to our unpreparedness, every- 
thing that has helped to open our eyes, has been and 
is well known to every foreign government. 

Any man in the service who attempts to give the 
public information as to the actual conditions of the 
army or of the navy, for the support of which the 
people are contributing two hundred million dollars 
a year, is promptly reprimanded or transferred. 



270 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

Anyone outside of the service who attempts to 
tell the people the truth is subjected to the displeas- 
ure and ridicule of the heads of the departments. 

No loyal American citizen desires the Secretary 
of War or the Secretary of the Navy to make public 
one single fact, the suppression of which might be 
for the interests of the United States. 

During the present administration, however, offi- 
cers both in the army and navy have been repri- 
manded, even major-generals and admirals not ex- 
cepted, because they have stated the most general 
truths of our unpreparedness— truths already well 
known to every layman who has made a study of 
the subject. 

The Secretary of War reprimanded a Captain 
for stating: 

"It will take the United States about three years 
to put an army of one million trained men in the 
field, and in that time an enemy could take and hold 
our American seaboards." 

If a similar statement had been made in peace 
times in militaristic Germany or Russia, members 
of the stafif would have engaged in open debate on 
the subject. 

Admiral Fiske stated that it would take five years 
to put our navy in condition to fight a first-class 
power. This is truth which any one who knows 
anything about the navy already knows. But it 
convinced Secretary of the Navy Daniels, who had 



BLUNDERING AND SUPPRESSION 271 

been in the navy tzventy-foiir months, that Admiral 
Fiske, who had been in the navy forty-four years, 
was either ignorant or careless in his statements; 
hence Admiral Fiske was "transferred." 

This same Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Daniels, 
furnishes us an amusing and at the same time tragic 
illustration of the inability of a man who has had 
no previous knowledge of naval affairs to know of 
what he has approved and of what he has disap- 
proved. Less than four months ago Admiral Fiske 
was again called to the office of Secretary Daniels. 
Admiral Fiske was told that, had he been a younger 
officer. Secretary Daniels would have court-mar- 
tialled him for publishing an article without first 
referring it to the Secretary of the Navy. 

The amusing side of this incident is that the ar- 
ticle of which Secretary Daniels disapproved zuas 
an article which Admiral Fiske had previously sub- 
mitted to Secretary Daniels and which Mr. Daniels 
had himself previously approved. Secretary Dan- 
iels is not to be blamed ; with his previous experience 
only as a small town newspaper editor and state 
printer, how could he be expected to have suffi- 
cient knowledge of naval affairs to determine 
whether an article should be approved or disap- 
proved until it had been made public and he had 
found out from the politicians that its publication 
was unwise politically? 

Who is Admiral Fiske? He is one of the great- 



272 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

est naval experts — he has been in the navy forty 
years, he has won two gold medals for navy insti- 
tute work, he has had command of three different 
divisions of the Atlantic fleet, he has invented a 
naval telephone sight which is now adopted by all 
the navies of the world, he has been president of 
the Naval Institute. 

The serious and tragic side of the incident is that 
Admiral Fiske — a man with such a record — should 
be absolutely forbidden by Secretary Daniels to 
write for any publication or to speak anywhere on 
national defence. Secretary Daniels' words, as 
creditably reported by Admiral Fiske himself, were 
in substance these: "You cannot write or speak 
on any subject connected with national defence. If 
the people really want to know anything about the 
navy they can come to its Head. You cannot even 
say two and two make four." 

This is one of the results of our political military 
system. It makes it possible for any president, no 
matter of what party, to appoint a politician who is 
so ignorant — no matter what his native capacity in 
his own line may be — of naval affairs and naval 
science that he cannot tell whether he has approved 
or disapproved of an article of military affairs. It 
is regrettable that such a secretary can maintain 
his assumption of superiority only by depriving the 
most noted expert in the navy department of his 
freedom of speech even in private life. 



BLUNDERING AND SUPPRESSION 273 

Moreover, the public is misled by the statements 
officially given out as to the real condition of the 
navy. 

In May, 191 5, the Secretary of the Navy pub- 
lically proclaimed that nine of our submarines had 
made an extraordinary trip from Key West to New 
York ; but he did not inform us that three out of the 
nine submarines never joined the fleet until they 
reached a position off Delaware; nor were we told 
that one of the K boats and the E-2 had to be towed ; 
nor were we told that the fleet was accompanied by 
a tender all the way. 

Moreover, in comparing the broadside-fire of our 
best ships with those of the British Navy, the Sec- 
retary of the Navy compared the broadside fire 
of British ships which have been finished with ships 
which we are going to have some day. 

And again. Secretary Daniels in his late an- 
nouncement has classified the Michigan and the 
South Carolina as dreadnoughts — although all na- 
val experts, our navy department, and even Secre- 
tary Daniels himself, have not previously so classi- 
fied them. These ships have a speed of but 18% 
knots and a propelling power of but 16,000 and 
18,000 horsepower respectively. 

His announcement that the United States navy 
keeps a larger percentage of men on its ships in time 
of peace than any other navy in the world, is but a 
portion of the truth. We keep practically all the 



274 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

trained men we have on our ships, because we 
haven't enough. Other navies have thousands of 
trained men in reserve. They are not on the ships 
in peace time, but they are ready to go on at a mo- 
ment's notice. 

What the American citizen wishes is frankness 
and freedom! He is not afraid of the truth; if 
there are dangers, he wants to know of them; if 
there are defects in his tools of defence, he wants 
to remedy those defects! 

But how could the American public ever have be- 
come informed of our present condition if laymen 
and students and former government officials and 
statesmen had not, in opposition to the wishes of 
this administration, revealed to us the present de- 
fects of our army and navy? All thanks are due 
them. The important point, however, is that these 
same conditions may arise again and again — no 
matter what party is in power, no matter what man 
is in the White House — so long as we tolerate the 
"political-plum" method of placing the safety of 
our nation in the hands of untrained men. 

QUOTATION REFERENCES 

^ Page 261. Rear- Admiral Austin M. Knight, U. S. Navy. 
2 Page 263. Major-General Leonard Wood. 



CHAPTER III 

WASTING BILLIONS 

WE are unprepared because we have wasted 
hundreds of millions of dollars through 
political mismanagement. We have been paying, 
on an average, for the last ten years at the rate 
of one hundred million dollars a year to maintain an 
army of less than 100,000 men. This little army, 
because of the waste and extravagance due to the 
*'pork-barrelling-method" of appropriating moneys, 
and to the inefficiency of the political Secretaries of 
War, has cost us in ten years one billion dollars. 

Yet after all this expenditure we have but thirty- 
four thousand men in the United States that can be 
mobilised, and those are so scattered that they can- 
not be mobilised inside of thirty days. 

Switzerland has an army much more efficient and 
better equipped. At the beginning of the war 
Switzerland mobilised an army equal in number to 
seven armies of the size of the entire mobile army 
in the United States. This was done in forty-eight 
hours. And these men were fully equipped. If it 
had been necessary she could have mobilised in ten 

275 



276 



AWAKE! U. S. A. 



OuF Mf litarism forPork 



a 




B 





Q- Our OrmyonaA/oi/y 
ExpoTd/'tures from 

J730'JQip 

^(6^500,000.000 

B= Q/l Other Qoi/ernmerU 

Dcpmd/'tures from 

1790-wio 

S UOOOOOO.QOO 



A. $16,500,000,000— Our Army and Navy Expenditures — including 

pensions and interest on public debts caused by 
war — from 1790 to 1910. 

B. 4,900,000,000 — All other Government Expenditures from 1790 

to 1910. 



WASTING BILIJONS 



^^77 



OuF MilttaFism for POFk 




USfromfoundcU/on 
ofGoi^ernmerU to/£>JO 



B=PortiJDn of Qdove 
Exfiended forOrmy 
ancfNavydunn^ 
same/Ter/ocf 



A. $21,500,000,000— All expenditures of U. S. from foundation 

of Government to 1910. 

B. 16,500,000,000 — Portion of above — including pensions and inter- 

est on public debts caused by wars — expended 
for Army and Navy during same period. 



278 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

days eight more additional armies, each equalling 
in number and surpassing in equipment the entire 
mobile army in the United States. 

Switzerland has maintained her army, and one of 
the very best small armies in the world, out of a 
population about equal to that of Massachusetts. 
Switzerland has done this without interrupting the 
industry of the country and without altering the 
peace-loving nature of the people nor the peace- 
policy of the Swiss Government. No nation in Eu- 
rope has for its size a more efficient army and no 
nation is more anff-militaristic. 

For every $i Switzerland spends to train, equip 
and keep a soldier in training, we spend $8o.6g. If 
we had been during the last ten years as econom- 
ically efficient as Switzerland, our army would 
have cost us less than twelve million dollars instead 
of one thousand million dollars. 

But this is a comparison with Switzerland only. 

Mr. Bryan, Mr. Ford, Mr. Kitchin and others 
wail that we do not wish to burden our people with 
the excessive cost of a militaristic system similar 
to that of Russia, Germany or France. 

The truth is this: we could have maintained an 
adequately trained army of half a million men each 
year since the Civil War and have saved the United 
States several hundred millions of dollars each 
generation, had we adopted the system of Russia, 
Germany and France. 



WASTING BILLIONS 279 

What is the annual soldier cost of each man of 
the United States Army compared with the annual 
soldier cost of each man in the armies of the most 
militaristic countries in the world? 

We pay from 400 to 600 per cent, more for the 
training and equipment of each soldier than other 
nations pay and get almost nothing in return. The 
per soldier cost in times of peace in Switzerland 
is $13, in Germany, $209, in France, $249, in Aus- 
tria, $256, in Russia, $293, and in the United 
States, $1,049. 

Again objection is made that there is a vast dif- 
ference between sustaining an army as it is sus- 
tained in the United States, with men at a salary 
of $16 per month each, and sustaining peace armies 
in Europe where the allowance as salary is but a 
few pennies a day per soldier. The objection is 
also made that there is a vast difference between 
the cost of food furnished to our soldiers and that 
furnished to the soldier of Russia, Germany and 
France respectively. 

Both objections are granted. It is true that the 
food furnished each man of the United States Army 
costs more than the food furnished each man of the 
Russian, German or French armies; but the ex- 
cessive cost is due more to waste and inefficiency in 
management than to a difference in the quality or 
amount of food. 

But this waste and this inefficiency in manage- 



S80 



AWAKE! U. S. A. 



MflflaFism roF Protection >sMflltorisfiirorPorK 
Annuel Peace Soldiepypep ^ $.000,000 



Q = Swi'tierlana m.6j5. 
B-US-CL sooo 



Mflirarism tor Pork rs MflftarfsmforPFOtectton 
Cost perSoIdierpepyear 



Q 

c~ 



B' Trance *m 
C= tSW/zer/Q/7Cf */3 



WASTING BILLIONS 281 

ment have not been due to inefficient men in the 
Subsistence Department but to the small number of 
men allowed by Congress for that zvork. At the 
beginning of our war with Spain there were but 
twenty-two trained heads in our Subsistence De- 
partment and these men were compelled to direct, 
even after partially trained men were given as aides, 
the buying of materials and the supplying of these 
foods to nearly 300,000 men in different camps in 
the United States, and to the armies in Cuba, Porto 
Rico, the Philippines and in China. Is there any 
wonder that there was waste? 

But to go back to the comparative cost of the 
soldier of different nations in peace times. 

After we have deducted respective amounts 
paid for salaries and food from the respective total 
cost of each soldier of the armies of Germany and 
the United States, we find that the annual cost for 
equipment and training of a soldier in the United 
States is 631 per cent, greater than it is in miUtar- 
istic-burdened Germany. And in Germany the sol- 
dier is equipped and he is trained. Not only is he 
taken care of in the most perfect manner, from his 
toe-nails to his scalp, but he is provided with the 
most modern and costly equipment and is furnished 
with sufficient ammunition for practice. Although 
we pay 631 per cent, more per soldier per year than 
Germany pays, the United States Army has prac- 
tically no equipment at all. In other words, elimi- 



282 



AWAKE! U. S. A. 



Our Army-Miat Might HciveBeai 



o_ 



0=QrmyWeNowHav^ ^ooo 

B-armyJVeMi0litHovefioa 
Every Year from /S7£> -to - 
w/f forourMoney,Hocf/t 
BeentS/ientas w/se/y as 
/n6W/7zer/ancf. 

6,50^00? 



OuFMUftaFfsm lor Port: 



B 



Q'CbstofOurOrmy 
for last 25 years 

iS963.000.000 

B- imatttst)ouc/tiave 
cost us/fmcneytiact 
been spent as econo- 
mfcot/yos/ntSH'ttzer/ana 

*S^OOO,000 



WASTING BILLIONS 283 

nating the differences in the costs in food and sal- 
aries, the United States spends 631 per cent, more 
per year for the equipment and management of 
each soldier than Germany does. Germany spends 
100 per cent, for equipment and gets the best in the 
world. We waste 631 per cent, and get little or 
nothing. Which is the burdened country ? 

We scoff at the bureaucratic-grafting govern- 
ment of Russia and we pity the poor Russians bur- 
dened by militarism; but even eliminating the dif- 
ferences in the costs of food and salaries, we an- 
nually spend for equipment 374 per cent, more per 
soldier than Russia does. Russia, at the beginning 
of the present war, equipped and mobilised 2,000,- 
000 men in 30 days; we cannot mobilise 34,000 
even partially equipped men in 30 days ! 

Why is America so inefficient? Because there 
has been flagrant administrative inefficiency and ig- 
norance and because there has been congressional 
waste and lack of co-operation. 

One of the great causes of waste is the continu- 
ance of 49 different army posts for 34,000 men. 
Most of these were established a hundred years 
ago. They were then necessary to protect the 
pioneers from the Indians. Five hundred men are 
still kept at Oswego, New York — evidently to pro- 
tect the people from the Red Skins that overrun the 
surrounding country. Congress has not yet recog- 
nised that we are living in 1916 instead of 1814. 



284 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

President Roosevelt's Secretaries of War over 
and over again urged Congress to abolish most of 
these army posts, insisting that they were useless 
and the cause of great waste. But Congressmen 
were appealed to by their constituents, who begged 
that their sources of revenue be not cut off. Hence 
Congress turned a deaf ear to the repeated demands 
of the Secretaries of War. 

Corresponding to the useless army posts, there 
are useless navy yards. 

Great Britain in first-class fighting ships has a 
navy almost four times as large as our own, yet we 
have twice as many first-class navy yards. In 
other words we have spent enough money to ade- 
quately accommodate a navy 800 per cent, greater 
than that we now have. Yet many of our yards 
are useless. Germany has a much more powerful 
and efficient navy than we have and Germany has 
adequate navy yards to accommodate her entire 
fleet, yet all her yards combined do not equal one- 
third of the accommodations we have provided 
for ships we have not. Navy yards have been 
established hit-and-miss along the coast. When- 
ever a Senator or a Congressman could bring 
enough pressure to bear to secure an appropriation 
for his state or district a navy yard was established. 

As an instance of this, some years ago a south- 
ern Senator insisted that a navy yard be established 
at Port Royal, South Carolina. There was a site 



WASTING BILLIONS 285 

for sale for five thousand dollars. This was pur- 
chased and nearly half a million appropriated to be 
distributed among the bankers, constructors, news- 
papers and politicians in the Senator's district. Of 
course, subsequent appropriations were necessary 
and the station was not abandoned until nearly 
three million dollars had been wasted there. Later 
this same Senator insisted on another navy yard 
at Charleston and five million dollars was squan- 
dered. This Charleston yard was built especially 
for big battleships, but is so badly constructed that 
it can be used only for destroyers and gun boats. 

Nine million dollars have been spent at Mare Is- 
land, California. Yet the water is so shallow that 
it has not an adequate dock and none of the larger 
battleships built in the last thirteen years can berth 
there. 

If up to 1910 we had spent our appropriations 
for navy yards as efficiently as Great Britain or 
Germany have spent their appropriations, we should 
have saved enough money to build two hundred sub- 
marines at one million dollars each, or four hun- 
dred submarines at half a million dollars each, or 
fourteen of the finest dreadnoughts afloat. 

And now, although former secretaries of the 
navy have insisted on the abandonment of half a 
score or more of these wasteful enterprises, the 
present Secretary of the Navy announces that he 
will not abandon a single one of them. 



286 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

WoF Expenses and Peace Waste 



A-^mOQOOQOOQ 




B- q/2/fiOOOOO 





A. The sum — including pensions and interest on public debts caused 
by war — we have spent on our army and navy from 1790 to 1915. 

B. The total actual cost of all our wars from 1790 to 1914, showing 
that we have spent in peace times 10,779 millions of dollars, while 
the cost of the wars of the United States has been but $6,i2i,cxx),ooo. 



WASTING BILLIONS 287 

Since 1900 we have spent in round numbers a 
billion and a half dollars on our navy. Germany 
has a navy almost tzvice as pozverful as that of the 
United States, yet she has spent $500,000,000 less 
than we have. We have wasted and allowed our- 
selves to be pork-barrelled out of five hundred mil- 
lion dollars in fifteen years. This would have built 
five hundred of the best, most up-to-date coast sub- 
marines, and in addition to that we could have added 
sixteen first-class modern dreadnoughts of great 
speed, mediumly light armour and high-elevation 
guns. Sixteen dreadnoughts of this type and five 
hundred coast submarines would have given us one 
of the greatest navies in the world. This amount 
our Congresses have wasted in a little over fifteen 
years. 

This is the result of political militarism — of un- 
trained Secretaries of War, of pork-barrelling Con- 
gresses and of ninety million American citizens 
^'criminally indififerent" to the welfare of their 
country ! 



PART FIVE: HOW POLITICAL 
MILITARISM FAILS 



PART FIVE: HOW POLITICAL 
MILITARISM FAILS 

CHAPTER I 

the: minute me^n 

THE minute men have won!" 
This was the cry heard in every American 
colony after the Battle of Bunker Hill. 

The minute men — our noble Revolutionary an- 
cestors — were each day struggling with nature for 
a living and holding the Indians at bay. They were 
courageous and physically fit. Moreover, every one 
of them knew from boyhood how to use firearms 
and how to hit the mark. 

Not only they, but their fathers and their grand- 
fathers had been so trained. A gun was taken with 
them when they went to work in the fields; a gun 
was ever ready for the use of the wife and the 
mother at the house; a gun was taken to the town 
meeting; even to church. 

And that gun, in relation to the armament of 
those days, stood as the rapid-fire machine gun does 
in relation to the armament of to-day. *'The min- 
ute men" in those days designated men physically 

291 



292 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

fit; men trained from boyhood up in the expert 
use of the efficient fire-arm of that time; men armed 
with and owning the firearm; men ready at a mo- 
ment's notice. 

To-day the citizen soldiery means : men physically 
unfit, coming from behind the counter, from the 
office desk, or from the club; men untrained in the 
use of the rapid-fire machine gun, the efficient in- 
fantry weapon of to-day; men — not one in a thou- 
sand — having expert knowledge of the machine 
gun; men — not one in a million — being the owner 
of such a gun; men absolutely unready to fight on 
a month's notice. 

To believe that citizen soldiery to-day can spring 
to arms and accomplish even what was accom- 
plished at Bunker Hill is a vain hope. We might ac- 
complish a similar feat if every male citizen were 
physically fit, if every male citizen from childhood 
up had possessed a rapid-fire machine gun and had 
had years of practice in using it. But in our coun- 
try to-day there is not one man in each half million 
of our unorganised militia that knows anything 
about the expert use of a rapid-fire machine gun. 

But did the minute men alone win the Battle of 
Bunker Hill? They were entrenched on a hill — a 
natural fort — behind breastworks, thrown up under 
the direction of trained generals. The British were 
compelled to march up the hill unprotected, to face 
men behind intrenchments ! The selection of the 



THE MINUTE MEN 293 

hill and the breastworks were due to the wisdom of 
the expert officers who had been trained in the ear- 
lier colonial wars. The minute men inflicted a 
heavy loss upon the enemy, yet their loss was 42 
per cent, of the British loss. Students of military 
matters are all unified in believing that the victory 
of Bunker Hill was due not only to the minute men, 
but to the trained officers who chose the position, 
planned the breast works, and restrained the irnpuU 
sive men, so that they did not waste their small sup- 
ply of ammunition. 

They won at Bunker Hill, but what is the true 
story of the minute men, the militia men, the citizen 
soldiery, during the remainder of the War of the 
Revolution, during the War of 1812, during the 
Civil War? 

The minute men won at Bunker Hill! But the 
minute men, or militia, or citizen soldiery, no matter 
by what name they are designated, have won but 
two battles in all the history of the United States — 
that of Bunker Hill and that of New Orleans, and 
even at the Battle of New Orleans the division un- 
der General Morgan deserted and fled battle when 
attacked. 

Yet in spite of the fact that during the seven long 
years of the Revolutionary War the minute men 
sufl"ered defeat after defeat, never again winning 
a single battle in that war, the reputation of that 
one victory has been allowed to modify all our mili- 



294 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

tary history — has resulted in years of unnecessary 
struggle, suffering and devastation, needless waste 
of hundreds of millions of dollars, and wanton 
waste not only of thousands, but of hundreds of 
thousands of men. 

Citizen soldiery — half-trained volunteers have 
failed. They have failed at the most vital crises to 
enlist in sufficient numbers ; they have failed during 
their training — refusing to obey orders, mutinying 
and deserting; they have failed, surprising as it 
may seem, in the ideal of volunteer service; they 
have always failed in battle. 

First: they have failed to enlist at vital crises. 
Within thirty-five days after the Battle of Bunker 
Hill Congress issued commissions and provided for 
a continental army (July 21, 1775) not to exceed 
22,000 men. During the four months from July 
21 to November 19, 1775, only p66 enlisted. So 
slow was the recruiting that Washington had to 
issue a special call for five thousand men to replace 
the minute men who were then insisting upon going 
back to their homes. 

And this was at a time when the colonies were 
preparing to fight for their very existence. 

Later, out of the 20,000 troops called for by Con- 
gress during the last three months of 1775, less than 
10,000 enlisted; and even after enlisting many of 
them refused to join the army. 

During the year 1776 Congress and the colonies 



THE MINUTE MEN 



295 



cruiefi SoldteFy a^fnsl Traf ned Troops 



Rei/olutfonory 

War 



War Of IS jz 



Mexfcan War 





3 I 



a-€olonfol Forces 

395.000 

B-Brftfsh Qrmfes 

150000 



D 





F 




F 





C- U.S. Forces t-USrorces 

5Z1.000 mooo 

DrOctuai Brftish Qr/ny r-McxfcanOrmy 
16,000 mooo 



Revolutionary War 

A. So inefficient was the volunteer system, that Washington was 
never able to bring into battle line a force larger than one-seventieth 
part of the forces enlisted. 

B. Largest actual British force which our army had to meet at 
any time, was about 36,000 men, even including all the British 
ineflFectives. 

War of 1812 

C. So inefficient were the volunteer forces that the largest number 
that could ever be assembled for battle was only one-hundred- 
thirty-second part of the forces enlisted. 

D. The aggregate force we had to meet in any one place at any 
one time was not more than one-half of this number. 



Mexican War 

R The volunteer forces were so inefficient that the Generals, after 
working for eighteen months to get them in shape, finally invaded 
Mexico with but little more than ten thousand men. 
F. The Mexican Army was not composed of well-trained troops. 



£96 AWAKE! U. g. A. 

authorised more than 90,000 troops. Yet the year 
1777 opened with Washington going into winter 
quarters at Morristown with an army which was 
reduced during his stay to less than 3,000 men, 
ahhough there were more than 20,000 trained Brit- 
ish veterans less than thirty-five miles away. 

Even during the last year of the war, when the 
fate of the colonies hung in the balance, the colonies 
called for more than 50,000 men, yet Washington 
was unable to get more than 5,000 effective troops. 

And this failure of the nation's citizens to vol- 
unteer during times of great stress has not been 
confined to the Revolutionary War. 

During the first year of the Civil War volunteers 
exceeded the call, but as soon as they saw that there 
was real fighting to be done many seized the first 
opportunity and went home at the expiration of 
their short enlistments, or deserted. In the Civil 
War, as in the Revolutionary War, when the real 
crisis came, the citizens did not volunteer in suffi- 
cient number to meet the needs. The draft had to 
be enforced. 

During the Spanish-American War the nation 
passed through no crisis. The war was over in 109 
days. We do not know what the results of volun- 
teer system would have been had the men enlisting 
deemed the campaign more than a great lark. 

Not only have the militia failed to enlist in suf- 



THE MINUTE MEN 



297 



amen SolcWeryA^alnsf Indians 



Creek Indian 
War i812-i8l2> 



Fl or/da War 




SeminofGivar BfacHHowK 
/8I7-181S War 1832 



C 




A-USM52I C-US-6JDJI E-U.S-^98^ G-US.-6g,69J 
B'Jncl-i950 D.'ind-JOOO J=-/nc/-/000 Hind- J 800 



A. The number of men called out for the purpose. 

B. Many authorities estimate the Indian forces as low as i,ioo. 

D. Estimated by some authorities as low as seven or eight hundred 
instead of one thousand. 

F. Indian forces probably not more than eight hundred, according 
to conservative estimate. 

G. The 6o,ooo militia and volunteers were so inefficient that General 
Scott begged Congress to disband them and give him 3,000 regulars 
instead. 

H. Indian forces are estimated by various authorities at from 1,100 
to 1,900. 



298 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

ficient numbers whenever there was a real crisis to 
be met and real fighting to be done, but they have 
failed during training. 

They have mutinied and deserted in unbelievable 
numbers. Innumerable instances of mutinying and 
desertion — so many they cannot here be mentioned 
— occurred among the militia of the various colon- 
ies before they were incorporated into the army of 
Congress. And even in the army under Washing- 
ton within five months after its organisation, deser- 
tion of troops became a serious matter. In writing 
of his failure to hold them, Washington stated: 

"Notwithstanding this (my explanation and 
plea) yesterday morning most of them resolved to 
leave the camp. Many went ofif and the utmost vig- 
ilance was used to apprehend them." 

In the beginning of the War of 1812 General 
Hopkins, commanding 4,000 Kentucky mountain 
militia, started to invade Canada. But in five days 
all the troops mutinied, deserted and went home. 
Another large force under William Henry Harri- 
son, organised for the same purpose, also decided to 
return to their homes. One month later practically 
all of the troops under General Dearborn, organised 
to invade Canada by the Lake Champlain route, 
marched up to the very border and then decided 
they did not wish to go to Canada. As a result 
they mutinied, absolutely refusing to cross the bor- 
der, and thus the expedition ended. 



THE MINUTE MEN 299 

During the fall of the year of 1813 first one 
group and then another of the troops employed un- 
der General Jackson in the Creek War, mutinied re- 
spectively. In the Second Florida War against the 
Seminoles, the Missouri volunteers ran away and 
hid in a swamp ; all the pleading of General Taylor 
could not induce them to return to the fighting. 

The militia mutinied: 

At Morristown in January, 1781 ; 

At Pompton, New Jersey, the same month; 

At Lancaster, in June, 1783; 

On the march to Detroit in June, 1812; 

At Detroit, Michigan, in July, 1812; 

On the march to the Wabash River in August, 
1812; 

On the march to the Maumee River, the same 
month ; 

Before the Battle of Queenstown in August; 

En route from Plattsburg in November, 1812; 

At Fort Strother, Florida, in November, 181 3; 

In the retreat to Bufifalo in December, 1813; 

At the Withlacoochee River, December 13, 1835; 

At Charlestown, West Virginia, in 1861 ! 

The official record states that the desertions from 
the armies of the United States during the Civil 
War were 199,000. But this is not the full truth. 
This number includes only the desertions after men 
were in the formal authorised armies of the United 



300 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

CITIZEN SOLDIERY AGAINST TRAINED TROOPS 

Civil War 

During the first year of the war, the Confederacy, because of their 
initiative in beginning to prepare at an earlier date, had better 
trained troops. During the last two years of the war, the Union 
because of its greater supply of men had more trained troops than 
the Confederates. 

The First Battle of Bull Run was described by the Count von 
Moltke, the Prussian military observer, as a "contest of two armed 
mobs." 

A. Because of the inefficiency of the volunteer system, less than 
half of these ever became effective troops. One out of ten were 
discharged because they were unfit to serve; one out of every five 
deserted. We have paid as a result of this system $9,800,000,000, 
while it would have cost us less than $500,000,000 if it had been 
conducted on a military instead of a political basis, even at the 
rate of expense of the present European War. 

B. The largest estimate made of all the enlistments of the Con- 
federate army. Many good authorities place the number at from 
seven to eight hundred thousand. 

Spanish-American War 

C. But 52,000 of these were ever out of the United States, and 
only about 26,000 ever saw a gun fired at the enemy. 

In addition to our 281 ,000 men, we had the service of several 
thousand Cuban revolutionists, who rendered aid to our forces at 
a critical time. 

D. The Spanish forces were 200,000, but very poorly commanded. 
An efficient general at the head of the Spanish forces in Cuba, act- 
ing energetically, could have annihilated our little invading force 
of 17,000 men with but little trouble. 



THE MINUTE MEN 



301 



atiien Soldiery afjafnsi Traf ned Troops 

C/l^/7 War 



a 




B 





Snan/'s/i Omerfcan 
war 




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D -iffianjlsti Qrmy-mooo 



302 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

States. It does not include desertions from militia 
groups training for entrance into the Union Armies. 

In reality the number of desertions totalled 526,- 
000 men. This statement is made on the authority 
of a man who has been chief of staff of the Army 
of the United States and commander of one of the 
large divisions. It has been stated on the floor of 
the Senate that the number of desertions was even 
greater than this — that the true number, though 
suppressed by the War Department, probably 
reached the shameful figure of seven or eight hun- 
dred thousand men. This is no doubt an exagger- 
ated estimate. Nevertheless, compare this 526,000 
with the number of desertions from the Prussian 
army during the Franco-Prussian War. Their war 
records show that during the entire campaign of 
1870 and 1 87 1 but 17 men deserted. 

The volunteer system — as a system — has failed 
in that which we have held most dear — the ideal of 
service. 

This does not refer to the individual volunteer 
who stays with the army. After eighteen months' 
or two years' training the American becomes the 
finest soldier in the world! 

Volunteers are composed of three classes : First, 
those who enlist because of patriotism, of a real de- 
sire to serve their country. How small this num- 
ber is can be wisely estimated from the number 
who remain to become real effectives. Experience 



THE MINUTE MEN 



303 



titiien Milflfa per Million Populaifon 



Q-/32U52 



56m 



C- wjgy 

■O—0fU9.- 



E mo 



a-6wltzerland 
B-Auc^tralfa 

new dystem 

C-AustPQlla 

old iSy stem 

D.-Canada 
E-Brni6h Islos 
F' USA. 



Switzerland is the most protected country in the world, because 
of its obligatory military system, in proportion to its area and pop- 
ulation. 

Australia's new system is based upon the system of Switzerland. 
Australia's old system was a volunteer system similar in that respect 
to our State Militia. 

Canada's national citizen soldiery and England's Territorial force 
are based upon the volunteer system. 
In all cases these militia are trained without pay. 
Our past experiences prove that all efforts to secure a satisfactory 
army of defence by the volunteer system have failed in times of 
peace. 

All our past experiences prove that a volunteer army enlisted after 
a war begins is unfit, even harmful, during the first year of war. 
Our citizens more than those of any other country now employing 
the volunteer system fail to recognise the fact that they owe a 
duty to their government. 

Every million Australians furnishes 19,000 soldiers ; every million 
Canadians furnishes 9,000; every million British furnishes 7,000. 
Every million Americans furnish but 1,000. 

It is useless to attempt any plan of preparation in times of peace, 
so as to be able to defend ourselves should war come, by the 
volunteer system. 



304. AWAKE! U. S. A. 

shows that our greatest proportion of effectives ever 
attained was 19.6 per cent, and our smallest pro- 
portion, one per cent. Second, those who enlist 
because they believe there will be little or no fight- 
ing, that the campaign will be a joyful lark, that 
the war will soon be over, that they can return as 
the heroes of their respective communities. These 
desert at the first opportunity. Third, those who 
enlist for the sake of bounties — desert and re-enlist, 
and those who hold off for ever increasing bounties. 
In every war the United States has waged we have 
been compelled at each succeeding call for volun- 
teers to increase the bounties. 

We began in 1776 with a bounty of $20; soon it 
was increased to $20 and a hundred acres of land. 
But as this failed to bring sufficient troops and as 
those volunteering were so inefficient. Congress au- 
thorised Washington in 1779 to give a bounty of 
$200 to each veteran who would re-enlist. The 
states did still better — or worse. New Jersey add- 
ed $250 to the Congressional bounty and Virginia 
made the bounty $750 and a hundred acres of land. 
The following year New Jersey actually paid $1,000 
in addition to the $200 of the continental allowance. 
The system of bounties means but one thing, that, 
even during that time which we hold above all other 
times to have been the most patriotic in the history 
of our people, volunteers could not be induced to en- 
list unless they could secure from $200 to $1,000, a 



THE MINUTE MEN 305 

portion of it down in cash — always with the oppor- 
tunity of deserting 20 or 30 days later and re-enlist- 
ing and securing another bounty. This was so well 
understood that Congress in authorising Washing- 
ton to increase a certain bounty advised that he 
should use his discretion in keeping the matter se- 
cret as long as he deemed it necessary. 

And the bounty system of the Revolutionary 
War did not extend to the militia only. To secure 
a sufficient number of officers Congress was finally 
forced in 1779 to advocate that each officer continu- 
ing in command of troops to the end of the war 
should receive a bounty of half pay for his entire 
life. 

This same folly of giving bounties was repeated 
at the beginning of the Civil War. Hundreds of 
men, thousands of men enlisted, received their cash 
bounty, deserted, re-enlisted again in another com- 
munity or under another name, received another 
cash bounty, and deserted. The process was re- 
peated again and again. In fact, there is an official 
confession of one man who enlisted 32 times, re- 
ceived 32 different bounties, and evidently deserted 
at least 31 times. 

And in 1862 President Lincoln discovered that, 
although the United States Government was pay- 
ing daily for 140,000 men in Pope's army, Pope 
could find only 60,000. 

There is an ideal of service! There is such a 



306 AWAKE! U. S. A. 



thing as patriotism! But the patriotism of volun- 
teers" is not greater, nor as great, as that of regular 
troops. 

"Men may speculate as they will; they may talk 
of patriotism ; they may draw a few examples from 
ancient history, of great achievements performed 
by its influence, but whoever builds upon them, as 
a sufficient basis for conducting a long and bloody 
war, will find himself deceived in the end. ... I 
do not mean to exclude altogether the idea of 
patriotism. I know it exists. . . . But I will ven- 
ture to assert that a great and lasting war can 
never he supported on this principle alone/* Wash- 
ington to John Bannister, 1778. 

Volunteers have failed in efficiency in battle! 

In the hundreds of battles and engagements of 
our various wars, the untrained militia have mu- 
tinied, deserted, or failed in every single engage- 
ment, except that of Bunker Hill. 

The first campaign of the Revolutionary War — 
the movement on Canada — came to nought, al- 
though Arnold had finally taken 750 men, out of 
the two divisions of 4,100 men which began the 
campaign, up the steep ascent and demanded the 
surrender of Quebec. He was forced to make the 
attack without a day's delay — without waiting for 
reinforcements — because three of his captains and 
many of his men refused to stay and gave him no- 



THE MINUTE MEN 307 

tice that they would leave after the expiration of 
their terms of enlistment. The term of enlistment 
was to end in three days. And they made this re- 
fusal after having struggled through the Maine 
w^oods to get to Quebec. Of the 750 men, 486 
were killed, wounded or captured. 

During that year there had been under the pay of 
Congress and in the militia of the southern colonies 
37,600 half-trained volunteers. Yet the only re- 
sult was a disastrous expedition to Canada. 

Although 8g,6oo volunteers were trained during 
the second year of the Revolutionary War, they 
were so inefficient they could take no effective ac- 
tion against the enemy, although there were less 
than 30,000 British. Because of desertion, mutiny 
and inefficiency, the army, at the close of the year, 
had again dwindled to but a few thousand men. 

During the third year of the war there were em- 
ployed a total of 68,700 men. The only victory was 
that of General Gates, when a large percentage of 
regular troops were used ; otherwise the 68,700 men 
were absolutely unable to take any effective step 
against the 33,000 Britishers. The year ended in 
the retreat of a dwindling army to Valley Forge. 

During 1779 more than 44,000 men were under 
training, as against 34,000 British, yet nothing was 
accomplished. 

In 1780 General Gates was defeated at Camden 
even though his army was much greater than that 



308 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

of Cornwallis. The militia again ran away in a 
most disgraceful manner. Though 43,000 men had 
been under arms during 1780, little of consequence 
had been accomplished, and Washington's effectives 
had dwindled to 5,000 by the end of the year. 

The actual war closed in 1781, not through the 
efficiency of the American army reduced to less 
than 5,000 effective troops under the command of 
Washington, but to the French troops under La- 
fayette, the French fleet and the arrival of Rocham- 
beau with 6,000 additional veteran French troops. 
It was without doubt the assistance of the Comte 
de Grasse, of de Barasse, of Rochambeau, and of 
Lafayette, together with their fleets, their thou- 
sands of trained veterans, which finally effected 
the surrender of Cornwallis's men. Such is the 
actual record of half-trained volunteers during the 
seven years of the life-and-death struggle of the 
American colonies for independence. 

As a result of our inefficient militia 395,000 men 
were required in the War of the Revolution, yet 
the largest number ever concentrated for battle 
was 5,763 men under General Gates at Saratoga; 
and when the fate of the colonies hung in the bal- 
ance, Washington's army at Trenton and Prince- 
ton was less than 4,000 men. 

Washington in his letter to Congress pointing 
out the evils and danger of the volunteer system, 
asserted that Canada would have been won to the 



THE MINUTE MEN 309 

colonies, except for the action of the militia. Writ- 
ing to the President of Congress, September 2, 
1776, he said that 

". . . no dependence could be put in a militia or 
other troops than those enlisted and embodied for 
a longer period than our regulations heretofore 
have prescribed. I am persuaded, and as fully 
convinced as I am of any one fact that has hap- 
pened, that our liberties must of necessity be greatly 
hazarded, if not entirely lost, if their defence is 
left to any but a permanent standing army; I mean 
one to exist during the war." 

On the 24th of September, 1776, he wrote: 

"To place any dependence upon militia is as- 
suredly resting upon a broken staff." 

And later on, August 20, 1780, after five years 
of failures, Washington again wrote Congress : 

"It may be easily shown that all the misfortunes 
we have met with in the military line are to be at- 
tributed to this cause (failure of the militia). '^ 

And again during the same year, writing of 
Gates's defeat at Camden, Washington stated: 

"This event, however, adds itself to many others, 
to exemplify the necessity of an army, and the 
fatal consequences of depending on militia. Regu- 
lar troops alone are equal to the exigencies of mod- 
ern war, as well as for defence as offence; and 
whenever a substitute is attempted, it must prove 
illusory and ruinous. No militia will ever acquire 



310 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

the habits necessary to resist a regular force . . . 
the firmness requisite for the real business of 
fighting is only to be attained by a constant course 
of discipline and service, / have never yet been 
witness to a single instance that can justify a dif- 
ferent opinion; and it is most earnestly to be wished 
that the liberties of America may no longer be 
trusted, in any material degree, to so precarious 
a dependence." 

Morgan, explaining why he placed his militia in 
a certain position at the Battle of Cowpens, as- 
serted : 

"I would not have a swamp in view of militia 
on any consideration ; they would have made for it, 
and nothing could have detained them from it. 
. . . Had I crossed the river, one-half of the mili- 
tia would immediately have abandoned me." 

The War of 1812 opened with the surrender at 
Detroit of the American garrison of 1,800 men, 
mostly volunteers and militia to s^o British regu- 
lars and 400 militia, without so much as firing a 
single shot in defence of the garrison. 

The Hopkins expedition of 4,000 volunteers, the 
General Dearborn expedition of 5,700, the Gen- 
eral Smith expedition of 4,500, the forces under 
General Harrison, and the 3,100 men under Gen- 
eral Wadsworth all came to naught because of 
mutiny, desertion and inefficiency — in fact, during 
1812, the American forces of a little more thau 



THE MINUTE MEN 311 

64,000 men accomplished nothing in face of the 
active British force which did not exceed 1,400 
men — one-third of whom were boys and old men fit 
only for garrison duty. 

This is the record of the inefficiency of our mili- 
tia for the first year of the War of 1812. 

In the year 1813, the forces under Genera! Har- 
rison, which had been limited by Congress to 7,000 
men and the forces under Winchester of 3,000 
men won victories at the Thames ; and immediately 
following the success the usual blunder was made 
— the army disbanded and the campaign was given 
up. Though 50,000 militia had been called out 
within 16 months to defeat Proctor's little force, 
the entire result was nothing. 

Though a large American force of militia was 
stationed in northern New York to defend Bufifalo 
and the surrounding country, a British force of 
less than 650 men, regulars, Indians and militia 
combined, absolutely put to route 3,000 militia. 
General Cass, in writing to the Secretary of War, 
stated that all except a very few of them behaved 
in the most cowardly manner. They fled without 
discharging their muskets. 

In the Champlain region, General Hampton, 
with 5,000 volunteers, was defeated by 800 Cana- 
dian militia and Indians. 

The army of General Wilkinson, an advance 
guard of 1,700 men with 6,300 reinforcements, 



312 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

ran back to their boats, abandoning their campaign 
on Montreal, after having been attacked by 800 
British regulars at Chrystler's Fields. In fact, 
13,000 American volunteers were absolutely driven 
back by an enemy less than 2,000. 

During the same year there were on the Chesa- 
peake 66,000 enlisted militia. The British Admiral 
Warren with but 1,500 men destroyed Hampton 
after previously capturing and destroying French- 
town, Havre de Grace, Georgetown and Frederick- 
town, and the 66,000 militia offered no aid at all 
to the citizens who tried to protect their property. 

The year 1813 ended with the United States 
having employed 130,000 men, having not more 
than 14,000 or 15,000 British to oppose them, yet 
leaving a record of nothing but defeats. 

The year 1814 opened by General Wilkinson 
making another effort to invade Canada with 4,000 
men. They were repulsed by a force of 180 British- 
ers. The attempted invasion accomplished nothing 
except added disgrace for the American forces. 

At Bladensburg, a short distance from Wash- 
ington, more than 5,000 American militia deserted 
and ran before 1,500 British troops poorly equipped 
with but four little guns which they were com- 
pelled to drag up the incline themselves because 
they had no horses. The mass of militia fled at 
this battle without ever firing a shot. The Amer- 
ican loss was but 8 killed and 11 wounded. Thus 



THE MINUTE MEN 313 

ended the disgraceful record of our militia during 
the actual War of 1812 and 1814. 

The Indian War against the Seminoles shows 
that it required 60,000 militia and seven years of 
mutiny, desertion and fighting to defeat 1,200 In- 
dians. 

The militia deserted and ran away : 

On Long Island in August, 1776; 

At the evacuation of New York one month later; 

At the Battle of Brandywine in 1777; 

At Guilford Court House, 1781 ; 

At the Battle of Burwell's Ferry in April, the 
same year; 

At Williamsburg a day later; 

Near Fort Wayne in October, 1790; 

In Dart County, Ohio, in 1791; 

En route to the Racine River in 181 3; 

At Sackett's Harbour three months later; 

At French Creek seven months later; 

At Chrystler's Fields ten days later; 

At the burning of Buffalo, December 30, 1812; 

At the burning of Lewiston, the same month; 

At the Battle of Bladensburg and the burning 
of the capitol in 1814; 

At the Battle of New Orleans, 1815; 

At the Battle of Bull Run, 1861. 

''Our Civil War is often erroneously cited as 
illustrating the might of the citizen soldier sud- 
denly called to the defence of his country. On 



314 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

the contrary, it well illustrated the weakness of 
the untrained citizen soldier, and the length of time 
required to train him. In the first months of the 
war, untrained citizens of the North met the un- 
trained citizens of the South, and both were armed 
mobs as easily disorganised by victory as by de- 
feat. During the second year of the war training 
began to tell on both sides, as can be seen in the 
character of the campaigns and battles. In the 
final years of the war these volunteers were as good 
soldiers as ever marched to war." ^ 

The first year of the Civil War Congress and the 
President trusted to volunteers and militia. Al- 
though during 1861 we enlisted, trained and paid 
for 669,000 men, we were able to bring together at 
Bull Run but 28,500 men, all of whom excepting 
800 were volunteers and militia. Many of the militia 
ran away in panic and could not be stopped until 
they had reached the Potomac, some twenty-five 
miles away. 

The second year of the Civil War showed al- 
most as great inefficiency of the militia as the first. 
Summing up the results of the first and second 
periods of 1862, Upton states: 

"The withdrawal of the Army of the Potomac 
from the James River to Washington and Alex- 
andria, the invasion of Maryland and the retreat 
of the Army of the Ohio to Louisville produced a 



THE MINUTE MEN 315 

depression in the public mind nearly as great as 
that which succeeded the Battle of Bull Run." ^ 

In every war, in which half-trained militia and 
volunteers have been put to the test, they have 
mutinied, deserted, and run away from battle. 

Moreover, during the seventy years from the 
beginning of the War of 1812 to the second year 
of our Civil War, one-fourth of all the states then 
forming the Union actually defied the authority of 
the United States, defied the authority of the Pres- 
ident as commander-in-chief of the army, refusing 
to aid the United States with their militia, even 
when its armies were in danger. 

"If I was called upon to declare upon oath 
whether the militia had been most serviceable or 
hurtful, upon the whole, I should subscribe to the 
latter." ^ 

QUOTATION REFERENCES 

^ Page 314. Report of the Army Committee of the Na- 
tional Security League, including: Hon. Henry L. Stim- 
son, ex-Secretary of War; Colonel William C, Church, edi- 
tor Army and Navy Journal; Captain Matthew Hannah ; 
General Francis V. Greene; Major George Haven Putnam; 
Colonel S. Creighton Webb, and others. 

2 Page 315. Upton, "Military Policy of the United 
States." 

^ Page 315. George Washington. 



CHAPTER II 

THE^ PRICE WE HAVE PAID 

ALL the blunders of our wars — the enormous 
percentage of useless men, the extraordinary 
cost, the wasteful prolongation of each war, the 
wholesale murder of half-trained soldiers — have 
been due: first, to our ridiculous political military 
system; and second, to our mistake and vain belief 
in the value of citizen soldiers. 

Upton says: ''The same mistake in statesman- 
ship, which in time of peace gives us a nonexpan- 
sive military establishment, is certain to bring 
about in time of war useless sacrifice of human life, 
unlimited waste of money, and national humilia- 
tion/' 

During the Revolutionary War the colonies were 
subjected to seven years' struggle, suffering and 
devastation. But one year would have been neces- 
sary had Congress allowed Washington to actually 
command the armies under him. In July, I775> 
there were 17,000 men under Washington; the 
British effectives were less than 6,500. Dur- 
ing the next five months 37,500 American troops 

316 



THE PRICE WE HAVE PAID 317 

■ 

were enlisted. If these had been under military 
instead of Congressional control and if they had 
been properly trained and equipped, they could 
have defeated the British forces — could have cap- 
tured them or driven them off the continent within 
six months; and we would have had time to pre- 
pare before England could have sent more troops. 

We would have been spared six years of struggle 
and waste ; we would have been spared the terrible 
winter at Morristown and the sufferings at Valley 
Forge; we would have saved millions and millions 
of dollars! 

Washington in 1780 said: "Had we kept a 
permanent army on foot, the enemy could have 
had nothing to hope for, and would in all probabil- 
ity have listened to terms long since." 

At the beginning of the War of 1812 the Brit- 
ish had but 4,500 effectives on the entire North 
American continent. We then had an army of 
6,700 men. If Congress had kept our men in con- 
dition — properly organised and officered and prop- 
erly supplied with ammunition — they could have 
defeated the British within six months. We pro- 
vided 65,000 untrained men the first six months, 
but these were unable to gain a single victory over 
the 1,450 men they had to oppose. The war would 
have been over in six months instead of two years 
later; and we would have been spared the shame 



318 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

of Detroit, the dishonour of the Lake Champlain 
campaigns, and the disgrace at Bladensburg and 
the burning of Washington. 

If we had had but 10,000 trained troops the war 
could have ended victoriously in six months. 

Huidekoper, referring to the War of 1812, 
writes : 

"Had Congress at the beginning of the year de- 
clared that all men owed their country military 
service and raised the army to 35,000, by volunteer- 
ing or by drafting for service 'during the war,' 
such a force after six months' training could easily 
have occupied Canada and terminated the war in 
one campaign." 

If, when South Carolina seceded. Congress had 
acted immediately — had at once put our little regu- 
lar army into condition and had immediately called 
for two hundred fifty thousand volunteers — our 
276,000 men could have had seven months' train- 
ing by July 30, 1 86 1, at which time the Confeder- 
acy had less than 60,000 troops with from two to 
four months' training. These 276,000 trained 
troops, well equipped, could have put down the Re- 
bellion in one year. But Congress did nothing until 
five months after the Confederacy elected their 
president, nothing until four months after the Con- 
federacy issued its call for a hundred thousand 
volunteers, nothing until 35,000 of these had al- 
ready had three months' training. 



THE PRICE WE HAVE PAID 



319 



Excessive Prolondatton and Devasfatton 

.„„ .^ * m/o/ rime or UcT ivarj- 

Que lO <Sem/no/e War of 

PalillndMrnioFfein ^''^ '^°"''"'" 



Warorm 

/Mexican g'/iyeans 
st'/syears 





r.f(7/7 



7yea/y 



A 



r<?/ rrrF^.'isf/ ff 



7yeanr 






Sffycant 



6yrs-// months 



rp.rminntinn nr nnr lA/nrrT . 



The Revolutionary War lasted seven years, the War of 1812 lasted 
two years six months, the Mexican War two years four months, 
the First Seminole War three months, Second Seminole War 
seven years, the Black Hawk War five months. Civil War four 
years, Spanish-American War three months, Philippine War two 
years four months. 

We have been at war, twenty-six full years of twelve months each 
out of 140 years. 

If we include a few of the campaigns against the Indians, we find 
that we have been at war one entire year of twelve months out of 
every five years from 1775 to 1915. 

If we had adopted and maintained a rational and efficient military 
system, we could have — according to Washington, Upton and Huide- 
koper — successfully terminated the Revolutionary War in one year, 
the War of 1812 in six months, the Mexican War in one year, the 
Second Seminole War in six months, the Civil War in two years 
or less, and the Philippine War in six months. 

This shows : that George Washington, who is the most trustworthy 
authority on the Revolutionary War, and that Upton, who is the 
greatest authority on our Civil War, believed, and that Huide- 
koper, the greatest military authority of our day, now believes 
that we have wasted just nineteen years and one month out of the 
twenty-six years we have been at war. 



320 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

Upton, writing of the body of national volun- 
teers that had been organised to take the place 
of the militia in the War of 1812, states that, 
had that system come down to us — each regiment 
with a professional soldier at its head — oii^r Civil 
War would have been finished in half the time, 
with the employment of hut ^00,000 men. 

Almost one-fifth of the 140 years from 1775 to 
191 5 have seen us engaged in actual warfare. In 
fact, if we include a few of the small campaigns 
against the Indians, we find that we have been at 
war one entire year of twelve months out of every 
five years. 

The Revolutionary War lasted seven years, the 
War of 1 81 2 two years six months, the Mexican 
War two years four months, the First Seminole 
War three months, Second Seminole War seven 
years, the Black Hawk War five months, Civil 
War four years, Spanish-American War three 
months, Philippine War two years four months. 
Thus we have been at war 26 fidl years of twelve 
months each out of 140 years. 

If we had adopted and maintained a rational 
and efficient military system, we could have — ac- 
cording to Washington, Upton and Huidekoper — 
successfully terminated the Revolutionary War in 
one year, the War of 1812 in six months, the 
Mexican War in one year, the Second Seminole 
War in six months, the Civil War in two years or 



THE PRICE WE HAVE PAID 321 

less, and the Philippine War in six months. This 
shows that George Washington, who was the most 
practical and trustworthy authority on the Revo- 
lutionary War, and that Upton, who was the great- 
est authority on our Civil War, believed, and that 
Huidekoper, the greatest military authority of our 
day, now believes that ive have wasted just ig years 
and one nioiitli out of the 26 years we have been 
at zvar. What folly to waste, because of a ludi- 
crous military system, one whole generation of 
peace, burdening the nation for 19 years and one 
month, by years of suffering, untold hardships, 
unnecessary waste of moneys, of business, of pros- 
perity and of the lives of hundreds of thousands 
of men. 

Huidekoper states : our wars have been '^outrage- 
ous extraz'agances" in men and in money. 

And what have we paid in waste of money? 

A voluntary system is based on the immoral idea 
that no citizen owes a duty to the government 
which protects his property, his business, himself 
and his family. It is based on the vicious idea 
that no man is by honour hound to pay his just 
obligations unless it suits his frame of mind or 
unless he can be bribed to do so. From this basis 
arises the political system which induces the few 
— by calls to patriotism, by bounty bribes, and by 
promises of pensions — to bea/r the burden of all 



822 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

Because volunteers are unfit when most needed, 
there is the enormous waste in training, in feed- 
ing and in drilHng men, who must later be dis- 
charged because of physical inability. Under the 
universal training system, these men would not be 
taken into the army in the first place. The nation 
would thus be saved the extra time of their officers, 
the waste of money in feeding, the waste of time 
and effort and money in training. 

"Certain I am that it would be cheaper to keep 
50,000 to 100,000 in constant pay than to depend 
upon half the number and supply the other half 
occasionally by militia. The time the latter are in 
pay before and after they are in camp, assembling 
and marching, the waste of ammunition, the con- 
sumption of stores, which they must be furnished 
with or sent home, added to other incidental ex- 
penses consequent upon their coming and conduct 
in camp, surpass all idea and destroy every kind 
of regularity and economy, which you could es- 
tablish among fixed and settled troops." . . . 

"We have had, a great part of the time, two sets 
of men to feed and pay — the discharged men going 
home, and the levies coming in." ^ 

What is the record of the money wasted? 

The Revolutionary War has cost us 440 mil- 
lion dollars. During the first year the 37,000 con- 
tinental soldiers comprised a force 469% greater 
than the total British effectives then here, — a force 



THE PRICE WE HAVE PAID 



323 



OuF Losses of ciliien Soldiery 

C/v/l War 




^/lanidfi -Amer/can 

Wop 



a 




D 





A~ /3«f ^ 532 - U(S. LOcMecy C-^^SP/- UcS'.c^OlCf/eM 

3~/ooo, 000- All confecferores actuoiiy en^a^ecf 

£ver En/iiStea D=ssoo-Deaci/roni/j^/?t{n^ 

ona cf/cfaiGcycy 

Civil War 

A. Our losses — due to a great extent to the volunteer system of 

half-trained soldiery were : 

Total losses from dead of all causes 359,528 (l) 

Total desertions 526,000 

Men discharged for disability 250,000 

Number wounded 248,014 (2) 

Total losses 1,383,582 

1. From Heitman, Volume II, Page 286. 

2. Estimated at the rate of ^.j men to each man killed in action. 
This is the lowest rate ever known in any great war. Our wounded 
were probably 4.5 men wounded to each man killed, which would 
give an increase of more than 25 per cent, of 248,014. 

Spanish-American War 

D. Total number of dead from fighting and sickness, about 6,500, 
although the Adjutant-General for i8g8 and 1899 gives the total 
of 7,043. These reports, however, duplicate the few deaths of 
volunteers in Cuba. 



824 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

221% more than the entire British force, sick and 
well. If they had been properly trained and 
equipped, the war would have been ended in twelve 
months and the cost of that war — even at the per 
soldier rate of Germany's stupendous expense in the 
present war — would have been only a little over 
30 million dollars instead of the 440 millions the 
war has cost us. In other words, we would have 
saved 410 millions out of 440 millions. 

The War of 1812 has cost us $i32,ooo,cxx). If, 
when the war began, we had a force of but ten 
thousand trained soldiers, that force would have 
been 598% greater than all the British effectives 
we were compelled to meet during that first year. 
The war would have been closed in one year — 
probably in six months — and, even at the present 
per soldier rate of the European expense, it would 
have cost but $8,280,000. We would have saved 
124 millions out of the expenditure of 132 mil- 
lions. 

The Second Florida War cost us $69,000,000. 
General Scott begged Congress for 3,000 efficient 
troops instead of the 60,000 militia and volunteers. 
The three thousand troops asked for by General 
Scott would have been 250% of the Indian force. 
They could have defeated the twelve hundred In- 
dians in six months at least, and the war would 
have cost less than 3 millions, even at the present 
European rate of expense, instead of nearly 70 



THE PRICE WE HAVE PAID 325 

millions. Out of the 70 millions spent we could 
have saved 67 millions. 

The Mexican War has cost us 137 millions. 
The total force that invaded Mexico was less than 
11,000 men. If at the beginning of the war Gen- 
eral Scott had had 22,000 trained soldiers — a force 
twice as great as the number that actually decided 
the war — the war would have ended in one year 
and would have cost, even at the present European 
rate of expense, but 16 million dollars instead of 
137 millions. We could have saved 125 millions 
out of the 137 millions that have been spent. 

The Civil War cost us $9,800,000,000. Upton 
states : that the war could have been closed in two 
years zvith three hundred thousand trained men. 
And this force would have been 400% greater 
than the Confederacy could have mustered, had we 
had a trained army of but fifty thousand men to 
interfere with their preparations at the beginning 
of the war. The cost of this army of three hun- 
dred thousand men for two years, at the rate of 
present expenditures in Europe would have been 
but 496 millions. Up to the present day, we would 
have saved $9,332,000,000 on the Civil War alone. 

The Spanish-American War has cost us to date 
$367,000,000. If we had had a trained army of one 
hundred thousand men in 1898, there would have 
been no necessity of calling out 250,000 volunteers 
and militia. One hundred thousand men are al- 



326 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

most 200% of all the forces we ever had on foreign 
soil during the war. The cost of the war, at the 
rate of present European expenditures, would have 
been but 2y million dollars instead of 367 millions 
— a saving of 340 million dollars. 

The total cost of our wars up to the present time 
— including pensions — has been nearly 10,976 mil- 
lions. If we had had an obligatory system and if 
our wars had been conducted even as expensively 
as the present European War, it is estimated that 
the cost would have been 582 million dollars instead 
of 10 billion 976 million. We would have saved the 
entire 10 billion dollars, and out of 976 millions we 
would have saved 494 millions. 

What folly to waste $10,393,000,000 out of ex- 
penditures of $10,976,000,000. 

And because of our ludicrous military system, 
we have paid in billions of dollars of waste during 
peace times as well as during war times. 

The peace expenses of our military system from 
1 79 1 to 1 9 14 have been $8,718,000,000. The reports 
of the Secretaries of War show that we have had 
but 2,488,000 annual soldiers during these periods. 
Hence the yearly soldier cost during peace times 
has been $3,504 per soldier. And more than half 
of this is for pensions. During peace times, before 
the outbreak of the present war, the annual soldier 
cost of each man and the proportionate soldier 
cost of each French soldier was $249 annually. 



THE PRICE WE HAVE PAID 



327 



Excessive Cost of Wofs with cUfzen soldfeiy 



Wtal Money dyien/ on OupWap<f 

* /O.97S,5O/.000 

Total Wa^te 

^ tO.393,000.000 



QV/iWQr 



What They <Shoulcf Have Coet-J 

Qevotuti'on i^pariM/y Afex/can /s/S dimmo/e 
~l I L ^ 



* vgf.maooo 



4:30700.000 fZ7jop,ooo frasso.ooo *iuq,ooo utaqoot 



These figures seem so small as to make one doubt the value of the 
estimate. 

The estimate is secured by multiplying the number of men as esti- 
mated by George Washington, Upton and Huidekoper, that would 
have been required under an efficient military system by the number 
of years which these same authorities estimate would have been 
necessary to terminate these wars. This gives the total number of 
annual soldiers for each war, respectively. 

The cost of each annual soldier is estimated, including the propor- 
tionate cost of transportation and ammunition, at the extraordinary 
rate at which Germany spends money on her soldiers during the 
present war. 

Certainly this is an overestimate rather than an underestimate. 
Ammunition and the means of transportation in the Civil War, the 
Mexican War, and the War of the Revolution were not as ex- 
pensive as they are in Germany to-day, nor was ammunition then 
used at the rate at which ammunition is used to-day. 



328 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

We have paid on an average $3,504 per year per 
peace soldier from 1791 to 19 14 — an unbelievable 
figure, did not the facts bear it out. 

That France has received something for what 
she has spent is proven by the conduct of her sol- 
diers during the present war. 

If we had based our military system upon the 
highest ideal — the ideal that every citizen owes a 
duty to the government which protects him — we 
could have maintained each year an army twice as 
large as the army we actually had during that 
year and we could have maintained the larger army 
at 17.6% of the cost we actually paid for the smaller 
force. 

We could have maintained during the first twen- 
ty years of our national existence, 1789-1809, an 
annual army of 15,000 men — twice as large as the 
force we actually had ; for the next fifty years, 1809 
to 1859, we could have had an annual army of 25,- 
000 trained men, a force 225% of what we actually 
averaged during those years; for the next twenty 
years, 1859 to 1879, ^^ could have maintained an 
army of 50,000 — a force 250% greater than we had ; 
and for the last 35 years, 1880 to 1915, we could 
have maintained 100,000 trained men each year — 
202% of what we have actually averaged for those 
years — and all these would have cost us — at the rate 
France and other European nations have paid for 



THE PRICE WE HAVE PAID 329 

soldiery during peace times — 17.6% of the money 
we have actually paid for very inferior forces. 

In other words, under the obligatory system, we 
could have had from 1791 to the present day, a 
trained army twice as great as that which we have 
had each year, and it would have cost us for all 
those years but one and a half billion instead of 
eight and a half billion dollars. And moreover, if 
we had had such a force, 75% of the expenses of 
the War of 1812, of the Second Seminole War, of 
the Mexican War, of the Civil War, of the Span- 
ish-American War, and of the Philippine War, 
would have been saved. In fact, it is more than 
probable that there never would have been a War 
of 18 12, nor a Mexican War, nor a S panish- Amer- 
ican War if we had a military system and armies 
similar to those just indicated. 

Our own history furnishes us with a sufficient 
basis for such a conclusion. 

At the close of the Civil War, we were in as 
great danger of going to war with France and Aus- 
tria over the imperial occupation of Mexico as we 
had been in danger of going to war with England 
in 181 1, or in danger of going to war with Mexico in 
1845. -^^^ because we had a regular army, and 
a million additional men who had become veterans 
because of their two and three years' training in 
the Civil War, both Prance and Austria backed 



330 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

down, withdrew from Mexico, and there was no^ 
war. 

There is no doubt that the yearly living cost of 
each soldier was less during our War of the Revo- 
lution, less during our War of 1812, less during 
the Mexican War and even less during the Civil 
War, than it is to-day. It is also certain that a sol- 
dier of to-day uses more ammunition than did a sol- 
dier even a generation ago, to say nothing of the 
soldier of 140 years ago. It is certain that the 
average per soldier cost of the present day's am- 
munition is a thousand times greater than it was 
during the Revolutionary War or during the War 
of 1812, and perhaps 200 times as expensive as it 
was during our Civil War. 

! We gasp at the tens of millions of dollars thrown 
away every day in Europe through the use of gi- 
gantic and expensive explosive shells; we stand 
aghast at what we consider the extravagant cost of 
the transportation systems of the present armies 
fighting in Europe. 

But — including the proportionate per soldier cost 
of all the expensive ammunition used to-day and 
the proportionate per soldier cost of the expensive 
transportation system needed at the present time 
— the annual soldier cost of each Russian soldier 
in the present war is but $661, of each French sol- 
dier $774, of each German soldier $828, and of 
each English soldier $921, while the average annual 



THE PRICE WE HAVE PAID 331 

soldier cost of every soldier who ever enlisted in the 
Civil War has been $3,6"/^. Under our voluntary- 
system — zvith its enormous zvaste in the training 
hundreds of thousands of men and then discharging 
them, zvith its enormous and vicious bounties paid 
over and over again to men who enlist, desert, and 
re-enlist and desert again, — our annual soldier costs 
have always been ''outrageous/' 

The average annual soldier cost of every man ever 
enlisted for the Spanish- American War zjuas $4,354, 
at the rate money has been spent for the 109 days 
of that war. 

In the Civil War expensive ammunition such as 
is used to-day was not used, and in the Spanish- 
American War there were not more than 26,000 
men out of the 280,000, who were ever employed in 
using ammunition against the enemy. 

But even these gigantic annual soldier extrava- 
gances are small compared to the actual cost of 
each effective man. These figures just quoted give 
the average annual soldier cost of every man who 
ever enlisted during the Civil War and the Span- 
ish-American War, respectively. The annual sol- 
dier cost of the largest number of effectives we 
have been able to get together at any one time 
during each war is quite a different matter. 

The lowest annual soldier cost of an effective 
soldier in the War of 18 12 zvas $0,320; at the rate 
money was spent during the Spanish-American 



332 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

EXCESSIVE COST OF CITIZEN SOLDIERY — ANNUAL 
SOLDIER COST 

Notes to Chart. 

1. The sum total of each nation's yearly war expenses divided by 
the sum total of the annual soldiers called by that nation to the 
battle front or put into training camps. Consequently this includes 
the proportionate soldier cost of the excessively expensive trans- 
portation system of the present day and proportionate soldier cost 
of enormously expensive ammunition. 

2. The total war cost up to the present day of each war respectively 
apportioned among the total number of men ever enlisted. This 
shows the excessive costs, due to training men for months and then 
being forced to discharge them because of disability, or due to 
bounties, desertions and pensions. 

3. The annual soldier cost (at the rate money has been spent for 
the 109 days of the war), as apportioned among the 52,000 men who 
were outside of the United States. Only about half of these ever 
were in a position to see a gun fired at the enemy. 

4. Total Union war expenses apportioned among the soldiers under 
General Pierce's command at Big Bethel, those engaged at Rich 
Mountain, Carrick's Ford ; those under General Patterson, near 
Harper's Ferry, and those who were finally gathered under Gen- 
eral McDowell's command at the Battle of Bull Run — a total force 
of about 40,000 men. Only 28,500 Union troops were finally con- 
centrated at the First Battle of Bull Run. 



THE PRICE WE HAVE PAID 



333 



SX9P7 



Excessive Cost OUien Soldiepy 
Annual Soldier Cosi 



ifi3jy« 



Annual tSoldicn 

CCkStOf 

£och Man 
Enlidtea z 



/ P.5H 



Annual (Soldier 
Cost of Each <So/c//er 
/n Pretsent War / 

fiGff/ f77^ ^S28 ^SS/ 



Uweet Annual Cart 

I Of I 

Each Effective 

doldiGP 



ii3677 



^umo 



C/v/J 
War 



Span 
Amer 
War 



War 

or 

1812 



Span. 
Amen 
War 

3 



Isfibaj 
C/vfj 
war 



334 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

CITIZEN SOLDIERY DESERTIONS 

Civil War, 1861-1865 

Total Union enlistments 2,673,341 

Total Union desertions, according to suppressed reports... 526,000 
It has been claimed on the floor of the Senate that even this num- 
ber is beloviT the actual number. 
Record of desertions made public 199,000 

Franco-Prussian War, 1870-1871 

Prussian Army mobilized 640,000 

Number of desertions 17 



THE PRICE WE HAVE PAID 



335 



crrfien Soldiery Deserlions 

Cfvfiwar /S6/-JSSS 



Dessert ions /Q, u % of All Enlijtment<:S 
Report (SuppreiTJec/ by War Dept. 



Decrer/foriiS 7.^7o 
o/A/f Eni/dtmentd' 

Public 
Qecorc/tF 



Prussian Army 
f2-Qnco-Pruss/on 
war 

/S70 -JS7' 

Desertions: 



336 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

War, the annual per soldier cost of each effective 
was $2^,584. And during the first year of the 
Civil War, the annual soldier cost of each effective 
— even including those who ran away from battle 
—was $32,997! 

Compare this $33,000 with $920, the highest 
average annual soldier cost of any soldier of any 
nation at present engaged in war — and the $920 
includes the proportionate per soldier expense of 
the most costly ammunition ever used. 

And what have we paid in men ? 

Because of the voluntary system the government 
must try out millions of men, discharging hundreds 
of thousands because of physical disability. More 
than 250,000 men were discharged for this cause 
in the Civil War alone. Under the voluntary sys- 
tem, with no registration of citizens, thousands, 
even hundreds of thousands accept bounties, desert 
and cannot be found until they apply for pensions. 
In the Civil War our desertions were 526,000 men 
— 19.7% of all the men who ever enlisted. 

By long, tedious, waste fully costly processes, we 
have enlisted and employed during our 26 years 
of wars only 604,000 annual regulars. If we had in 
the beginning adopted a sensible military policy and 
maintained a small and efficient army, such as has 
been previously indicated, not only would we have 
saved billions of dollars in war time and billions 



THE PRICE WE HAVE PAID HSl 

of dollars in peace time, but we would not have 
been compelled to employ at enormous waste of 
time and money 3,490,000 extra militia and volun- 
teers — men who are more harmful than beneficial 
up to the time that they have become veteran sol- 
diers by a year or more of training. 

Our waste in feeding and training useless men 
in the Spanish- American War was 81.4%; in the 
Mexican War, 89.8% ; in the War of the Revolu- 
tion, 91.4%; in the first year of the Civil War, 
94.1%; and in the War of 1812, 99%. 

What business house would conduct its business 
in such a way as to make it necessary to keep on 
its pay roll 1,000 men for the sake of securing the 
labour of 186 men? Yet this is the best record we 
have ever shown in any war in obtaining effectives. 

Because of the voluntary system, unprepared 
men are taken into camps, concentrated in close 
unprepared quarters, and as no adequate hospital 
and sanitary corps are ready to take charge of 
these volunteers, sickness breaks out and thousands 
die unnecessarily. 

During the Mexican War 17% to 2y% of all en- 
listed men were ill ; General Scott, writing of 6,000 
soldiers at Chapultepec, stated that i»,ooo out of the 
6,000 were too ill to be of service. 

In the Spanish-American War those who died 
from sickness and disease were 710% of the en- 
tire number killed in battle and of those who died 



AWAKE! U. S. A. 



CITIZEN soldiery: excessive cost in men 

The value of an army is not in having its soldiers or its companies 
separated by hundreds of miles, but in having them at one place 
at one time. 

First Year Civil War 

Out of 669,000 enlisted during 1861, only about 40,000 were ever 

engaged in battle or even in skirmishes. 

The rest were pure waste. 

Of the 28,000 at the Battle of Bull Run, many had been in training 

hut thirty days. 

War of 1812 

Though the United States Government enlisted 527,000 men, it 

was able to obtain but 55,000 of these during any one year. 

The largest number of effectives ever concentrated in battle was a 

little over 3,000, at the Battle of Lundy's Lane. 

Enlisted, 527,000; greatest effective army, 3,000. 

War of the Revolution 

Though the Colonies enlisted 395,000 men in seven years, the great- 
est total effective during any one year was 34,000, but these were 
never together at any one place at one time. The largest number 
of effectives ever concentrated for battle was at Saratoga, where 
between five thousand and six thousand men, under General Gates, 
defeated Burgoyne. 

This demonstrated what five thousand men could do when brought 
together. 

The entire war demonstrated what 395,000 men could not do when 
serving at different times and at different places. 

Spanish-American War 

Only 52,000 — of the 279,000 men enlisted — ever left the United 
States, or set foot on foreign soil during this war. 
If we had had a military system upon which we could have de- 
pended without fear, the enlistment and consequent waste of the 
other 207,000 men v/ould have been saved. 

Mexican War 

Though the United States enlisted 104,000 men, there were never 
more than 21,000 under training together at the same time, and 
less than half of these were effective. 



THE PRICE WE HAVE PAID 



339 



Citiien Soldiery 
Excessive Cost fn Men 



/J/ Year 
Cm I War 



Waror/S/2 



52765'^mcn 



War of 

Revo I ut/ on 



AijiGr/can 
War 





27Si72Zmen 






/^ex/con 
War 








lOU28i/men 








89.8% 
WocTte 




/{ 




VooM 




12000 






99% 

wajre 



V'i68P\ 



A - Lories/ total EffectlvGiS Qt any one ///ne 



340 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

DEATH OF CITIZEN SOLDIERY DUE TO SICKNESS 

"Large bodies of men who are not soldiers, under officers who have 
had little or no military training, cannot be brought together and 
held for many weeks in camp and remain healthy. If the water 
supply is not abundant or is not good, if the thoroughly well- 
established rules of sanitation are not observed ; if the discipline 
of the camp puts little restriction on drunkenness and immorality; 
if the soldier does not know how to live, and his officers do not 
watch him and teach him; if his food is poorly cared for and 
badly cooked, and he is permitted to eat and drink anything and 
everything he can find, sickness will certainly prevail. If, as at 
Camp Thomas, a regiment can go for ten days without digging 
sinks ; if the sinks dug are not used or they quickly overflow and 
pollute the ground; if practically no protection is afforded against 
the liquor sellers and prostitutes of neighboring places; if com- 
mands are crowded together and tents seldom struck, or even 
never during the occupation of the camp; if no one is called to 
account for repeated violation of sanitary orders, it cannot be but 
that typhoid fever, once introduced will spread, rapidly, widely." — 
Report of the Commission appointed by the President to Investi- 
gate the conduct of the War Department in the War with Spain. 
"What the country needs to know now is that in actual warfare 
the volunteer is a nuisance, that it always takes one regular to 
offset his mistakes, to help him cook his rations, and to teach him 
to shelter himself and to keep himself clean." — Richard Harding 
Davis. 

Notes to Chart. 

I and 2. Though their proportions are essentially true, the figures 
here are not exact, due to the fact that the report of the Adjutant- 
General for 1898 lists only the deaths which occurred between 
May 1st and September 30th, while the Statistical Exhibit issued 
by the Adjutant-General on December 13, 1899, gives the total 
deaths of volunteers, thus twice listing the small number of deaths 
of volunteers who were in actual service. 

The first report gives the total deaths from May ist to September 
30th as 2,910, only 345 of which resulted from being killed in action 
or from wounds received in action. The Exhibit gives the total 
deaths of volunteers as 4,137, only 279 of which were killed in 
action or fatally wounded. Total deaths from all causes not 
making allowance for small number listed twice, 7,043. 



THE PRICE WE HAVE PAID 



S41 



Death Of Ciifien soldiery 
due 10 Sickness 



C/V// IVor 



Nex/can 
Wop 




2UQ,5S6 
from 

cS/cAnecTcS' 



J / 0,070 

from 

Battle 



cSfionijn 

WOP 



6,555 

from 
/ 



from 
BatttA 



342 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

from wounds received in battle. In the Civil War 
200,000 men died of sickness and disease and 49,- 
000 more died from causes other than being killed 
in battle or from wounds received in battle. There 
were in the Civil War more than 6,000,000 re- 
corded cases of sickness. 

And what have we paid in blood? 

Saddest and most costly of all is the great 
slaughter of untrained and poorly equipped men 
when opposed by a trained and well-equipped en- 
emy. In our war with Mexico, we lost by death in 
battle or death by sickness one man out of eight. 
In the Spanish-American War, although not more 
than 26,000 of the two hundred eighty thousand 
enlisted ever saw a gun fired at the enemy, yet 2,- 
910 were lost in that war — almost one-seventh of 
the number engaged in actually fighting the enemy. 
Much of this loss was due to the fact that our 
small hospital corps, perhaps sufficient for our 
regular army of 26,000, was absolutely unable to 
care for an army of nearly three hundred thou- 
sand. 

Our losses in men discharged because of dis- 
ability, our losses in captured, our losses in 
wounded, our losses in battle and losses by death 
from sickness in the Civil War were 1,300,000 men 
— a number not only equal to all the Confederate 
soldiers ever under arms but 30% greater than 
their entire army. 



THE PRICE WE HAVE PAID 343 

Armies composed of regiments of regulars and 
volunteers do not work in harmony in battle; the 
number of killed and wounded are infinitely greater 
than they are in a trained army of similar size. 
Veteran soldiers remain calm — attempt no rash 
feats and consequently sustain comparatively small 
losses. 

In the Civil War we lost 110,070 men killed in 
action or dead as a result of wounds received in 
action and 249,458 from disease and causes other 
than wounds in battle : a total Union loss of 35^- 
528 dead. 

The present war in Europe is a bloody war. We 
gasp at the British losses of August, 1914. Dur- 
ing the terrific battle at Mons and during the re- 
treat to the Marne the British lost 22.8% of their 
men. 

History, literature and painting have made 
memorable for all time the terrible slaughter dur- 
ing the Charge of the Light Brigade at Balaklava. 
The Light Brigade lost 5/% of its men! Yet in 
the Civil War at the Battle of Gettysburg, the One 
Hundred Fifty-seventh New York lost 61% of its 
men; Seventy-sixth New York 62%, One Hundred 
Sixty-second Pennsylvania 62%, Seventy-fifth 
Pennsylvania 63%, One Hundred Seventh Penn- 
sylvania 65%, One Hundred Fiftieth Pennsylvania 
65%, One Hundred Seventh New York 70%, One 
Hundred Forty-seventh New York 70%, One Hun- 



34.4 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

EXCESSIVE COST OF CITIZEN SOLDIERY IN MEN KILLED 

History, literature and painting have made memorable for all time 

the terrible slaughter at the Charge of the Light Brigade. 

The Light Brigade lost J7 per cent, of its men! 

At the Battle of Gettysburg the per cent, of the men lost was: 

157th New York 61 

76th New York 62 

i62d Pennsylvania 62 

7Sth Pennsylvania 63 

107th Pennsylvania 65 

150th Pennsylvania 65 

107th New York 70 

147th New York 70 

151st Pennsylvania 71 

24th Michigan 73 

149th Pennsylvania 74 

2d Wisconsin 77 

i6th Maine 84 

The Battle of Chickamauga, in which 120,000 men were engaged on 
both sides, and the Battle of Chancellorsville, in which 120,000 men 
were engaged on both sides, were almost as bloody as the battle 
of Gettysburg. In fact, one authority called Chickamauga the 
"bloodiest battle of history." 



THE PRICE WE HAVE PAID 



345 



Dccessive Cos! of Cilizen Soldiery 
in Men Kinea 



37% 



The 

Of the 
UQtit 
Brigade 



iO% 



7C% 



74/% 



77% 



^4/ tn 
Micni^an 
Re^/ment 



1^9 in 

Pennspvan/Q 
Ue^iment 



2na 
WMCons/n 
Qe^/ment 



/Gtn 
Maine 
j^Q/meni 



Battle Of GettyisDuf0-I 



d-Nine Ot/ier Ue^//77ent<s lost from 6J% to 7J%Jf/Jiea 



346 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

EXCESSIVE COST OF CITIZEN SOLDIERY IN DEATH 
CASUALTIES 

Up to the outbreak of the European War the Russo-Japanese War 
was considered the most costly war in history. Japan then lost 
both in battle and by sickness but 3.8 per cent, of her men. 
The entire number of British dead in the present war, up to 
December i, 1915, was but 4 per cent, of the armies she had organ- 
ised up to that time. 

Russia's dead up to December i, 1915, were but 6.4 per cent, of 
her armies. 

Germany, by the use of trained soldiers, has accomplished a 
greater invasion of Belgium, France, Poland and the Balkans than 
we accomplished during our Civil War in invading the South.^ Yet 
to accomplish these invasions in three different directions, it has 
cost her a loss in dead of but 8 per cent, of her men. 
It may be objected that all of these armies have not been in bat- 
tle ; neither were all of our soldiers of the Civil War ever in battle. 
Of the 660,000 men of 1861, not over 40,000 ever took part in battle. 
To accomplish in 1864-1865 a lesser invasion of the South — an 
invasion in one direction only — cost us iS-4 per cent, of all the men 
ever enlisted in the Union armies, even including the half million 
who deserted and the quarter million who \yere discharged for 
disability, iQ.g per cent, of all the actual Union forces, and 25.6 
per cent, of the armies we had in 1864 ond 1865, the two years 
during which the invasion was executed. 



THE PRICE WE HAVE PAID 



347 



Excessive Cost ojf Oiizen Soldiepy 
fn 

Oeam Casualties 



Cm/ War 



Paper 
Forcets 



Prec^ent 
European War 







German 
dead 


Japanese 
Wor 2 




6,UVo 

RU(Ssian 

dead 


7apane<se 
deaa 




Br/t/csn 
cfead 



Aauai 

Force<^ 



Union 
dead 



Un/on 
dead 



348 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

dred Fifty-first Pennsylvania 71%, Twenty-fourth 
Michigan y2>%^ O'^^ Hundred Forty-ninth Penn- 
sylvania 74%, Second Wisconsin TJ%, Sixteenth 
Maine 84%. 

And the Battle of Chickamauga where 128,000 
men were engaged on both sides and the Battle of 
Chancellorsville where 120,000 men were engaged 
on both sides, were almost as bloody as the Battle 
of Gettysburg. In fact one authority calls Chicka- 
mauga the ''bloodiest battle of history." 

Even when we compare the death losses of en- 
tire wars or entire campaigns, we find the percent- 
age of death of citizen soldiery to be far greater 
than the percentage of death of regulars. 

Up to the outbreak of the European War the 
Russo-Japanese War was considered the bloodiest 
of history. Yet in per cent, of men actually lost 
it does not compare with our losses in the Civil 
War. 

Japan lost in the Russo-Japanese War, both in 
battle and by sickness, but 3.8% of her men. 

The entire number of British dead up to De- 
cember 1st, 1915, was but 4% of the armies she 
had organised at that time. 

It may be objected that all the British armies 
were not in battle; but neither were all of our sol- 
diers of the Civil War ever in battle. Of the 660,- 
000 men of 1861, not over 40,000 ever took part in 
battle. 



THE PRICE WE HAVE PAID 349 

Russia's dead up to December ist, 191 5, were 
but 6.4% of her armies. 

Germany, by the use of trained soldiers, has ac- 
complished a greater invasion of Belgium, France, 
Poland and the Balkans than we accomplished dur- 
ing our Civil War in invading the South. Yet to 
accomplish these invasions in three different direc- 
tions has cost her a loss in dead of but 8% of her 
men. 

To accomplish in 1864 a smaller invasion of the 
South — an invasion in one direction only — cost us 
25.6% of the armies we had in 1863 and 1864 — 
the years during zvhich the invasion was executed. 

In the number of men required to win victory, 
in the unnecessary years of suffering and devasta- 
tion, in the excessive annual soldier cost, in the 
total money waste, in losses by disability and de- 
sertion and capture, in losses by death in battle, in 
losses by death from sickness, the volunteer army 
system is the most useless, the most wasteful, the 
most costly, the most bloody! 

All history proves it. 

Why propose to continue the folly? 

^ Page 322. George Washington. 



CHAPTER III 

TRAGIC COMjSDY 

THE comic-tragedy of it all — the comedy of 
our military blunders and the tragedy of our 
waste of money and men — has been due to political 
militarism. Congress has never been able to real- 
ise, except when forced to do so under great stress 
and after months and even years of disaster, that 
the military is an executive function and not a 
legislative one. 

The folly began when Washington first took 
command at the beginning of the Revolutionary 
War. The Continental Congress then recom- 
mended that the officers of each company should 
be elected by the rest of the company. Washing- 
ton, the Commander-in-Chief, had not the power to 
choose the officers to govern the companies of 
which he was the head. Moreover, Congress sit- 
ting in Philadelphia — a two weeks' journey in 
those days from Boston where Washington had 
his command — refused to accept Washington's ad- 
vice as to the term of enlistment or the size of the 
army. In fact, Congress actually forbade Wash- 

350 



TRAGIC COMEDY 3gl 

ington organising an army larger than 22,000 men ; 
and forbade the New York division being made 
larger than 5,000. 

As Washington was about to move to defend 
New York, Congress ordered him, in spite of his 
protests, to send nearly half of his army to re-in- 
force the Canadian expedition, which had already 
failed — compelled him to do this, reducing his army 
to about 5,300, though he had to confront an enemy 
numbering from 27,000 to 30,000. When Congress 
finally realised what it had done, it called out 6,000 
militia in June, who were supposed to train, arm, 
prepare for battle, win the war, and be back home 
again by the last of November. 

Even after five years of fighting — after defeat 
after defeat — Congress decided to reduce the size 
of the army, though we then had no efficient means 
of combating the English forces which had won 
success after success for five years. 
' To cap the climax. Congress authorised armies, 
but declared it had no power to provide men with 
' food and clothing. Consequently Connecticut regi- 
ments and Pennsylvania regiments mutinied and 
1,300 men threatened to march on Congress. Then 
the political debaters, seized with fear, capitulated 
not to the military power, but to a mob of men 
who had become desperate because they were starv- 
ing. 

During the War of 1812, Congress again failed 



352 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

in every way to understand the needs of the army. 
There was no forethought — there was not even 
afterthought. 

During the latter part of 1813 and for six 
months during 1814 there had been a British force 
of three thousand men and a British fleet in Chesa- 
peake Bay within a few hours' march of Washing- 
ton. Yet neither Congress nor President Madison 
did a single thing to strengthen the defence of the 
capital during the entire twelve months; in reality 
no real appeal was made for new militia to defend 
the capital until two days before they were ex- 
pected to fight. The general in command, report- 
ing to Congress on the mob assembled, described 
them as without officers, devoid of discipline, and 
without any knowledge of service. Another gen- 
eral, reporting on the Battle of Bladensburg, wrote 
that he could not call it a battle, it was merely a 
disgrace. 

In the campaign against the Creeks in 1813, Jack- 
son was just on the point of success when he was 
compelled to withdraw because Congress had not 
and would not furnish supplies and food to his sol- 
diers. Even after a crushing defeat of the Indians 
he was compelled to remain ten days at Fort 
Strother debating with his troops. They acted al- 
most as badly as the men in Congress. First, the 
militia mutinied and the volunteers had to bring 
them to order with their guns. Then the volun- 



TRAGIC COMEDY 353 

teers mutinied and the militia had to do the same for 
the volunteers. The debating being over and the 
militia and volunteers each having proven to the 
other that each in turn could quell the other, the 
army disbanded and went home. The Creeks 
warred on. 

In the Seminole War — the second war — 60,000 
volunteers were enlisted to defeat less than 1,200 
Indians. Becoming disgusted with the volunteers, 
General Scott asked Congress to get rid of the 60,- 
000 and give him 3,000 trained troops. Congress, 
adhering to its belief that untrained, unfed troops 
were always better fighters than trained troops 
well fed, became very indignant and relieved Gen- 
eral Scott of his command. Marvel of political 
militarism — a nation of 17,000,000 inhabitants send- 
ing forth 60,000 troops, warring seven years at a 
cost of $69,000,000 to defeat 1,200 Indians! 

Our Mexican War, from the military standpoint, 
was more successful than any other war we have 
ever waged up to the Spanish-American War. But 
it was due to the fact that the President and the 
Congress were so far away from the army that 
their meddling did not interfere as much as usual. 
Even at that time, after all the failures of the 
past, President Polk in his message to Congress 
said that: 

"A volunteer force is beyond question more ef- 
ficient than any other description of citizen sol- 



354. AWAKE! U. S. A. 

diers; and it is not to be doubted that a number 
far beyond that required would readily rush to 
the field upon the call of their country." 

When General Taylor made his advance upon 
Monterey, he was compelled to leave 6,000 volun- 
teers behind because not a single wagon had 
reached him. General Scott, after getting his troops 
in shape, found that many of them had decided to 
go home, and because of the idiocy of Congress, 
nothing could be done to prevent them from going. 
Consequently on May 4th, 1847, seven of his vol- 
unteer regiments were sent back to New Orleans 
without having been of any use to the army. Al- 
though Scott drilled and trained some 104,000 
men, when he advanced into Mexico to do fighting, 
his army was reduced to less than 10,000 men. 

No loyal American can look back upon the fol- 
lies of Congress during the early part of 1861 
without a blush of shame. 

By February ist, 1861, seven states had seceded 
— one of them — South Carolina — had seceded 42 
days previously. By February 4th, they had elect- 
ed a president and a vice president; by the 28th 
they had authorized the president of the Confed- 
erate States to issue a call for a hundred thousand 
men ; by the eighth of April, they had equipped 35,- 
000 men ; a week later thev had seized all the arse- 
nals within their reach and all forts in the south- 
ern states. 



TRAGIC COMEDY 355 

And what has Congress done? Nothing! 

What did President Lincoln do? Even he did 
not issue a call for a single volunteer until Jeffer- 
son Davis had 35,000 men enlisted and under train- 
ing. And even then, though the armed forces of 
the Confederacy were almost in sight of Washing- 
ton, though the outbreak in Baltimore had made 
the capture of the capitol possible, Lincoln did not 
call out the militia to defend the capitol, but to 
serve only in offensive warfare — to "repossess 
forts, places and property which had seceded from 
the Union." 

Congress knew on the first day of January, 1861, 
that we had an army of but 16,000 men. By the 
5th of April no material increase had been made in 
the size of the Union army, although the rebel 
government had an army twice the size of the Un- 
ion army, and the rebellion had covered 560,000 
square miles of territory. The Union army at that 
time could have furnished but one soldier to re- 
conquer each 33 square miles of rebel territory. 

The Confederate army was enlisted for twelve 
months, but because of a law over 60 years old, 
which Congress had failed to repeal. President 
Lincoln could not call volunteers or militia for a 
longer period than ninety days. Hence the 75,000 
volunteers called by President Lincoln on April 
15th, were to be permitted to go home at the very 
moment at which the Confederate army of 100,000 



356 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

would be trained, equipped and ready for eight 
months' additional service. 

Congress convened July 4th, and as soon as Con- 
gress began to act it began to blunder. Two 
hundred fifty thousand men were again enlisted 
under a system which permitted the men to elect 
their own officers. Later, in authorising the larger 
army of volunteers, Congress gave the governor of 
each state the right to appoint the officers for the 
companies of his state. Congress thus prohibited 
the President of the United States, Commander-in- 
Chief of the Armies of the Union, from even desig- 
nating a single field officer of a single volunteer 
regiment. 

When Congress met, the 75,000 men, called out 
by President Lincoln, had had at least a few days' 
training and, within a few weeks, their terms of 
enlistment would end and they would go home. 
Consequently Congress insisted that these men 
must fight at once before leaving. It did not matter 
whether the nation was ready to open a campaign 
or not. Those soldiers had been trained for thirty 
days or more, they had been fed for a longer time. 
They should fight before the ninety days was up. 
Hence Congress was compelled to provide a battle 
for them. The result was the disastrous defeat at 
the Battle of Bull Run. 

By the end of 1861, Congress had paid out $238,- 
000,000 for 670,000 troops; Congress had got to- 



TRAGIC COMEDY 357 

gather 28,000 men at the Battle of Bull Run — 
many of whom had had but thirty days of train- 
ing, and most of whom — with the exception of 800 
of the regular army — ran away in panic. 

Even so wise a man as President Lincoln proved 
himself incapable of directing armed forces. In 
1862, because of President Lincoln's interference 
with McClellan's plan of uniting his forces with 
those of General McDowell, the best chance of 
success was thrown away. Only in 1863, when 
President Lincoln and Congress turned matters 
over to General Grant to do absolutely as he 
pleased, did matters mend. 

When the Spanish-American War began it was 
found that regiments which should have had ten 
companies had only eight and that these companies 
had only six out of each ten men they should have 
had. 

"There were no brigades, no divisions, and worst 
of all, no plans, nor could any be formulated for 
the very excellent reason that Congress, with its 
usual short-sightedness, had restricted its appro- 
priation to national defence and to that one ob- 
ject alone. No money was available for offensive 
operations, the only kind which could possibly be 
used against the Spanish possessions in both hem- 
ispheres." * 

On March 2, i8q6, Congress requested Spain 
to recognise the independence of Cuba. But Con- 



358 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

gress took no action zvhatever to prepare for war 
until March 9, 1898, just two years and eleven days 
later. Two years and eleven days ! — even then Con- 
gress did nothing toward the organisation of the 
army. Fifty-five days after the appropriation was 
voted, Congress awoke to the fact that an army as 
well as money was needed. Naturally at that late 
hour, Congress re-committed the old blunders. 
Again it took the power of the appointment of 
officers of volunteer companies out of the hands of 
the Commander-in-Chief of the army of the United 
States and turned it over to the governors of the 
various states. 

So inefficient was the training that General 
Miles telegraphed to the Secretary of War that 30 
to 40 per cent, of the fourteen regiments of volun- 
teers which he commanded were absolutely un-^ 
drilled, that there were 300 men in one regiment, 
each of whom had never in all his life even fired a 
gun. These men might have had at least ninety 
days of shooting practice but for lack of of- 
ficers ; and Congress had failed over and over again 
to respond to the recommendations of the Secretary 
of War for more officers. 

This lack resulted also in great confusion when 
troops assembled in Florida for embarkation. A 
few sentences from the account of then Lieutenant- 
Colonel Roosevelt indicates the scramble of the 
troops for the transports. 



TRAGIC COMEDY 359 

"As the number and capacity of the transports 
were known, or ought to have been known, and as 
the number and size of the regiments to go were 
also known, the task of allotting each regiment or 
fraction of a regiment to its proper transport, and 
arranging that the regiments and transports should 
meet in due order on the dock, ought not to have 
been difficult. However, no arrangements were 
made in advance; and we were allowed to shove 
and hustle for ourselves as best we could, on much 
the same principles that had governed our prepa- 
rations hitherto. . . . 

*'We were ordered to be at a certain track with 
all our baggage at midnight, there to take a train 
for Port Tampa. At the appointed time we turned 
up, but the train did not. The men slept heavily, 
while Wood and I and various other officers wan- 
dered about in search of information which no one 
could give. We now and then came across a brig- 
adier-general or even a major-general; but no>- 
body knew anything. Some regiments got aboard 
the trains and some did not, but as none of the 
trains started, this made little difference. At three 
o'clock, we received orders to march to an entirely 
different track, and away we went. No train ap- 
peared on this track either ; but at six o'clock some 
coal-cars came by, and these were seized. . . . 

"Finally, after hours of search, the first Volun- 



360 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

teen Cavalry were allotted to the transport Yu- 
catan. . . . 

"At the same time I happened to find out that 
she had previously been allotted to two other regi- 
ments — the Second Regular Infantry, and the Sev- 
enty-first New York Volunteers, which latter regi- 
ment alone contained more men than could be put 
aboard her. Accordingly, I ran at full speed to 
our train, leaving a strong rear guard with the 
baggage, I double-quicked the rest of the regiment 
up to the boat, just in time to board her as she 
came into the quay, and then to hold her against 
the Second Regulars and the Seventy-first, who had 
arrived a little too late, being a shade less ready 
than we were in the matter of individual initiative. 
There was a good deal of expostulation, but we had 
possession, and as the ship could not contain half 
of the men who had been told to go aboard her, the 
Seventy-first went away, as did all but four com- 
panies of the Second." 

Compare this with the fact that Napoleon had 
his army so trained that he could embark 1^3,000 
troops in three hours. 

Much of the confusion and mismanagement of 
the volunteer troops of the Spanish- American War 
was due to the lack of efficient officers. State gov- 
ernors often appointed, merely because of friend- 
ship or political influence, many men, who were ab- 
solutely unqualified to lead troops, as company and 



TRAGIC COMEDY 361 

regimental officers. When the War Department 
begged Congress for authority to issue commis- 
sions to retired army officers of experience so that 
they might again enter active service, Congress em- 
phatically denied the petition, believing that in- 
experienced, untried political friends of state gov- 
ernors would render better service. The results 
were deplorable. Men went for days without food, 
while food at the same time lay decaying and spoil- 
ing within a few miles of them. 

There was great disorganisation of the commis- 
sary department, due to the fact that men who had 
been trained to handle supplies for the small army 
of 30,000 were absolutely at sea in attempting to 
handle supplies for 270,000. Food could not be 
taken from the storehouses, even though in sight 
of starving soldiers, without military authority — 
unless one wished to run the risk of court martial. 

One young captain at Chickamauga did run this 
risk. Assuming command of wagons and teams of 
mules, he drove to the station, brought back food 
which had been lying for days on the platform in 
the sun, and consequently gained the everlasting 
thanks of the entire company. 

Merely because there were not a sufficient num- 
ber of officers to train the men, to lay out and pro- 
vide sanitary camps, 77,000 men were crowded at 
Camp Thomas, which could not suitably accommo- 
date more than 19,000 troops. And the conditions 



362 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

at Camp Alger were so bad that they caused a 
scandal. As a result of the mismanagement due to 
Congress's lack of understanding of army condi- 
tions, trouble among the men broke out. It is 
impossible to bring together thirty or sixty thou- 
sand men whose life habits are different, concen- 
trate them in a camp without sufficient officers 
trained in handling men, subject them to regular 
rules, to discipline, to diet, to duties, without trouble 
and without sickness. 

Congress's action in the Philippine War was no 
more commendable. The refusal of Congress in 
the first place to enlist men until such a time as the 
commander-in-chief of the army deemed it wise 
to discharge them, left General Otis for ten months 
with 3,722 men — whom he was entitled to com- 
mand — to face some 35,000 Philippine revolution- 
ists. 

Even in late years Congress by not giving heed 
to the pleas of the War Department for a larger 
commissary staff has left men on duty in the Phil- 
ippines three and four days without food and often 
under the hot sun without even water, as a result 
of which the tongues and lips of the men have been 
so swollen they could not speak or eat for forty-eight 
hours. 

"Congress is chiefly responsible for the bad ad- 
ministration of the army and its organisation. 
They have often been appealed to to reconstruct 



TRAGIC COMEDY 363 

the army on modern principles, and they have failed 
to do so; and until this is done the evils we have 
encountered will recur again, and we will never be 
able to take our place beside other military nations 
until we do that." ^ 

QUOTATION REFERENCES 

^ Page 357. Huidekoper, in "The Military Unprepared- 
ness of the United States," 

~ Page 363. General Sanger, in report of Investigating 
Committee appointed by the President to investigate the 
conduct of the War Department in the war with Spain. 



PART SIX: WILL THE PROPOSED 
PLANS PROTECT? 



PART SIX: WILL THE PROPOSED 
PLANS PROTECT? 

CHAPTER I 

DEALING IN FUTURES — DANIELS 

INASMUCH as the administration had, by De- 
cember 191 5, been face to face with six inter- 
national crises in thirty-one months one marvels 
that the Secretary of the Navy's recommendation to 
Congress did not sound a stronger note for imme- 
diate defence. Three of these crises actually re- 
quired naval action and each of the others might 
have led our nation into war. All had occurred 
during the time Mr. Daniels had been Secretary of 
the Navy. 

The present administration in May, 1913, actu- 
ally expected at any hour an attack upon Manila 
by Japan, and feverishly prepared for it; the ad- 
ministration, on April 22, 1914, sent a fleet to Mex- 
ico and occupied Vera Cruz; in April, 191 5, Sec- 
retary Daniels had to order a battleship to the Gulf 
of California to get four Japanese warships out 
of Turtle Bay where Japanese marines were sur- 
veying the country; in 1915, Secretary Danielc 

367 



368 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

sent an expedition to Hayti; moreover, during the 
last few months, the administration has had to 
twice request the recall of the ambassador of one 
world power, has had to request the recall of the 
naval and military attaches of one of the greatest 
naval powers of the world, and was for several 
months almost on the diplomatic breaking-point 
with that power, and is now engaged in a dangerous 
punitive invasion of Mexico. 

It is indeed remarkable that the Secretary of the 
Navy should seemingly forget his eventful experi- 
ences all crowded into thirty-one short months, and 
propose a plan which makes little provision for the 
immediate future, indicating that we should not 
prepare for 1917 or 1918, but for 1922 and 1923. 

The scheme of Secretary Daniels proposes a so- 
called increasingly progressive upbuilding of the 
navy; that is, less to be done in 19 17 than in 19 18, 
less in 19 18 than 19 19, and so on. The entire plan 
of Secretary Daniels lays stress on preparing to 
defend ourselves against attack five years after 
ip2^ — thus after 1^28. 

And why 1928? Because Secretary Daniels^ pro- 
gram is not a building program but a voting pro- 
gram. Not one of the ships that Secretary Dan- 
iels proposes will be finished before 192 1 or 1922 
if constructed at the rate our ships have been con- 
structed during the past ten years. We are often 
told that a ship can be built in three years. It can ; 



DEALING IN FUTURES— DANIELS 369 

but two years often elapse between the voting of a 
ship and the laying of the keel. One of Secretary 
Daniels' excuses for not recommending more bat- 
tleships at present is that we have not yards in 
which to build them. The General Board, how- 
ever, shows that two or three other yards, espe- 
cially the one at Mare Island, California, could be 
put into condition to build large battleships in 
from seven to nine months. Nine months seems a 
long time when we think of our immediate needs 
but nine months is less than five years. 

As Secretary Daniels presents his plan to the 
public he leads us to believe that his plan will pro- 
vide ten new battleships by 1923. The real truth 
is that, according to his voting program, the 
strength of the navy will not be increased at all by 
1923. The ten ships he proposes will not be fin- 
ished until 1928 and by that time many of the ships 
which are now efficient will be out of date. So 
that by 1928 our navy will be just as inefficient as 
it is to-day. 

Secretary Daniels has publicly announced that 
the program of his reforms has been greatly hin- 
dered because of the inefficiency of the Secretaries 
of the Navy preceding him. This announcement 
led us to expect that, in this time of world struggle 
and national danger, Secretary Daniels would have 
proposed; first, to eliminate the two great existing 
causes of inefficiency; and secondly, to put our pres- 



370 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

ent equipment and personnel in fit condition for 
service as quickly as possible. 

The two great causes of past and present ineffi- 
ciency have been and are; first, the criminal waste 
of funds due to political mis-management and to 
pork-barrelling in favour of useless navy yards; 
and, second, the ridiculous organisation of the navy, 
under which no young man can expect any consid- 
erable advancement before he has reached the age of 
ninety-seven. 

Secretary Daniels proposes no plan for remedy- 
ing the latter, and emphatically asserts that he will 
insist on keeping open every one of the useless, 
wasteful navy yards — he even asserts that those 
which previous Secretaries of the Navy have closed 
will be reopened. 

To put the present navy, its equipment, and its 
personnel in fit condition to be of service, we 
should : first increase the personnel to meet at least 
the present needs, even if we do not provide for men 
to be trained to man the ships we shall soon have 
ready to put into commission; secondly, provide a 
sufficient store of reserve ammunition; thirdly, or- 
der the construction of a sufficient number of am- 
munition ships and repair ships, so that our present 
fleet may fight, if called upon to do so, as efficiently 
as possible. 

What does Secretary Daniels wish to have done 
in the next eighteen months to meet these needs? 



* 



DEALING IN FUTURES— DANIELS 371 

Every one who knows anything about our navy 
knows that we are woefully short of men; short, 
even for the ships we have at present. Secretary 
Daniels' Assistant-Secretary of the Navy, Franklin 
Roosevelt, a short time ago, stated officially that we 
were eighteen thousand men short of what we 
should have. Admiral Fiske testifies that we need 
20,000 men to man all the ships. 

These men cannot be trained in a day, a month, 
or in two months, or even two years. Moreover, in 
case of war we ought not to take a single officer 
from the navy to train them. Of course, we are 
not at war; but a navy is of real value to-day only 
if it is ready for war ! 

If, when war broke out in 1 9 14, it had taken Eng- 
land sixty days to get her navy ready not only the 
whole history of this war but the whole history of 
the world would have been different. During those 
sixty days Germany could have occupied the Chan- 
nel; bombarded the northern coast of France; cap- 
tured Paris ; prevented England ever sending a sin- 
gle soldier to the continent and landed 500,000 
men in England before England could have 
equipped 150,000 men. 

To advise that we spend millions upon millions 
for ships and to refuse to recommend sufficient 
men to handle those ships in time of war is folly. 
According to the opinion of many experts we are 
now 20,000 men short. The ships to be commis- 



372 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

sioned in the next six monttis will require 3,P4p ad- 
ditional men and those ships to be commissioned 
early in 191 7 will require 3, Sop more men. Con- 
sequently before another act of Congress becomes 
effective we shall need to make our navy of fight- 
ing value, 2"/, 'J ^8 more men than we have at pres- 
ent. And what is the use of having a navy if it 
cannot be manned so as to defend us in case of 
need? 

To meet these needs, Secretary Daniels, abso- 
lutely ignoring the suggestions and advice of ex- 
perts, asks for but 7,500 additional men up to July 
I, 1917, a year and a half in the future. The sug- 
gestions of the General Board on this matter were 
most modest and reasonable. They were made by 
men who have commanded ships in action, — officers 
who know how many men are needed and what the 
results are in case of war if there are not a suffi- 
cient number of trained men. The General Board 
asked for 15,000 men only. Yet Secretary Daniels 
cut this number down to 7,500. 

Considering that new men should be in training 
so as to be ready for the new ships under con- 
struction, we realise that Secretary Daniels has 
asked for only about one-fourth the number of men 
absolutely necessary! 

Now as to ammunition supply! 

There is a request for but eight million dollars 
for reserve ammunition. That amount has been 



DEALING IN FUITTRES— DANIELS 373 

used on the battlefields of Europe in a few hours. 

Eight million dollars for reserve ammunition is 
to the layman an enormous sum. How far will it 
go? If we choose only the ten best ships that may 
be called upon to use this ammunition and deter- 
mine the amount of ammunition the twelve and 
fourteen inch guns of those ten ships would re- 
quire, making no allowance at all for all other guns 
on those ships or for any of the guns on all the 
other ships of our entire navy, this eight million 
dollars reserve ammunition would last — if these 
ships were engaged in battle firing by salvos, the 
only effective method of firing at present, firing at 
long range, at much slower rate than admirals of 
the navy state would be necessary for those ships 
to hold their own against foreign battleships — this 
reserve ammunition, this eight million dollars'* 
worth, would last just four hours fifty-two min- 
utes. 

Every shell of the reserve ammunition could be 
used at slow fire at long range in that time ! If the 
guns were fired a Uttle faster — 33^ per cent, more 
rapidly, not equal to their maximum rapidity of fire 
by any means — the entire eight million dollars' 
worth of ammunition would be used up in three 
hours and fourteen minutes! 

But if the opposing fleet outnumbered our ten 
ships and should force us into battle at short 
range, the fire to be effective would have to be 



374 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

much more rapid. If, then, the number of shells 
fired per minute is estimated at the normal rate 
of fire at short range, making all allowances for 
possible delays, this eight million dollars' ammuni- 
tion for the big guns of these ten ships only, would 
last just ninety-six minutes. 

When attacked our only chance of saving our- 
selves would rest with our navy. Yet Secretary 
Daniels, in direct opposition to the advice of the 
General Board, proposes but two new battleships 
a year; and such ships as he proposes will be in- 
efficient because of their slowness. 

The Blnecher was lost in the North Sea battle 
only because she was too slow — the other German 
ships were saved by their speed. Yet Secretary 
Daniels proposes that our new $18,000,000 battle- 
ships shall have a maximum speed two and a half 
miles an hour less than the Blnecher. 

Colonel Roosevelt, when president, did more to 
build up our navy than any president we ever had. 
And under him it accomplished feats which naval 
experts of all nations declared could not be ac- 
complished. Because of the fact that a battleship 
as a fighting machine is of little value after its 
twelfth year, he realised that the standard then at- 
tained could not be maintained unless new ships 
were added each year. Consequently he fought 
for a construction plan providing four battleships 



DEALING IN FUTURES— DANIELS 375 

a year for several years. Congress compromised 
on two battleships per year ; but even this plan was 
dropped, so that for five years we have been lag- 
ging woefully behind in our construction pro- 
gramme, and our navy as a result has rapidly dete- 
riorated. 

The proposed plan of Secretary Daniels advo- 
cates nothing to aid us in catching up with what we 
should have had, had previous plans not been dis- 
continued. 

When we are so far behind, how can a Secretary 
of the Navy presume to assert that adding two bat- 
tleships a year to our navy for the next five years 
will put us in fit condition to defend ourselves 
from other powers which have added and are add- 
ing three and four each year. 

According to the present proposed programme, 
we shall merely waste millions on battleships which 
when finished will be outclassed in speed and out- 
numbered two to one by the new ships which other 
nations are now building — even though we do not 
count the ships they built while we were idle. 

Here again Secretary Daniels does not follow the 
wise suggestion of the General Board — of men of 
experience in naval matters who recognised the 
pressing need of quickly constructing great battle- 
ships and battle cruisers to immediately build up 
the navy so that we might have an adequate de- 
fence as soon as possible. As previously stated, 



376 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

Secretary Daniels' recommendations for ships are 
increasingly progressive. In his five years' plan 
less is to be done the first two years than after- 
wards. The General Board even in their October 
report, which Secretary Daniels requested should 
be made to conform to Jiis ideas, advises that more 
ships be authorised the first two years and less dur- 
ing the following years. 

The board, in their original report advised 
four battle cruisers, four dreadnoughts and six 
scouts for immediate construction. Secretary Dan- 
iels on the other hand recommends but tzvo dread- 
noughts, two battle cruisers and three scouts the 
first year. Even the "fettered" report of the Board 
made in October, even when limited to the same 
amount of money that Secretary Daniels recom- 
mended should be spent, recommends four battle- 
ships, three dreadnoughts, and four scouts the first 
year! The General Board saw the wisdom of 
recommending the construction of almost double 
the number of capital ships the first year and of 
limiting the construction during the fourth and fifth 
years. The most dominant feature of Secretary 
Daniels' plan is the policy of doing as little as pos- 
sible at present and of promising as much as pos- 
sible for the indefinite future. 

The Secretary of the Navy asks but two million 
dollars for aviation. An amount equal to this is 



DEALING IN FUTURES— DANIELS 377 

spent every week in England and France producing 
new aeroplanes for the western battle line only. 

Perhaps the average American citizen does not 
realise that our present battle fleet would go into 
combat with a foreign power absolutely blind. 
Every Admiral of the navy has emphasised the fact 
that our battleships could not successfully combat 
an enemy's fleet of the same size, because we have 
no aeroplanes to determine the advances and lo- 
cation of the attacking fleet. Senator Fletcher, 
who has thoroughly studied this phase of the 
Navy's needs, insists that we should have 676 aero- 
planes to properly equip our present navy. Every 
navy manoeuvre we have had in the last five years 
has been conducted as it would have been con- 
ducted tivelvc years ago. For the purposes of imme- 
diate defence, and by immediate defence, we 
mean within the next two years, the proposed aero- 
plane equipment of Secretary Daniels is ridicu- 
lously small. 

Russia appropriated twenty-two millions for aer- 
oplanes and dirigibles even in 19 13 when no one in 
Europe expected that war would come for five or 
ten years. 

Another essential need of the Navy is the pro- 
vision of fast coal and oil-fuel supply ships. Dread- 
noughts and battle cruisers cannot be spared from 
the battle line in the midst of a combat to run home 
to naval stations for their fuel. 



378 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

"To send a fleet thus blind and crippled into hos- 
tile waters would be to invite destruction. We have 
an altogether insufficient number of fuel-ships, and 
practically no scouts." ^ 

Yet Secretary Daniels provides for no fuel ships 
until 1918; and then the plan proposes the construc- 
tion of only one fuel ship during the entire period 
of five years. 

We are woefully lacking in ammunition supply 
ships. The General Board advised the immediate 
construction of ammunition ships and repair ships 
as these are essentially necessary to a fleet in ac- 
tion. Yet no additional ammunition ships to car- 
ry and transfer ammunition to battle cruisers and 
dreadnoughts at sea are to be provided, according 
to the Secretary's plan, until 1920. 

But most astounding of all is the proposal in 
Secretary Daniels' plan to build new battleships 
which will not have a speed of more than 21 knots. 
One can only guess at the cause of this policy. The 
European War has proven that a battleship of 
twenty-one knots is So% inefficient. It is too 
slow, if outnumbered, to get away from the ene- 
my; and it is too slow to keep up with an enemy 
if the enemy tries to get away. It is too slow to 
move in and out adjusting its range to the enemy's 
moving battleships — in fact, it is almost useless. 
The Nevada has just been tested; it has a speed 
less than twenty-two knots per hour. 



DEALING IN FUTURES— DANIELS 379 

While speed is vital to both sides in a running 
fight, it has marked advantages in any engagement. 
The faster fleet can bombard or seize a strategic 
point with impunity ; it can fight or run, as its com- 
mander may will; when fleets engage in parallel 
lines it can steam away from the enemy's slower 
ships and concentrate its fire on the head of his col- 
umn, thus destroying it in detail. 

More amazing still is Secretary Daniels' expla- 
nation of this recommendation. The engines are 
to be planned for endurance rather than for speed. 
We have always supposed we were creating a navy 
for defence; but this explanation contains a subtle 
suggestion that Secretary Daniels thinks our new 
battleships are to make long cruises — evidently of- 
fensive warfare. For defensive warfare we need 
battleships of great speed, capable of moving 
quickly from one portion of our coast to another 
to meet an attack wherever it may be planned. 

The policy of Secretary Daniels in reopening 
the unused and useless navy yards which have been 
closed by previous Secretaries of the Navy, is open 
to censure as a useless waste. His additional pro- 
posal now, to keep all these navy yards open and 
to establish armour and projectile factories there, is 
certainly open to severe criticism. 

First, whether unintentionally or not, this is an 
appeal to the pork-barrel men. This is evidenced 
by the fact that within five days after Congress 



380 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

convened, Senator Tillman — idol of the pork bar- 
rellers — the same man who secured millions for the 
useless navy yards at Port Royal and Charleston 
— who comes from the South from a state adjoin- 
ing that from which Secretary Daniels comes — 
states that do not believe in a navy but in navy 
yards — proposed to introduce a bill asking Con- 
gress to appropriate eleven million dollars for a 
factory and site to make armour and ammunition. 
It was this enthusiastic advocate of navy yards who 
led Congress to purchase a dear little navy yard 
site in his native state and to spend nearly three 
millions upon it; it was the same enthusiast who 
induced Congress to create another navy yard for 
large battleships only a few miles away from the 
first and to waste another five millions on it. Yet, 
after all this expenditure, it is so poorly constructed 
that it is of little value — only for torpedo boat de- 
stroyers and gun-boats. 

Secondly, in the present great emergency, it is 
unwise to postpone the purchase of large projec- 
tiles — the most essential ammunition in modern 
combat — until they can be manufactured by gov- 
ernment factories, which do not as yet exist. 

From what we already know of the construc- 
tion by the government of factories already built, 
we can judge that the building of these new fac- 
tories will not take months but years. Many a cit- 
izen of the United States has grown grey during 



DEALING IN FUTURES- DANIELS 381 

the construction of a government post office, re- 
quiring only ordinary building materials. In con- 
structing ammunition plants, not only will time be 
consumed in building the factories; but factories 
for the manufacture of large projectiles require 
great, complex, delicate machines to make the pro- 
jectiles. 

Certainly we should establish government fac- 
tories and establish them as soon as possible. In 
the future we must be independent of private manu- 
facture. But it is one thing to propose to build 
government ammunition factories, and quite an- 
other matter to propose that we are to postpone sup- 
plying ourselves with an adequate reserve of am- 
munition until those factories are completed! In 
our present condition we need the products of both 
governmental and private factories. Both com- 
bined cannot supply us with enough ammunition! 

Private factories in the United States manufac- 
turing large projectiles could now obtain European 
contracts for 200^^ or 300^0 their present out- 
put. // they conld only get the materials, the 
chemists and the machines, to make them. Will 
they, while making a good profit, sell their machines 
to the government? Will they manufacture these 
machines for the government when they cannot 
now turn out half enough for their own use? The 
manufacturer, the engineer, the expert mechanic, 
readily understands the folly of the proposal. 



382 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

The argument of Secretary Daniels and of Sena- 
tor Tillman in favour of government-owned ammu- 
nition plants is that "We are now at the mercy of 
the private manufacturers." We've had experi- 
ence in the past. It's bad enough to be at the mercy 
of the private manufacturers; but there's no hope 
at all, if left to the mercy of the pork barrellers. 

In naval appropriations alone, during the last 
thirty years, the pork barrellers have sluiced $500,- 
000,000. We may pay high, when at the mercy of 
the private manufacturers, but we get something! 
At the mercy of the pork barrellers, we have got 
little or nothing! 

Even the peace-loving socialist and hater of rich 
men, Charles Edward Russell, after a trip to Eu- 
rope, realises that the essential thing is to prepare 
and prepare quickly; no matter what the cost, no 
matter how many millions private manufactur- 
ing concerns may make out of legitimate manufac- 
turing work. 

After all, is it not better — allowing, let us say, 
one hundred million dollars' profit — to have private 
manufacturing concerns already equipped make the 
big guns and big ammunition we need and actually 
get something for money spent, rather than be 
"porkbarrelled" out of five hundred million dollars 
and get nothing for it, except unpreparedness and 
jthe risk of having to pay some foreign power an 



DEALING IN FUTURES— DANIELS 383 

indemnity of five thousand million dollars to save 
our coast cities from bombardment? 

Thirdly, nothing could be more convenient to an 
attacking force than to locate our proposed great 
armour plants and large projectile factories in navy 
yards on the coast, as Secretary Daniels proposes 
to do, where they can be conveniently bombarded, 
destroyed or captured by an attacking fleet. 

Certainly, this last proposition is most unwise 
and impractical, though perhaps politic. 

QUOTATION REFERENCE 
* Page 378. Rear- Admiral Austin M. Knight. 



CHAPTER II 

TH^ WILSON-GARRISON BRYANIZElD ARMY PI.AN 

FORMER Secretary of War Garrison stands in 
distinct contrast to Secretary of the Navy 
Daniels. He has rendered one great service to his 
country by emphasising the fact that the United 
States should not depend for its protection upon 48 
different little armies under the control of 48 differ- 
ent governments, but upon one army under the di- 
rect control of the United States. It is to be re- 
gretted, however, that former Secretary Gar- 
rison was not permitted to submit a plan in 
accordance with his ideas. 

It is still more regrettable that the head of an 
administration should oppose a plan which his Sec- 
retary of War, after two years of conscientious 
study, found necessary. 

However, as American citizens, seeking above all 
else to provide adequate defence for ourselves, we 
must consider former Secretary Garrison's plan 
from the standpoint of what it proposed, and not 
from the standpoint of what former Secretary Gar- 
rison desired to propose. Although Mr. Garrison 

384 



WILSON'S BRYANIZED ARMY PLAN 385 

has resigned, his plan is here considered because, 
without doubt, it is stronger than any plan which 
will be approved by the present Congress. 

The Chamberlain Senate bill, while stronger in 
some features than the Garrison plan, is weak in 
that it opens the way for and establishes another 
precedent in favor of political grafting in connec- 
tion with the supervision of the militia. The Hay 
House Bill is of course, not worthy of serious con- 
sideration except as an aid to the enemies of de- 
fence and a ''good thing for the pork barrellers." 

Mr. Garrison proposed a plan which outlines a 
five-year policy for progressively increasing the 
military forces of the United States. 

But, as in the case of the naval plans, the most 
essential question is : What is proposed to eliminate 
the present weaknesses and what additions are pro- 
posed for the first and second years? 

The present weaknesses are: (i) inability to 
quickly mobilise, (2) extravagant waste of funds, 
and (3) unbalanced organisation. Former Secre- 
tary Garrison's proposed plans, if carried into ef- 
fect, would augment each of these weaknesses. 

First, every one who knows anything about mo- 
bilisation from General Wood down to the least 
important officer, has agreed that it will take at 
least thirty days to mobilise our little army of thirty 
thousand men. 

''Our army needs complete reorganisation — not 



386 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

merely enlarging — and the reorganisation can only 
come as the result of legislation. A proper general 
staff should be established. Above all, the army 
must be given the chance to exercise in large bod- 
ies. Never again should we see, as we saw in the 
Spanish War, major-generals in command of di- 
visions who had never before commanded three 
companies together in the field." ^ 

According to the present organisation, the sol- 
diers are distributed in tiny little camps all over the 
United States. Secretary Garrison is to continue 
the use of all these useless army posts. The thirty 
thousand men, instead of being concentrated in a 
few main camps, as advised by all army experts, 
are to be kept in just as divided and separated a 
condition as possible, thus preventing any improve- 
ment toward a more rapid, more efficient method of 
mobilisation. 

Second, former Secretary Garrison's plan, by 
continuing these expensive army posts, continues 
the wasteful expenditure on these posts. This is 
one of the reasons why the United States pays 
$1,000 a year per soldier while Switzerland gets a 
better-trained and better-equipped soldier for $13. 

Thirdly, former Secretary Garrison's plan makes 
no satisfactory proposal for reorganisation. He 
urges the enlistment of 400,000 men in a volunteer 
army but makes no proposal that will give us a suf- 
ficient number of trained officers. 



WILSON'S BRYANIZED ARINIY PLAN 387 

Not only does former Secretary Garrison's plan 
propose to continue the three great evils of our 
present army organisation and present criminal 
waste, but his plan neglects to propose, or at least 
to lay emphasis upon, the needs and the means 
of remedying our greatest deficiencies in equipment 
and men. 

We hope for preparation that will enable us to 
defend ourselves in 1917, as well as in 1919 and 
1920. No foreign nation liable to attack us will 
stand sweetly by, patiently waiting five or six years, 
until we are more efficiently equipped to resist them. 
Austria did not wait until the Russian munition 
factories were completed; Germany did not wait 
until France had recovered from the military crisis 
of 1913. 

We must first efficiently organise and make ready 
for defence such means and forces as we already 
have, before dreaming of untried and questionable 
plans of defence to be worked out two or three years 
hence. 

We need a sufficient number of men to man the 
262 coast defence guns which we now have mounted 
but without a single man trained to use them. 

We need aeroplanes to give eyes to the army. 

We need concentration of our regular army of 
thirty-four thousand mobile troops so that rapid 
mobilisation may be possible. 

We need big howitzers and rapid-fire guns as 



388 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

good as those employed in Europe and a sufficient 
number of them to equip our present army. 

We need ammunition for the guns we now have 
and ammunition for the new guns to be provided. 

What does former Secretary Garrison's plan pro- 
pose to do to meet these immediate needs ? 

The first land resistance we could make against 
an attacking force would be from our coast forts 
and our coast defences. As already stated, we have 
262 guns mounted, ready for use, without sufficient 
ammunition and without a single individual trained 
to man them. Three-fifths of these 262 guns are 
gigantic twelve- and fourteen-inch monsters. Sena- 
tor Thomas at the time of the Senate Investigation 
stated that he deemed it "criminal" to provide no 
men for these guns. 

General Weaver, Chief of Coast Artillery Di- 
vision, admitted in testifying that the coast artillery 
was 13,671 men short in 19 14. It is estimated that 
we are now seventeen thousand men short for coast 
defence operations, to say nothing of the men who 
will be needed to man the new guns about to be 
placed in position. 

"If at this minute every one of the 90,000 regular 
soldiers in the United States cavalry, infantry, 
coast and field artillery were assembled in New 
York City, there would not be enough men to man 
the guns there on a war footing." ^ 

The Garrison plan, to meet this present "criminal 



WILSON'S BRYANIZED ARMY PLAN 389 

lack" of men and to provide men for the new guns 
to be installed during the next year, asks for but 
^,720 men. 

The next resistance our land forces might offer 
to invaders would have to be directed in accord- 
ance with information furnished our army by aero- 
plane scouts. England and France together now 
use on the western battle line 2,700 aeroplanes. 
Ex-Secretary Garrison asked for ^8 aeroplanes for 
the next year and a half, — almost enough to poorly 
equip the army of Uruguay. 

Our coast forts are without ammunition, both on 
the Pacific and on the Atlantic. 

The army is absolutely unequipped so far as up- 
to-date field guns are concerned. 

The great strain of former Secretary Garrison's 
proposal is : increase the number of untrained men, 
— not more trained men and better equipment. 

The recruits are to be divided into three classes: 
the regular army; the state militia; and the new 
national militia, designated as the Continental 
Army. 

According to reported plans of the former Secre- 
tary of War, it appears in big black- faced type that 
we are to have a *-egular army of 140,000 men to 
defend us. Of the ten new infantry regiments 
seven are to be kept in the United States. These are 
to be organised on a "peace-basis," which means 820 



390 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

men to a regiment. Seven of these skeletonised 
regiments will give us 5,470 men. 

If one carefully reads the proposal one soon re- 
alises that the increase advocated for the regular 
mobile army in the United States is but 10,540 
men, — both infantry and artillery. Our present mo- 
bile army in the United States is but 34,798 men. 
The addition, then, of 10,540 men will give us ex- 
actly 45,338 men in the mobile army of the United 
States for home defence, not quite the 140,000 men 
talked about. Thus under the plans for an "enor- 
mously" increased army, we shall have, in a year 
and a half, 45,338 men in the mobile army — one- 
half the army of Chile. 

The General Staff and the War College is com- 
posed of the greatest army experts of this coun- 
try, — men who have had practical experiences of 
from twenty to fifty years. They proposed a 
trained army of 240,000 men. 

Former Secretary Garrison asked that only nine 
thousand additional militia be recruited during the 
next year and a half from the forty-eight states of 
the Union. 

The piece de resistance of former Secretary Gar- 
rison's plan is the proposal to recruit a Continental 
Army of four hundred thousand men in three years. 
These men are to sign for six years' service, and are 
to be trained for the first three years only — two 
months' training each year. 



WILSON'S BRYANIZED ARMY PLAN 391 

Every sane-thinking man who was in the Platts- 
burg training camp went home convinced that he 
had been greatly benefited by the training but that, 
even after six months' training, he would still be 
unfit to stand any severe military service. What we 
need is an army\of defence, not an untrained ex- 
cuse of one that will be useful only in deceiving us 
as to our state of preparedness and security, and 
valuable only in eating up appropriations. 

The idea of the Continental Army is superb, if 
it would only work. 

All history proves such an army is always use- 
less; and that the only efficient feature about half- 
trained men opposing regulars is the ease with 
which the opposing regulars ''murder" the citizen 
army. England is proving it for us again to-day 
— one man dead out of every four. George Wash- 
ington, Light Horse Harry Lee, General Grant, 
General Lee, Lord Roberts, General Francis 
Greene, have all advised oyer and over again 
against the use of citizen soldiery. 

Not only is there a question as to the efficiency of 
men trained for two months, but there is a question 
as to whether they can even be enrolled. 

A few years ago a certain plan was launched for 
the creation of a reserve army of the United States. 
Its men were also to be obtained by the volunteer 
system. The Secretary of War at the end of two 
years announced that a reserve army of the United 



392 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

States had been created — numbering sixteen men! 

The idea of the Continental Army is to form a 
volunteer army with limited training, under the 
supervision of the United States instead of under 
the direction of the individual states, as are the 
militia. After many years, the militia of the 
forty-eight states have been able to enlist less than 
120,000 men and able to half -prepare 60,000 men 
for service. None of the inducements that have 
been offered by the State Militia can be offered in 
enlisting young men in a Continental Army. 

The militia have the inducement of a club house 
without expense. Many of them have gymnasia, 
swimming tanks, shower baths, and recreations and 
card rooms. A man entering the militia can choose 
any regiment he pleases. A company can be formed 
of intimate chums and friends. The militia train- 
ing almost never interferes with business duties. 
The militia are organised so that promotion from 
the ranks is very rapid. Every man has a chance 
of becoming an officer. 

Ex-Secretary Garrison's own testimony before 
the Investigating Committee indicates that he him- 
self did not believe his proposed volunteer system 
would furnish the men he had asked for. 

The question, then, arises as to how we can pos- 
sibly enlist, by a voluntary system, without any 
special inducements, 133,000 men each year, whether 
for a Continental or for any other kind of an army. 



WILSON'S BRYANIZED ARMY PLAN 393 

It has been difficult to enlist even a few thousand or 
a few hundred in the regular army each year. 

And even the number enlisted has been reduced 
by death, by desertion and by disability. Experi- 
ence, even in the regular army of the United States, 
has shown that often twenty-five per cent, of new 
recruits desert during the first year, that fifteen 
per cent, of the entire mobile army are sometimes 
lost annually by disability. 

In 1909 our army numbered 76,049 men. The 
mobile forces were about 51,000. But there were 
almost 5,000 desertions from the mobile army dur- 
ing that year. There were, in exact number, just 
4,993 desertions — nearly ten per cent, of the entire 
mobile army. 

On the other hand, during the same year, there 
were 7,174 men discharged because of disability, so 
that the mobile army of the United States lost, dur- 
ing the year by desertion and disability, 24 per cent, 
of the entire force. And this after those who were 
supposed to be unfit for service had been eliminated 
by rejection at the time of enlistment. In 19 10, 
for example, of all those who made application to 
enlist, 81% were rejected because of physical disa- 
bility. In 191 1 more than 72% were rejected. 

After thirty years the state militia with all their 
inducements have now enrolled less than 120,000 
men. 

Two and a half years' experience in organising 



394 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

a reserve army and thirty years' experience in en- 
listing militia in forty-eight different states indi- 
cate that the system of voluntary enlistment pro- 
posed by former Secretary Garrison will not work ! 

The plan as a whole proposed a Garrison-Bryan- 
ized army — "citizenry springing to arms and fight- 
ing after two to six months' training." 

Ex-Secretary Garrison's plan ignores the advice 
of experts and proposes a plan for a citizen soldiery 
when all history proves that such armies are useless 
and costly in money and blood. 

"The War Department has closed its ears to all 
advice which does not consort with the political 
policy it has adopted. Facts were presented to the 
department by experts from the Army College and 
members of the General Staff. Facts have been ig- 
nored in the Continental Army scheme." ^ 

The Continental Army, even if the War Depart- 
ment is able to enlist the soldiers, will be inefficient 
because improperly trained. 

"The fallacy of this Continental Army scheme is 
not in its numbers so much as in its disregard of 
the need of adequate training. 

"Physical endurance becomes a paramount vir- 
tue. An army ill-equipped and unseasoned in prac- 
tice exposes its vital weakness the moment it is sub- 
mitted to attack. Such an army is worse than use- 
less ; it is criminal. 

"Those who understand army matters can hardly 



WILSON'S BRYANIZED ARMY PLAN 395 

refrain from smiling at the notion of conferring 
an adequate military training upon men in two 
months, this period being followed by ten months 
of entire suspension from service. Would such 
a system work anywhere else? Go into any pro- 
fession. Would it be possible for a man to become 
a lawyer by applying himself to law two months a 
year? Would he be esteemed competent? Would 
clients put any confidence in him? Quite the same 
thing applies in the army. The plan is devoid of 
sense." * 

The one great lesson of the w^ar in Europe is 
that modern war is a war of machines and science; 
and not a war of men, only in so far as they are 
equipped with modern machines of w^ar and trained 
to use them. This fact former Secretary Garrison 
failed to grasp. His plan proposed a maximum of 
poorly trained men with the least emphasis possible 
on the equipment and supplies. The most efficient 
army of to-morrow will be the one that is supplied 
with the greatest machines and instruments of war 
manipulated by the smallest possible number of 
trained, experienced, skilful men. 

"Maintain a potential preparedness for war in 
which fighting is done by machines, not men." * 

This does not mean that our present army is suf- 
ficient in numbers; it is pitifully small, ridiculously 
small. We must increase it. We should have an 



3% AWAKE! U. S. A. 

infinitely larger army, even though we were not in 
danger of foreign attack. 

Our republic is but 127 years old. Yet it has 
been necessary to employ our regular army one 
hundred different times to put down rebellion, in- 
surrection and riots and to repel foreign invasion. 
Our trained army must be composed of the best- 
trained bodies and the best-trained minds of 
America. It should be an honour to qualify for it. 
No mother wants to rear a son to be a soldier and 
a cad; but every mother should be proud to rear a 
son to be a soldier and a man — able to protect her 
and his sisters if attacked! 

"All we want is peace; and toward this end we 
wish to be able to secure the same respect for our 
rights from others which we are eager and anxious 
to extend to their rights in return, to insure fair 
treatment to us commercially, and to guarantee the 
safety of the American people." ^ 

And there is still need for armed protection, and 
there will be for many a generation. 

Historians tell us that if we patch together the 
days and hours during which no nation has been at 
war with any other nation, we will find that this 
earth of ours in the last three thousand years has 
had just two hundred three years of peace and 
2,797 years of war. 

Neither is to-day a time of peace; as one may 
note by glancing at Hayti, Mexico, Japan, Great 



WILSON'S BRYANIZED ARMY PLAN 397 

Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Austria-Hungary, 
Turkey, Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, Belgium, 
India, Canada, Australia and half of Africa — in all 
of which eight hundred millions of people live, di- 
rectly or indirectly, affected by war. 

Moreover, universal peace will not be ushered in 
by July, 1917. 

We should have an army equal in size, at least, 
to that of Paraguay, Uruguay, Peru or Liberia. 
In this enormous country of ours, with its popula- 
tion of 100,000,000, even the pacifists should not 
oppose a regular army of five hundred thousand 
men. Even an army of that size would be but 
twice as large as that of Holland, whose territory 
is the size of Maryland only, and a little larger than 
the standing and reserve army of Switzerland 
which is about half the size of Maine. 

Neither little Plolland, with one of the best- 
trained small armies in Europe, nor Switzerland 
where every school boy is compelled to take mili- 
tary training and every man of military age is an 
active member of the reserve, have been made mili- 
taristic and bloodthirsty, even by generations of 
military training. 

"In this country there is not the slightest danger 
of an over-development of the warlike spirit, and 
there never has been any such danger. In all our 
history there has never been a time when prepared- 
ness for war was any menace to peace," ^ 



398 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

Sane military preparation does not, has not and 
will not lead to militarism. It is not the training 
that gives a nation war lust; it is false ambition, 
national conceit and the spirit of conquest — thriv- 
ing on an international scale — that degrades a 
people. 

There are plans of defence and plans of defence. 

There are plans of defence which aim to benefit 
all the people by protecting all their resources. 

There are plans of defence which aim to benefit 
a few people by pork-barrelling appropriations. 

And there are plans of defence which aim to 
benefit the government by leading the people to be- 
lieve that they are to have that which they demand. 

"Congress is going to be made the recipient of a 
military recommendation, not such as it should re- 
ceive, but such as it is deemed likely Congress will 
feel like adopting. 

"Based upon the number of troops which the dif- 
ferent great powers can land on our shores in the 
event we lose control of the sea, we should have a 
regular army, or troops of the first line of a certain 
strength. This strength has been determined by 
the War College, and this is the programme that 
the Secretary should submit to Congress and let 
Congress take the responsibility of either providing 
for it or refusing to do so. Instead of this he has 
to formulate a policy which is intended to cover up 



WILSON'S BRYANIZED ARMY PLAN 399 

the deficiencies of Congress. It is a political re- 
port, not a military report." ® 

QUOTATION REFERENCES 

^ Page 386. From speech of Colonel Theodore Roose- 
velt, delivered in Chicago sixteen years ago. 

2 Page 388. Colonel H. O. S. Heistand, Adjutant-Cen- 
tral, U. S. Army. 

^ Page 394 ; * page 395. Colonel William C. Church, mem- 
ber Army Committee of the National Security League, and 
editor Army and Navy Journal. 

^ Page 395. Report of interview with Thomas Edison. 

^ Page 396. From ex-President Roosevelt's message to 
Congress, December, 1901 — fifteen years ago. 

' Page 397. From address of Colonel Theodore Roose- 
velt, delivered eighteen years ago. 

^ Page 399. ( See note 3.) 



CHAPTER III 

BKlyGIUM AND BELGIUM 

THERE is a Belgium of Europe and there is a 
''Belgium" of the United States. 

The Belgium of Europe stood in relation to con- 
tinental Europe in 19 14 as the Belgium of the 
United States stands in relation to continental 
United States to-day. 

Perhaps no more vivid and concrete illustration 
of our unpreparedness can be presented than a com- 
parison of the forces which the Belgium of Europe 
had for defence in August, 1914, with those which 
the "Belgium" of the United States may have by 
July, 1917. 

The Belgium of the United States embraces the 
eastern third of Massachusetts, southern Rhode Is- 
land, southern and middle Connecticut, reaching up 
to and including Springfield, Mass., northern New 
Jersey. This ''Belgium" of the United States in- 
cludes the cities of Boston, Cambridge, Lowell, 
Providence, New York, Bridgeport, New London, 
Jersey City and Hoboken. 

There are many astounding, even amazing simi- 

400 



BELGIUM AND BELGIUM 401 

larities between the 19 14 Belgium of Europe and 
the present "Belgium" of the United States. 

First — The Belgium of Europe had the most 
representative government of any nation of Con- 
tinental Europe, not excepting Switzerland; we 
have the most representative government of the 
American continent. 

Second — The area of the Belgium of Europe is 
11,300 square miles; that of the "Belgium" of the 
United States, 10,900 square miles. 

Third — the population of European Belgium in 
1914 was 8,060,000; the population of our Ameri- 
can "Belgium" is 8,005,000. 

Fourth — The Belgium of Europe was the most 
densely populated portion of Continental Europe; 
our American "Belgium" is the most densely popu- 
lated portion of Continental America. 

Fifth — The per capita wealth of European Bel- 
gium was greater than that of any other country of 
Continental Europe. The per capita wealth of our 
American "Belgium" is greater than that of any 
other section of Continental America. 

Sixth — The countries — large producers of manu- 
factured and agricultural products, Germany espe- 
cially — bordering upon and beyond the Belgium of 
Europe — depended upon Antwerp for the exporta- 
tion of their goods; the states of the United States 
— large producers of manufactured and agricul- 
tural products — bordering upon and beyond our 



402 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

THE BELGIUM OF EUROPE AND THE BELGIUM OF 
THE UNITED STATES 

A. The Belgium of Europe had in 1914 a population of 8,060,000. 
The Belgium of the United States has a population of 8,050,000. 

B. The Belgium of the United States embraces the eastern third 
of Massachusetts, southern Rhode Island, southern and middle 
Connecticut, reaching up to and including Springfield, Mass., north- 
ern New Jersey. This Belgium of the United States includes the 
cities of Boston, Cambridge, Lowell, Providence, New York, 
Bridgeport, New London, Jersey City and Hoboken. 

C. In 1914, Belgium, to protect herself against invasion, had an 
army totalling 371,000 — 40 per cent, trained men and 60 per cent, 
partially trained men. 

In 1917, we may have 308,000 men — 17 per cent, trained, 83 per cent, 
untrained — if every man proposed by Former Secretary Garrison's 
plan enlists and trains; and Mr. Garrison's plan provides for more 
men than either the Qiamberlain Senate Bill or the Hay House Bill. 



BELGIUM AND BELGIUM 



403 



Belgium 0/ Europe 
and 

Belgium of The Unfted States 



C. 



'■PojiuJatjoii'' 



~Area6 
-Armies^ 



404 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

American ''Belgium" — depend upon New York as a 
port of export. 

Seventh — ^Just beyond the Belgium of Europe, 
were the greatest steel works of Europe; just be- 
yond the borders of the "Belgium" of the United 
States — in Pennsylvania — are the greatest steel 
works of America. 

Eighth — In the Belgium of Europe — in Ghent 
and others cities — were located the greatest cotton 
and spinning factories of Continental Europe; in 
the ''Belgium" of the United States — in eastern 
Massachusetts — are located the greatest cotton and 
weaving factories of Continental United States. 

Ninth — Antwerp was the biggest near-Atlantic 
port of Continental Europe; New York is the big- 
gest Atlantic port of Continental America. 

There is no need to rehearse what happened to 
Belgium in 22 days in 19 14. What did happen, 
however, has made us think. It started a campaign 
for adequate defence which has in one year secured 
the general approval of our citizens. This approval 
has become so widespread and so strong that Presi- 
dent Wilson and Secretary Daniels have been forced 
to absolutely reverse their positions of twelve 
months ago. 

We now wish to know what adequate defence 
means. We now wish to know what would prob- 
ably happen if an attack, similar to that launched 
against the Belgium of Europe in 1914, should be 



BELGIUM AND BELGIUM 405 

made upon our American "Belgium," to-day, or a 
year or two hence, say in 1917 or 1918. We now 
wish to determine whether or not the plans pro- 
posed by Secretary Daniels and former Secretary 
Garrison will adequately protect our "Belgium" by 
1917 — provided, each and every recommendation of 
Secretary Daniels and former Secretary Garrison 
shoidd be at once adopted by Congress — provided 
each and every recommendation should be carried 
out with amazing quickness. Although Secretary 
Garrison has resigned, his plan is considered be- 
cause, without doubt, it is stronger than any plan 
which will be approved by the present Congress. 

The invasion, defence, and devastation of Bel- 
gium of Europe are facts. By this comparison, we 
will have as a basis of judgment, the facts of that 
which did occur — not the supposition of that which 
might have occurred. 

Compare the forces Belgium had in 1914 to de- 
fend her area and population with the forces we 
may have in 19 17 — if all our proposed plans carry — 
to defend an equal area and an equal population. 

Compare the number of trained and partially 
trained soldiers Belgium had with the number of 
trained and partially trained soldiers we may have 
by 1917. 

Compare the preparation of Belgian forces with 
the preparation of our forces. 

Compare the areas from which the Belgian forces 



406 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

had to be mobilised with the areas from which our 
forces will have to be mobilised. 

Compare the greatest distance Belgian soldiers 
had to be transported to the distances our soldiers 
will have to be transported. 

Compare the efficiency and quickness of the mo- 
bilisation of the forces that defended Belgium, with 
our last three efforts at mobilisation. 

Then ask: if, to defend an equal area with an 
equal population, we will have by July, 19 17, even 
if all our hopes as to proposed plans should come 
true, a chance of victory against an invading army 
similar to that which invaded Belgium. 

This is the only concrete practical way of deter- 
mining whether or not the plans of former Secre- 
tary Garrison and Secretary Daniels will give us 
adequate protection even if carried out to the letter 
with amazing celerity. 

First, as to the size of armies: Belgium had a 
regular and reserve army and a Guarde Civique, 
the soldiers of which had had about the same train- 
ing as that which our National Guard has had. In 
addition, however, Belgium had the aid of at least 
45,000 English soldiers. These totalled 371,000 
men. 

As comparisons are here made between the forces 
Belgium had in 1914 and those we hope to have 
within the next fifteen months and as neither the 
Chamberlain Bill nor the Hay Bill provides for as 



BELGIUM AND BELGIUM 407 

many men as does the plan of former Secretary- 
Garrison, we shall, with a certainty, overestimate 
— by employing as a basis of comparison the num- 
ber of men former Secretary Garrison hoped to 
enrol — rather than underestimate the forces we 
miay have by July ist, 19 17. 

If the full number of men asked for for the reg- 
ular army immediately enlist, if the 9,000 extra 
militia at once enrol as members of the National 
Guard, if in the next four months 133,000 men en- 
list to form the Continental Army so as to have two 
months' training during the present summer — if 
all this is accomplished without a hitch, we shall be 
able to muster by July, 19 17, an aggregate force of 
308,000 — provided, of course, that every man of 
our regular army, every man in our reserve army, 
every member of the state militia, every volunteer 
of the Continental Army answers the call. If all 
these conditions are met, we shall have, by July i, 
19 1 7, an army which in numbers alone will be 83% 
of the army Belgium had for its defence in 1914. 

We must remember, however, that of our pro- 
posed ten regiments of infantry — 20,000 men — only 
seven are to be kept in the United States and that 
these seven are to he formed on a peace basis, which 
means but 820 men in each company. Consequently 
the 20,000 men, so far as the defence of Continental 
United States is concerned, dwindles to 5,740. The 
figure 308,942 men is based upon the supposition 



408 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

that not a single man will be lost out of our present 
mobile army of 36,787 men, that every one of the 
5,740 men called for by Mr. Garrison for the United 
States will enlist, that every one of the 4,800 men 
called for by the plan for the field artillery will not 
only enlist but will enlist in time to be trained by 
July I, 19 1 7, that every man now in the militia of 
the states will answer the call of the United States, 
that the 9,000 additional militia asked for will en- 
list, that the 133,00c called for by the Continental 
Army plan will not only have enlisted but will also 
have had two months' training this present sum- 
mer. 

Second, as to the training of the soldiers: Of 
Belgium's army of 371,000 men, 96,000 were trained 
Belgian soldiers, and 45 ,000 were trained English 
soldiers, many of whom had seen active service in 
South Africa and other parts of the British Em- 
pire — in all 151,000 trained equipped men. The 
balance of 230^000 were partially trained. By July 
I, 19 1 7, if every factor of Mr. Garrison's plans 
should be worked out perfectly, we would have in the 
mobile army in the United States but 45,33^ trained 
men, in the reserve army perhaps 24 men, a total of 
only 45,362 trained men. The balance would be 
composed of our militia, 50 per cent, of whom have 
never qualified as second-class marksmen, and of 
the Continental Army the members of which will 
have had but two months' training. 



BELGIUM AND BELGIUM 409 

Belgium, to defend herself in 1914, had 371,000 
men — 40 per cent, trained and 60 per cent, partially 
trained men. We, to defend our American ''Bel- 
gium," may have an army of 308,000 men — 17 per 
cent, trained and 83 per cent, partially trained men. 

Third, as to aids and equipment: Belgium of Eu- 
rope had, to aid her army in holding its battle lines, 
the greatest forts in the world. The forts about 
Liege, Namur and Antwerp were large, new, strong 
forts. They were extraordinarily strong, built 
in the three years previous to the war. Military 
experts of all countries, excepting Germany and 
Austria, had asserted that they could never be 
taken. The Belgian regular army was in fine con- 
dition. It was well supplied with ammunition. It 
was fully equipped with armoured cars, armoured 
automobiles, transport and ammunition trains. Its 
infantry was well equipped with tripod-machine 
guns, with bicycle machine guns, and with machine 
guns drawn by dogs. Its signal corps was in ex- 
cellent condition. 

Some Americans assume that Belgium was un- 
prepared. Belgium was well prepared. She had 
been preparing for three years. She had been pre- 
paring ever since the Kaiser and the Kaiserine paid 
that official visit to Belgium, during which occurred 
that memorable after-dinner scene in King Albert's 
private study. The Kaiser and King Albert were 
alone; and the Kaiser, absorbed in the study of a 



410 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

new relief map of Belgium, unconsciously allowed 
his hand to trace the line of march from the Ger- 
man border down over the Belgian valleys into 
France. This caused King Albert to build the new 
forts, equip the Belgian army anew, and provide a 
large reserve of ammunition. 

We on the other hand have no armoured trains, 
no sufficient transportation system, and practically 
no reserve ammunition. Our army is lacking in 
large guns. We have not a sufficient number of 
machine guns, even for 34,000 men — our present 
mobile force in the United States. We have no 
bicycle machine guns, no dogs trained to take ma- 
chine guns quickly from one point of a battle line to 
another — trained to lie down quietly during fire. 
We have no armoured automobiles. In fact, our 
equipment lacks in every factor. And, if we do 
not do more than former Secretary Garrison recom- 
mended to remedy our present deficiences — it will 
be three or four years before our present army is 
equipped with even the minimum number of guns it 
should have. 

Fourth, as to mobilisation areas: Belgium's 
entire army was resident on the 11,300 square 
miles of Belgium; the English army began land- 
ing within three days after the invasion and 
within eleven days 45,000 English soldiers had 
landed. Our army is and will be scattered over a 
territory of 3,027,000 square miles. Because of 



BELGIUM AND BELGIUM 411 



MoDiiizaHon Areas 



A . United <5tate6 3.027000 ^^. m/jei^ 



B\BeJ^fU'm ii,^00 ^qm/le^ 



A. Our prospective army of 308,000 (under the proposed Garrison 
plan) will be distributed over area A. 

B. Belgium's army — regulars, reserves and Guarde Civique — were 
all concentrated on area B. 



412 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

this our mobilisation problem is vastly different 
from that which Belgium had to face. 

Fifth, as to mobilisation distances: It was 
necessary to transport 90% of the soldiers of the 
Belgian army less than 75 miles to perfect their 
mobilisation. No Belgian soldier was moved more 
than 130 miles. To protect the same amount of 
territory and the same number of people, our sol- 
diers from the west would have to be transported 
three thousand miles, even those of Texas would 
have to be transported at least 1,900 miles. 

Sixth, as to time and efficiency of mobilisation: 
Belgium mobilised her standing army in 72 hours. 
The English soldiers that fought in Belgium 
against the German invasion — not those that 
fought later in France — were all on Belgian soil 
within eleven days. 

It is worth while noting from our past experience 
just how inefficient we have been in mobilising less 
than 13,000 men of our regular army, whose only 
duty in peace times is to keep in training and to 
remain at the army posts ready for mobilisation. 
These experiences will indicate what difficulty we 
would meet in mobilising 300,000 men. 

The war with Spain was not an imexpected war. 
Two years before, in 1896, the Congress and the 
Senate had requested Spain to recognise the inde- 
pendence of Cuba. It was two years later that the 
Maine was sunk. Nearly a month more passed be- 



BFXGIUM AND BELGIUM 



413 



MobiUiation Distances 



Belgium: 

ISttaUtu* 

United States: 




Belgium: Belgium mobilised her regulars and reserves in seventy- 
two hours. No soldier was moved a greater distance than 130 
miles. 

United States: Our best military authorities state that it would 
take nine months to mobilise the prospective half-trained army of 
Secretary Garrison's plan. 

Our experiences in mobilisation show this to be a very conserva- 
tive estimate. 

Major-General Wood, who is a most energetic officer in securing 
quick action, estimates that it would take thirty days even to 
mobilise our little continental mobile army of 34.000 men. 



414 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

fore Congress took action. Therefore there had 
been plenty of time for preparation. 

On March ii, 1898, the War Department began 
its mobihsation for an invasion of Cuba. Yet it 
took us 102 days to land but 16,800 officers and men 
in Cuba; and the transports crowded to full ca- 
pacity — men sleeping on decks, packed in any- 
where — were compelled to leave ten thousand more 
men behind at Tampa because the War Department 
in three and a half months, after two years' warn- 
ing, was unable to provide enough ships to carry 
more than 16,000 men from Florida to Cuba. 

Moreover, it was two weeks more before our 
War Department could get enough food from 
Florida to Cuba to supply our men for three days 
in advance. Even then the quality of the food was 
so bad that hundreds died from eating it. 

The War Department was not able to mobilise 
a single full regiment in Cuba. At San Juan the 
regiments averaged 566 men each, though each 
regiment should have had 1,272 men. With two 
years' warning and three months' preparation the 
War Department was able to provide each regi- 
ment at San Juan with but 44% of the men they 
should have had. 

Compare this with Germany's invasion of Bel- 
gium or with Japan's landing in Chemulpo Bay in 
February, 1904. The tide at Chemulpo Bay rises 
and falls 30 feet. Four times a day the waters 



BELGIUM AND BELGIUM 415 

rush in and out like a mill race. At low tide there 
are mud flats for miles around. 

The Japanese landing was at the beginning of 
the Russo-Japanese War. Its success was not the 
result of having learned by previous failures. The 
Japanese accomplished the entire landing in a few 
days. 

First, they sent over corps of carpenters 
and corps of blacksmiths. The blacksmiths 
set up their forges near the landing place. The 
carpenters built cleated wooden roadways to cover 
the mud at low tide and to float on the water at 
high tide. The wooden roadways were covered 
with rice bags to deaden the noise of landing. 

After this the medical corps landed. Then the 
horses, being let down from the sides of the boats 
in slings, were put ashore at a minimum rate of one 
per minute, many at the rate of two per minute. 

Under the most extraordinary conditions with 
water rushing in and out in a torrent, the Japa- 
nese in a few days landed 20,000 men, 2,500 horses 
and 200,000,000 pounds of food and military 
stores. 

On March 6, 191 1, the Secretary of War under 
President Taft, ordered the mobilisation of a 
manoeuvre division at the Texas border. This 
manoeuvre division should have had at its full 
strength, 1^,200 men. After 86 days of effort, the 
War Department was finally able to get together 



416 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

just i2,8op men. That was the largest number of 
men the manceuvre division ever attained. 

Again in 1913, orders were issued from the War 
Department on February 21st and February 24th 
for the mobilisation on the Texas border of the 
Second Division under Major-General Carter. 
This division should have had at its full strength 
22,^6^ men. After 126 days, the War Department 
was finally able to get 11,28/ men together. This 
was only 52% of the number the division should 
have had. And during this mobilisation, 3.4 men 
out of every hundred deserted, were court-mar- 
tialled or were discharged without honour. What 
a glorious feat for a nation of a hundred million 
people — unable to mobilise more than 11,28/ men 
in 126 days out of a division that should have had 
22,565 men! Moreover, this division brought with 
it no proper supply trains, no proper ammunition 
trains; it was short three companies of engineers; 
it was short one full regiment of field artillery; it 
was short field hospitals; it lacked a field signal 
corps ; it lacked ambulance companies ! 

And again on April 23, 1914, the War Depart- 
ment under President Wilson ordered General 
Funston to sail from Galveston — to take four in- 
fantry regiments to the coast of Mexico. These 
four regiments should have had 7,956 officers and 
men. They actually had 2,830 — only 36% of what 
they should have had. And a large portion of 



BELGIUM AND BELGIUM 



417 



Proleclion to Lands and Ottnens 
Beljjium and U.S.A. 



c 

D. 



Bel^jum 




Belgium 





A. -Belgium: U82 ^olcf/ers jierfoooo ftopzilation 
B.-Bel^ium :su/5tyoldieriS p^r too square inile^ 
C' USA : zf<yoJc//er<s- /lenoooo/iopu/ation 
DrUfS.A : w isoldj'ens fier /oo<sguaremiIe<s 

To protect each million population in 1914, Belgium had 1454 per 
cent, more soldiers than we might have under Garrison's plan to 
protect each million of our population. 
What happened to Belgium is a fact. 
There is no supposition about it. 

Belgium was over-run in twenty-two days by a force not greater 
in number than that which could easily be transported to th« 
shores of the United States in twelve days. 



418 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

General Funston's original command as well as 
the artillery, cavalry and transportation service 
was necessarily left behind at Galveston because 
there were not sufficient transports. 

Major-General Wood, commander of the Di- 
vision of the East, has definitely stated that it 
would take thirty days to mobilise our standing 
mobile army of 34,000 men. How many months 
would it take to mobilise the 308,000 regulars, 
militia and raw continental troops from all por- 
tions of the United States? 

Belgium had an army of 371,000 men to protect 
her 11,000 square miles of territory. She had 
3,415 soldiers to protect every hundred square 
miles. Our army, even if Mr. Garrison's plans 
should be realised, would furnish us but 10 soldiers 
per hundred square miles. 

Belgium had 371,000 soldiers to protect 8,060,000 
people — 482 soldiers to each ten thousand of the 
population ; the army Mr. Garrison hoped to have in 
19 1 7 would give us but 31 soldiers to each ten thou- 
sand people. 

Belgium had in 1914 an army of 120% of what 
Mr. Garrison hoped to have in 191 7. Her propor- 
tion of trained soldiers was 235% of what he hoped 
we would have. Her army was better equipped than 
ours will be in 191 7. Her soldiers were mobilised 
from an area of but 11,000 square miles; ours will 
have to be mobilised from an area of three million 



BELGIUM AND BELGIUM 419 

square miles; we will have to move many of our 
soldiers from 1,000 to 3,000 miles. Belgium mobi- 
lised her standing army in 72 hours ; the two partial 
mobilisations which we have attempted in the last 
five years have required 86 days to get 12,000 men 
together and 126 days to mobilise 11,000. 

What happened to Belgium? 

In 22 days, ^50,000 Germans over-ran three- 
fourths of all Belgium. Many thousands more, 
during that time and after that time, marched 
across Belgium to fight in France, but the number 
that over-ran Belgium was never more than 350,- 
000. They were victorious because they were bet- 
ter trained, better equipped, better organised, bet- 
ter supplied — not because they were braver or more 
heroic than the Belgians. They subdued in 22 days 
a territory nearly the size of the "Belgium" of 
America, subdued and levied indemnities upon a 
population equal to the population of the cities of 
New York, Boston, Providence, New London, 
Bridgeport, and Jersey City and all the country dis- 
tricts of the eastern third of Massachusetts, south- 
ern Rhode Island, southern Connecticut and north- 
ern New Jersey. 

Since Belgium in Europe, defended by an army 
concentrated on 11,000 square miles of territory 
— practically on the field of battle — was over-run in 
22 days, could we, with an army less in size, with 
an army having a greater proportion of raw 



420 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

troops, with an army scattered over forty-eight 
different states, over 3,000,000 square miles of 
territory, with an army many regiments of which 
would be 1,000, 1,200 and 3,000 miles distant from 
the land and people they would be called upon to 
protect, with an army only partially equipped with 
guns and ammunition — expect success where Bel- 
gium failed — expect victory so long as the present 
inefficient organisation of our army is maintained? 

But would a foreign nation desiring to attack 
the Atlantic coast of the United States direct its 
forces against the ''Belgium" of America? 

Undoubtedly they would attack where — on the 
smallest area possible — they could quickly seize our 
largest ammunition plants, strike at our greatest 
cities, levy the greatest indemnities, subject to mili- 
tary control our greatest financial institutions, and 
subdue the greatest proportion of the population. 
They would land their armies in the "Belgium" of 
the United States and their navies would threaten to 
bombard Boston, New York and Philadelphia un- 
less indemnities were immediately paid. To choose 
instead the beaches of Florida, or North Carolina, 
or the shores of Maine would be idiocy. 

But could not the United States navy prevent 
such invasion? 

Many of our military authorities and many of 
our naval authorities, those actually knowing what 
the navy can do, have stated that the navy in its 



BELGIUM AND BELGIUM 421 

present condition would be unable to prevent inva- 
sion. Moreover, the report of Admiral Fletcher, 
commander of the Atlantic fleet, just submitted to 
the Senate, so emphatically points out the inability 
of our navy to protect our Atlantic coast, that the 
Senate of the United States hesitated to allow it to 
be printed as a public document. 

In its present deteriorated condition our navy — 
with its lack of men, lack of sufficient ammunition 
supply, lack of sufficient ammunition-ships ; lack of 
fuel-ships, lack of aeroplanes, lack of fast scouts — 
could not meet the naval forces of any one of the 
great naval powers of Europe. 

We have now 21 ships of the first and second 
line in service. We have 12 more of these ships 
but they are "out of commission," or **in repair," 
or *'in ordinary." Of these 21 ships 10 are of the 
first line and 11 of the second line. Two of the 
first-line ships are so old as fighting machines that 
they are to be transferred to the second line some 
time in March. By May, 1917, six others will be 
more than 12 years old, the age at which foreign 
nations consider a battleship almost useless as a 
fighting machine; three additional ships will be ii 
years old. The ships already authorised and al- 
ready under construction are not sufficient in num- 
ber to replace these. This is due to the failure of 
Congress during the past few years to maintain the 
1903 programme. Consequently we shall be in 



422 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

worse condition by May, 19 17, than we are at pres- 
ent, unless something extraordinary is done. 

But how about the ships Secretary Daniels has 
recommended? Even if these are voted immedi- 
ately, it is very probable that their keels will not 
even be laid by July i, 191 7. The fact is that the 
keels of most of our battleships are not laid until 
eighteen months or two years after they are voted. 
The Nevada and Oklahoma, voted five years ago, 
are not yet in service. Not one of the ships which 
Secretary Daniels recommends will be finished be- 
fore 1920 or 192 1, unless extraordinary haste is 
made. Hence, because of the voting programme 
of Secretary Daniels and the few ships already 
authorised to take the place of those that will 
year by year lose their fighting value, our navy will 
remain in its present weakened condition until 1920 
at the earliest. 

Furthermore, the action of Secretary Daniels 
in reducing the amount of the recommendation 
of the General Board for ammunition and avia- 
tion will compel our ships to enter a contest, if the 
case should arise, without eyes and without suf- 
ficient shells with which to fight. Hence the 
coast-line of our American "Belgium" will be open 
to an invasion just as the border line of the Belgium 
of Europe was open to invasion in 1914. 

Neither the naval programme of Secretary Dan- 
iels nor the army programme of former Secretary 



BELGIUM AND BELGIUM 423 

Garrison nor the provisions of the Chamberlin Bill 
or the Hay Bill will provide adequate defence either 
in 1917 or 1918 even if carried out to the letter and 
with astounding quickness. 



PART SEVEN: WHAT EACH CITIZEN 

CAN DO 



PART SEVEN: WHAT EACH CITIZEN 
CAN DO 

CHAPTER I 

AS TO EXPERTS 

THE American citizen is not a technical expert 
in army and navy matters; he does not pre- 
tend to be. He has not and will not presume to 
give advice to men who have been trained for 
twenty years in naval construction and in army 
and navy organisation and management. 

But the American citizen has common sense — a 
goodly amount of it — and the revelations of the 
last year are making him realise that we ought to 
have at the head of our army and navy, men who 
have had years of experience in army and navy af- 
fairs, — men thoroughly, practically and technically 
trained in those lines. 

Moreover, the American citizen now knows that 
billions have been wasted and that millions are be- 
ing wasted every month; that innumerable blun- 
ders have been made in the past and that pro- 
posals, which would result in still worse blunders 
if carried out, are now submitted to Congress; that 

427 



428 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

there has been and is lack of organisation, lack of a 
sensible system of promotion, lack of officers, lack 
of men, lack of equipment, lack of ammunition in 
both the army and in the navy ; that there has been 
flagrant negligence, in fact criminal negligence; 
and the American citizen is now determined to 
remedy these things. 

Primarily they have been due to the indifference 
of the citizens of the United States as a whole, 
but that indifference is passing! Secondly, they 
have been due to pork-barrelling in Congress; and 
thirdly, to the appointment of politicians ignorant 
of the needs of the army and navy as the heads of 
those departments. 

Political secretaries may plead that they have 
urged over and over again certain recommenda- 
tions to Congress and that Congress has again and 
again turned a deaf ear. But why? Because of 
the indifference of the people; and, more than all 
else, because the men as heads of the Army and 
Navy Departments, the Secretaries of the Navy 
and the Secretaries of War, have not been well 
enough acquainted with their work to make a 
popular fight for that which they recommended. 

Just as in England in times of peace, one sen- 
tence from Lord Kitchener aroused the English 
people more than all the appeals of politicians; so 
in America a vigourous presentation of the needs 
of the navy by an admiral as Secretary of the Navy 



AS TO EXPERTS 429 

and a strong presentation of the needs of the army 
by a major-general as Secretary of War would have 
done much in the past and would now do much to 
arouse the people. 

If, in the past, their recommendations had been 
ridiculed by indifferent men or sugar-coated by 
*'pork-barrelling" Congressmen and Senators, their 
long acquaintance with vital facts and their decades 
of experience would have made it possible for them 
to speak to the people with such concreteness and 
authority that the people would not have remained 
indifferent and Congress would not have dared to 
"pork-barrel." 

Let us look at the business side of it. We are a 
hundred millions of people. We own more than 
three and a half million square miles of the richest 
land on the globe. Our wealth is a hundred and 
eighty billions of dollars — a hundred eighty thou- 
sand millions. 

Our army and navy exists for the purpose of 
protecting the honour and lives of these hundred 
million people; they exist for the purpose of pro- 
tecting three and a half million square miles; they 
exist for the purpose of protecting one hundred 
eighty billion dollars of wealth. Never was wealth 
so undefended; and never in the history of the 
world have other nations been so perfectly armed 
and in such great need of levying foreign indemni- 
ties. 



430 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

As managers, then, of the army and navy, the 
Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy 
have a more monumental task before them than 
any other two men in the world. It is their duty 
to see to it that the army and navy efficiently pro- 
tect our people, our lands, our wealth. 

The army and navy are specialised organisations. 
The mass of people know very little about their 
methods of operation, their direction, their equip- 
ment, or their needs. Therefore they require 
specially trained men to direct them. 

There is being established in the United States at 
the present time a new industry, the dye industry. 
It is also a specialty in commerce. The mass of 
people know very little about the chemistry of these 
dyes nor about choosing men as chemists. Would 
you, if you were about to invest a hundred thou- 
sand dollars in one of these industries, choose a 
man whose sole qualification was his ability to 
write good "editorial stuff" or good fiction, or his 
ability to secure a certain number of votes in a cer- 
tain ward or district, or his ability to write good 
law briefs or to plead well in court, or his ability to 
orate passionately for temperance reform? All 
these qualifications might efficiently fit a man to 
follow any one of the respective professions, as 
newspaper editor, ward politician, lawyer, or tem- 
perance orator; but those qualifications in them- 
selves would not in any way guarantee that the 



I 



AS TO EXPERTS 431 

man would be a good chemist or a good executive 
to handle your dye-manufacturing plant. 

If, then, you would not place such a man, recom- 
mended solely by such qualifications, at the head of 
a business in which you are about to invest a hun- 
dred thousand dollars, why should we, American 
citizens, permit such a man to be placed at the head 
of our army or navy, the most technical and ex- 
ecutive departments of our government? Upon 
them rest the safety of one hundred million people, 
the security of our home lands, and the security 
of a hundred eighty billion dollars wealth. 

It has often been argued that it is possible for a 
great statesman to become a good Secretary of the 
Navy or an efficient Secretary of War. Argument 
is of little value, because the nature of the two types 
of men and the nature of the service required is 
absolutely different. 

The armies and navies of the present day are 
half machinery and half men, and the machines are 
the most complicated in the world. A man to effi- 
ciently understand and direct the entire naval pol- 
icy, naval construction, and navy organisation of 
a country should be both an expert engineer and 
a man capable of handling men in action. The 
same applies to the organisation and direction of 
the army, the construction of fortifications, the 
selection and manufacture of guns and explosives. 
A great statesman is an administrator — not an 



432 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

engineer, tactician, or general. No politician, how- 
ever great, is able to handle these matters effi- 
ciently unless he is also an expert engineer, a 
tactician of experience, and a general by nature 
and training. 

Probably no greater statesman existed than 
Abraham Lincoln. During the first two years of 
the Civil War practically all of our military opera- 
tions were directed by Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Stan- 
ton, and the Confederate forces were on the whole 
successful. Referring to his direction of the mili- 
tary. President Lincoln is reported by General 
Grant to have stated that "he did know that many 
of his military orders were wrong, and that per- 
haps all of them were wrong." It was not until 
President Lincoln put the military entirely in the 
hands of General Grant to be handled exactly as 
General Grant pleased, that the North succeeded in 
winning battle after battle and in bringing the 
war to a successful close. 

"If Abraham Lincoln, great genius that he was, 
proved himself incompetent to direct armies in 
warfare, what would happen to us in case of con- 
flict if our defences had to be organised by the 
petty politicians of to-day?" ^ 

It is time we recognised that a shoemaker should 
be employed to make shoes, a butcher to cut meat, 
a temperance reformer to conduct temperance meet- 
ings, a journalist to write and talk for publicity; 



AS TO EXPERTS 433 

but that a naval authority should be appointed 
Secretary of the Navy and a war authority Secre- 
tary of War ! 

In the past there has been inefficiency, lack of 
organisation, blundering and negligence. Would 
such inefficiency, such waste, such blundering, such 
neglect long continue if Admiral Fiske, Admiral 
Fletcher, Admiral Badger, Admiral Benson, or Ad- 
miral Dewey were Secretary of the Navy for any 
length of time? Would all our useless, wasteful 
army posts — obstacles to the rapid mobilisation of 
our army, and the present deficiency in guns and 
ammunition continue long to exist if General Bar- 
nett, General Funston or General Leonard Wood 
were Secretary of War? 

England is learning her lesson; France has 
learned hers. The first Ministre de la Guerre dur- 
ing the present war was forced out of office by 
General Jofifre; the second one also. Now France 
has an army general as Ministre de la Guerre, and 
an admiral as Ministre de la Marine. 

We shall not lag behind if each citizen makes his 
demands for experts strong enough to make each 
Congressman realise that the vote of that individ- 
ual will be cast for or against him according to his 
Congressionl record on the subject. 

* Page 432. Eric Fisher Wood. 



CHAPTER II 

AS TO APPROPRIATIONS 

IF a blundering, ignorant nurse has carelessly- 
thrown out of the window the costly medicine 
which you have drained your pocketbook to buy 
for your sick child, do you smilingly free the nurse 
of all blame, rage about spending money on medi- 
cine and refuse to spend another cent to purchase 
more, even though you know that your sick 
child is in greater danger than ever before? Or 
do you rid yourself of the criminally negligent 
nurse, engage a trained one, and spend as much 
as you have already spent, even more if necessary, 
to save the life of your child? 

Adequate means for necessary protection must 
be provided, no matter what the cost — and pro- 
vided as soon as possible! No matter how great 
the waste has been in the past, the present danger 
is so great that we cannot wait "to be prepared by 
1928." 

Our danger is immediate. In 191 3 France 
thought her danger lay ten years in the future; 
England thought the same; Russia thought she 

434 



AS TO APPROPRIATIONS 435 

could finish her munition factories before the con- 
flict came. Leaders who attempted to disturb these 
sweet dreams were ridiculed. But England and 
France were awakened — and rudely too. 

The greatest national danger we have faced since 
the Civil War is not many years ahead. Few peo- 
ple at present believe this, any more than the peo- 
ple of France or England believed it two years 
ago. 

We must insist upon an appropriation not of 
four hundred million, but of a billion! A billion 
is a small sum, a very small sum, with which to im- 
mediately prepare ourselves so that no nation shall 
be tempted to attack us. 

The nations at war have spent this sum every 
two weeks since the war began. 

If our present Congress should appropriae one 
billion dollars for defence and authorise the issu- 
ing of this amount of twenty-year United States 
bonds, it would impose upon the people of the 
United States a debt (including interest) of only 
fifty-two cents per person each year for twenty 
years. 

The war in Europe is a little less than two years 
old, yet every person in England — man, woman 
and child — is already burdened with a per capita 
war debt of two hundred dollars. The war is not yet 
over. And this is but a portion of the burden 
thrown upon the English people! Already thou- 



436 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

sands of families have been ruined financially. 
England at first lost twenty per cent, of the men 
that went into battle ; five hundred thousand homes 
have been made desolate. 

A billion-dollar appropriation (fifty-two cents 
per capita for twenty years) to prevent being at- 
tacked by a foreign power is worth a hundred times 
that amount ! 

Are we so poor we cannot spend a billion dollars, 
the payment of which can be distributed over a pe- 
riod of twenty years? Because England and 
France refused to prepare they are now forced to 
spend this same sum every four weeks; and they 
are sufifering ruin, losing thousands of lives and 
bearing back to their firesides hundreds of thou- 
sands of maimed men. 

Let us vote a billion-dollar insurance upon our 
country. Of course it may not prevent us going 
to war, but it will at least save us from indemnity 
or devastation. And war may come. When you 
insure your house against fire, you know the insur- 
ance will not prevent fire ; but you know it will save 
the value of your house if there is a fire. 

Let each American urge an appropriation of a 
billion dollars. Let each American express his 
willingness to pay fifty-two cents a year ($10.40 in 
twenty years) to insure our safety against a pos- 
sible bombardment of our cities with the millions 
and millions of property, against the possibility of 



AS TO APPROPRIATIONS 437 

being forced to pay billions in indemnities, against 
the slaughter of a quarter million men! Why- 
should Americans gasp at the loss of a half dollar 
per year when the safety of a hundred million peo- 
ple and a hundred eighty billion dollars of wealth is 
at stake? 

But the duty of each American does not end in 
urging Congress to make a large appropriation. 
He must also awaken from his indifference and 
watch Congress carefully to see that the most es- 
sential needs are the ones for which provision is 
made. Every citizen of the United States must 
keep his eye on his Senator and his Representa- 
tive to see that there is no more sluicing to the 
"pork-barrel." 

And every citizen must let his Representative 
know that he is watching, patriotically watching. 



CHAPTER III 
AS TO citize:nship obligations 

THE military is the tool of the nation. It may 
be used to oppress and it may be used to 
graft; but it may also be used to protect and to 
liberate. 

The tool is neither good nor bad. It is the motive 
which animates its use and the method of using it 
that is right or wrong. 

A workman in the city light and power plant 
falls against a dynamo and is killed. Should the 
city government abolish the light and power plant 
and leave its citizens in darkness and without trans- 
portation ? 

A man goes mad — uses his razor to cut his 
throat. Should the city authorities brand all razors 
as evils and forbid all men ever shaving again? 

America persists in condemning militarism as an 
evil tool, although her military forces won her her 
independence; although her military forces freed 
the black man; although her military forces re- 
deemed Cuba! 

Militarism for conquest is based upon the prin- 

438 



AS TO CITIZENSHIP OBLIGATIONS 439 

pie that in the conquest of lands and wealth, a na- 
tion has the right to demand that all its men fight 
for the benefit of all its people. 

Militarism for protection is based upon the prin- 
ciple that a nation, because of the service it renders 
all its citizens has the right to demand in return 
the service of all of them for the purpose of pro- 
tecting its home lands, its citizens and its honour. 

These two forms of militarism differ widely in 
certain respects, yet both are based upon the ideal 
that the government, because of the good it renders 
all its people, has the right to demand the aid of all 
for the good of all. 

Militarism for politics is based upon the false as- 
sumption that the people of a nation are so un- 
patriotic that the protection of its home lands, its 
citizens and its honour must depend upon the 
special few who are altruistic enough to give their 
lives for their less courageous fellow citizens, or 
upon those who can be bribed by large bounties and 
by promises of pensions to serve their country. It 
is the worst form of class legislation. 

The American people have been too jealous of 
their individual freedom — and rightly so — to allow 
the United States ever to become subject to a mili- 
tary organisation existing for the purpose of con- 
quest. But in reacting against militarism for 
conquest, the people of the United States have be- 
come indifferent — reacted in the wrong direction 



440 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

— allowing a military system to develop for the 
financial benefit of the few, to the financial and 
moral detriment of the many. 

This system has been established under the plea 
that the citizen is free to volunteer or withhold 
his services from the government which protects 
him. Such a system implies that men who are 
not patriotic enough to volunteer their services to 
their government in exchange for the protection 
which their government gives them, can basely pay 
in money for the services of the others who are 
patriotic enough not only to give their services but 
their lives, if necessary. 

It is vicious: it sets up false ideals; it makes a 
people as a whole selfish, unpatriotic and cowardly ; 
it teaches them that they are not bound by duty to 
give anything except money in return for the pro- 
tection their government gives their lands, their 
property, their lives and their honour; it teaches 
the people of the nation that they may hire a 
special few for a few dollars in gold to protect 
them. In times of peace it is dishonest and waste- 
ful; in times of war it sacrifices the life of the 
manly, courageous patriot; while the coward, the 
sluggard and the polycule remain at home to per- 
petuate the race. 

It is based upon the idea that a gentleman should 
never protect a woman who is being insulted or 
assaulted unless a group of his fellows offer him 



AS TO CITIZENSHIP OBLIGATIONS 441 

a bounty or pension for doing so. It creates a 
false ideal of action for the man who is to protect 
the woman, in that it implies that it is not his duty 
to protect her unless his cowardly associates offer 
him a bounty. It creates a false ideal of inaction 
for his fellows in that it implies that they are re- 
leased of all gentlemanly duty to protect the woman 
because they offer a bounty or pension to one of 
their number to do that which each one of them, as 
a gentleman and as a man, ought honourably to do 
himself without thought of reward. 

In national life they who are chosen to protect 
the lives of the citizens of a nation come to demand 
larger and larger bounties and greater and greater 
pensions, while the mass of people cowardly agree 
to pay more and more so that it may be exempt 
from doing its duty. 

The only righteous military system is that which 
is based upon the ideal that all citizens owe a duty 
to their government in return for the protection 
which the government gives to all. 

Certainly Thomas Jefferson can never be ac- 
cused of leaning toward militarism. During the 
Revolutionary War and throughout his entire pub- 
lic career up to 1814, he was one of the most stren- 
uous advocates of citizen soldiery, but the experi- 
ence of the first two years of the War of 1812 so 
disgusted him with the voluntary system that he 
wrote to President Madison as follows: 



442 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

"It proves more forcibly the necessity of oblig- 
ing every citizen to be a soldier. This was the case 
with the Greeks and Romans, and must be that of 
every free state. Where there is no oppression 
there will be no pauper hirelings. We must train 
and classify the whole of our male citizens, and 
make military instruction a regular part of col- 
legiate education. We can never be safe till this is 
done.'* 

This is the only true ideal of national duty. 
This is militarism for protection — the service of 
all for the good of all. It is the system of Switzer- 
land and Australia. 

Let each American citizen urge its adoption ! 



CHAPTER IV 

AS TO NATIONAL FITNESS 

AS a nation, we have grown so rapidly, we have 
been so busy developing our resources and 
making money, we have been so revitalised year 
by year and generation by generation by the enor- 
mous influx of healthy peasant blood of Europe, 
that we have failed to appreciate the increasing 
physical unfitness of the mass of our citizens. 

We have drifted so completely to the "star sys- 
tem" of athletics, we have been so able to draw a 
few exceptional physical types from our hundred 
million people, that the great mass of American 
youths, enthusing in their worship of these selected 
athletic heroes, have gradually given up individual 
efifort to excel even in the common sports. 

We have specialised in physical fitness, encour- 
aging a system which produces a few men who 
have been able because of their natural physique 
to gain national fame in our sports and world re- 
nown in Olympic contests; but the masses of our 
people have gradually deteriorated. 

Those who seek to join either the army or the 

443 



444 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

navy are boys who have a stronger physique and a 
greater abundance of physical energy than those 
who do not apply. It is this superabundance of 
physical energy that urges them to seek the mili- 
tary life. The youth without a strong physique 
has no inclination even to make the attempt to 
enter the army or the navy. Applicants, then, are 
men who, in physical fitness, are far above the 
great mass of American youths. 

To be accepted a man must have good eyes, 
healthy lungs, a sound heart and good arms and 
legs. Yet out of the to-be-expected-fit youths im- 
pelled by their superabundance of energy and their 
love of physical action to make application to enter 
our regular army, from 70% to 90% are rejected 
because they are physically unfit to merely march, 
drill and learn to use a gun. Even out of the small 
number accepted, often 25 per cent, are discharged 
later because of physical inability to stand the 
marches and drill. 

The record of the Recruiting Bureau of the 
United States Marine Corps for the present year 
illustrates most vividly the physical unfitness of 
our men. It is astounding to learn that out of 
41,100 who made application to enlist during the 
year 1915, only 3,800 men were accepted — that the 
37,300 were rejected, not because they were not 
needed, hut because they were absolutely unfit. 
The record of the largest recruiting bureau, that of 



AS TO NATIONAL FITNESS 445 

New York, shows a still larger per centum of physi- 
cal unfitness. The application list of this bureau 
was 6ii% of the average of all other bureaus in 
the United States. Of the 11,012 who applied for 
enlistment, 10,696 were rejected. Even of the 316 
accepted, perhaps 25% or more will be discharged 
during the year because of inability to continue the 
physical training required. 

Our sociologists have been aware of the increas- 
ing effeminacy of the American man; but this has 
not become so apparent to the layman. The fact 
that our men, as a nation, have the best shoulders 
in the world has blinded us to our other physical 
weakness. Because of the bearing this shoulder 
gives us, we have not recognised that we are be- 
coming effeminate in other ways. The legs, the 
thighs, the hips and the back of the American is 
far below par — far below those of peasant women 
in foreign countries. The woman of the peasant 
and middle classes of Russia, Germany, Austria, 
Italy or France is able to swing along at a pace that, 
with the exception of a few of our star athletes, 
should put a blush of shame on the face of every 
American. 

There is ample cause for our self-deception. No 
matter where an American travels, he is recognised 
by the swing of his shoulders. Our shoulders are 
due to our national sport — baseball. No other na- 
tion has a national game — common to practically 



446 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

every boy and youth — that so efficiently develops 
the shoulders. Almost every American boy from 
nine years of age to manhood, every season and 
many months each season, plays some type of base- 
ball — if it is only pitching and catching. This has 
given the American race a shoulder stronger, freer 
in its action, more quick to respond to demand than 
that possessed by any other people. 

But as our youth are not compelled to take a 
system of training for all-round development of 
the body, we have degenerated in other ways. 

Physical degeneracy in a nation always begins 
to manifest in a decreasing strength of the stride 
of the man. One has only to watch the ankle walk- 
ing of most of our American men to realise that 
this degeneracy toward effeminacy has already be- 
gun. 

The Boy Scout Movement is offsetting this ten- 
dency toward effeminacy. The long marches — the 
necessity which compels the small boy to swing his 
leg so as to keep in step with the longer pace of the 
leader, is effecting a beneficial change, the value of 
which cannot be over-estimated. 

Much has been praised in the Boy Scout Move- 
ment — its ideal of honour and patriotism, its de- 
velopment of a love of nature, its awakening of a 
consciousness of comradeship and duty — but the 
one greatest good resulting from the Boy Scout 
Movement is the development of the thighs, the 



AS TO NATIONAL FITNESS 447 

strengthening of the muscles of the hips, and the 
consequent permanent habit of long vital, manly 
strides. 

But baseball and boy scout marching are not 
enough. We need universal training to bring about 
real national fitness. 

Incidentally it will prepare our men so that they 
will be able to defend our nation in case of war. 
War danger, however, is but periodic and tem- 
porary, while the greater danger, the danger that 
ever increases year by year — the danger of our na- 
tional unfitness, is always with us. 

To remedy this we need universal military train- 
ing- 
There is a vast difference between universal mili- 
tary service and universal military training. The 
French nation has universal military service, the 
Swiss have universal military training. 

The military service scheme takes the young man 
away from home, away from his studies, interrupt- 
ing his profession or his business for from one to 
three years. It aims to do by one dose after a man 
is twenty that which should have been done year 
by year during boyhood and youth. 

The universal military training scheme begins 
with the boy at ten years of age. It develops him 
physically, trains him to long marches, teaches him 
the topography of the country, imbues him with an 
ideal of comradeship and service at an early age. 



448 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

This is done without interrupting his schooling in 
any way. In fact it is done in connection with his 
schooling — a half hour a day in training — a half 
day a week in marching and excursions. As he 
grows older a few hours a week are given to train- 
ing him to shoot, to care for a gun, to know its 
mechanism, to be able to take it apart and put 
it together, to repair it if it is out of order. This 
goes on until he has finished the secondary school. 
Then as he nears manhood, being physically fit, he 
is required to take part in but two or three 
months' military manoeuvres. This teaches him to 
live hygienically with other men, to suppress in- 
dividualistic tendencies harmful to the group, to 
learn obedience, and above all to idealise democracy 
by the recognition of the good qualities of all the 
youths of a nation brought together on the same 
level. 

This results in unity of action; and unity of ac- 
tion is essentially necessary to the self-preservation 
of the group. If Harvard, or Yale, or Princeton, 
were able to choose an eleven of the best football 
players in America, no matter how efficient each 
individual of that team, it would make a very poor 
showing — if the men had never trained together — 
against a well-trained team composed of individ- 
uals each respectively less able than the men of 
the unorganised team. 

The one would be a tiny football mob of eleven 



AS TO NATIONAL FITNESS 449 

leaders, the other a football team under one leader- 
ship! 

Universal military training for every boy in the 
United States would remedy our physical unfitness, 
would inhibit the increasing tendency toward ef- 
feminacy, would teach our youths unity of action 
and obedience and would develop a deeper patriot- 
ism. 

Moreover, it would teach us democracy, real de- 
mocracy. Perhaps in no other country in the 
world, excepting only the distinction of class de- 
manded by the Prussian Junker, is there such sepa- 
ration of classes as in the United States. 

In principle we are the greatest democracy in the 
world; we have a great ideal of liberty, we have a 
great ideal of freedom, and a greater manifestation 
of these two qualities than any other people of any 
other nation. But our practice of equality is lu- 
dicrously hypocritical, compared to that of France. 

No greater benefit could come to our democracy 
than universal military training. Can any one es- 
timate the value of bringing together the farmer 
boy, the city boy, the village boy, and the sons of 
wealth, who have never in their lives done a single 
day's work — compelling each and all to share alike 
and to serve alike? 

At Plattsburg, Robert Bacon, Jr., son of a mem- 
ber of the firm of J. P. Morgan & Son, was ap- 
pointed to clean utensils and serve hash. It was 



450 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

his duty to wait upon his captain at the table and 
the captain happened to be a clerk of the firm of 
which his father was a member. But Robert 
Bacon, Jr., and a score of other Robert Bacon, Jrs. 
— hy their willing service — did more for true de- 
mocracy in that period than thousands of Fourth of 
July orations and scores of thousands of lectures 
by pacifists and advocates of volunteer citizen sol- 
diery teaching that we should be divided into two 
classes — those who are manly and courageous 
enough to serve us in time of struggle and those 
who are to be allowed to buy with their money the 
bodies of other citizens to serve in their stead. One 
is a process of making democracy, the other an as- 
sumption that the life of hero should be sacrificed 
to save the life of the coward. 

Each and every American citizen by demanding 
universal military training can make its adoption 
certain. Thus each citizen can aid in bringing 
about a change that will save our nation from its 
increasing physical tendency toward efifeminacy, 
from its increasing physical disability, from its in- 
creasing separation of the classes. Then America 
will realise a higher manhood, a greater unity of 
action, and a truer democracy. 



CHAPTER V 

AS TO THS IDEAL OF THE CHRIST 

WE need a true ideal of the Prince of Peace! 
Certain present-day prophets are teaching 
that "fast faith" is superior to "wisdom and truth;" 
that sentimentalism is more to be sought than vir- 
tue ; that foolishness is more noble than fitness ; that 
good intentions and weakness are more holy than 
righteousness and strength. 

These same prophets have utterly failed us in 
the past. For a decade before the great storm came 
they called to us from their intellectual heights, 
assuring us that the sky was clear ; that there never 
could be another storm. 

"There will be no war in the future. It has be- 
come impossible." ^ 

"It (European War) will never come. Hu- 
manly speaking, it is impossible." ^ 

Now that it has come they ask us to be gentle 
as doves and stupid as donkeys. 

This they hold up as the teaching of the Peace 
Christ. 

And worse still, they attempt to convince us that 

451 



452 AWAKE! U. S. A. 

the early martyrs who suffered to give an ideal to 
the world, taught what they are teaching. But why 
should we accept their interpretation? 

The interpretation is false; it is debasing! It 
strikes at the very root of our higher nature, at 
the very foundation of our Christian idealism. It 
embodies the essence of all that is lowest and basest 
in materialism ! 

Mr. Carnegie's advice to welcome conquest-mad 
soldiers with sweet smiles would lead to-day — just' 
as it did when Judea went out with incense and 
myrrh and gold to welcome the conquest-mad sol- 
diers of Alexander — to spoliation, debauchery, and 
rape. The nature of men crazed with conquest- 
lust has not changed with the centuries. The cry- 
ing of the women of Galicia suffering from the 
Russians, the moaning of the women of Poland 
suffering from the Austrians, the wailing of the 
women of Belgium suffering from the Germans are 
sufficient evidence. Soldiers of an invading host 
are not all high-minded officers. Men impelled by 
the ideal of conquest take what they want when 
able to do so! Sweet smiles and mild entreaty do 
not move them. The only safeguard is a cour- 
ageous manhood that knows its duty, and does it 
even though it encounter death in doing so. When 
did the Christ teach that it is best to save the body 
and stain the soul with cowardice and dishonour! 

There is no greater evidence of spiritual degen- 



AS TO THE IDEAL OF THE CHRIST 463 

eracy than a materialistic appeal that urges us to 
save the body and sacrifice the soul. Logically car- 
ried to its ultimate it teaches a woman to tamely 
submit to criminal assault; because — if she does 
not — the brute may scratch her face. 

The spiritual heroes of the world — Peter, Paul 
and the martyrs of their day — are lights to the soul 
of the race because they willingly sacrificed the body 
in maintaining their ideal of spiritual duty. Peter 
denying his Master as the cock crew is despicable ; 
Peter suffering martyrdom is heroically divine ! 

The Great Master Himself, when the money ven- 
dors desecrated the temple, did not smile upon them. 
He grabbed the whips and lashed them and drove 
them out of the temple. Later, He willingly suf- 
fered the most ignominious physical death rather 
than accept the ''peace-at-any-price" easier way of 
Roman materialism. 

Is not His example a fit one to follow ? 

QUOTATION REFERENCES 

^ Page 451. I. S. Block, in "The Future of War." 
2 Page 451. Dr. David Starr Jordan, in "War and 
Waste," 1913. 



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